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The hand of compassion was faster  
than the calculus of reason
Otto Springer (in Monroe, 2006)
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Jessica Rijpstra, Lucie van Schendel and Zarah Glaap, although the work itself was not exactly 
inspirational, I hope you realise that your contribution to the PDI-database has been very 
significant to the start-up of this study. 
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Without the valuable (financial) support of Wilde Ganzen, Oxfam Novib, Cordaid and NCDO 
this research would not have been possible. Thank you for the confidence you have placed in me. 
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Chapter 01
1. Introduction
 ‘So we went on a wonderful safari. […] And there [when visiting an orphanage] we were really 
shocked; the showers were so dirty. Yeah, that really impressed us. And then we went on to the coast 
and at a certain moment we said to each other “We should do something about this”. Back in the 
Netherlands, we looked at the pictures again and thought, “Can’t we collect some money, so they can 
renovate those showers?”’ […].1
  [Male, 35-45; supermarket manager] 
[Official registration foundation 2009; opening boys department 2008; budget: 20,000 euro]
‘We always had it in mind to do something in a developing country. And when we went to the 
notary to register our company, we said to each other, “Actually, this is the moment we’ve been talking 
about it for years, now we are going to do it”. So that is when we really started. We already had 
contact with a hospital in […]. When we were talking with the doctor he said, “I have big plans for 
this hospital. I want to extend it. And therefore I need many things. And one of the first things I want 
is a kitchen for the patients”.  So that was actually our first project.’
  [Female, 45-55; journalist] 
[Official registration foundation 2007; opening of a kitchen 2009; budget: 40,000 euro]
‘The death of my daughter was the reason we started our foundation. She became ill; we went to 
the hospital where she was taken care of by Professor […]. He told me about the situation regarding 
child cancer in […]. He told me that he met a boy with leukaemia, whose parents had no money to 
pay for the treatment. I said to him, “Why didn’t you tell me this before, then I would have arranged 
something so the treatment can be continued”. […] Then, as a family, we started a foundation.’
 [Male, 65-70; pensioner]
  [Official registration foundation 2001; improving children’s cancer 
department 1991; budget: 6,000 euro]
1  The quotes are derived from interviews with founders/members of  private development initiatives  
(see Chapter 5). The data are available on request.
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1.1 Motivation and research question
The two decades since the mid-1990s have marked a worldwide trend of alternative players 
joining the traditional actors in the field of international development cooperation. Apart 
from well-known multilateral and civilateral agencies such as the United Nations and Oxfam 
International and, at the bilateral level, national governments, a wide variety of individuals and 
organisations have started to look for opportunities to join the struggle against worldwide poverty 
and inequality. For different reasons, celebrities, private foundations, companies and ordinary 
citizens have increasingly become active players in the field of international aid (Bishop & Green, 
2008; Cameron & Haanstra, 2008; Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009; Samman et al., 2009; Yrjölä, 
2009). Madonna is building schools in Malawi, Bono is addressing members of the G8 and G20, 
Nestlé helps farmers to grow coffee in China and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation spends 
around 800 million US dollars annually on global health. This present study focuses on the ‘next-
door Madonnas and Bonos’ of today. These are the thousands of ordinary individuals that actively 
engage in the fight against poverty by starting their own small-scale, voluntary development 
organisation independent of direct government support. From here on we refer to them as private 
development initiatives (PDIs). 
Our site of study is the Netherlands, one of the forerunners in the field of international 
development cooperation. Although PDIs are not unique to the Netherlands, as far as we are 
concerned, apart from a number of studies in Belgium, the Netherlands is one of the few countries 
where PDIs have been studied for several years (see Develtere & Stessens, 2006; Develtere & De 
Bruyn, 2009; De Bruyn, 2013; Godin, 2013 for studies on PDIs in Belgium). Apart from the 
fact that it is valuable per se to build on the results of these earlier studies, the Netherlands is an 
interesting site of study because it is known for its generous (private and government) donations 
to charitable causes in general and to international development cooperation in particular 
(Micklewright & Wright, 2004; OECD, 2012; Schuyt et al., 2013; WRR, 2010). International 
development organisations received 281 million euro from Dutch households in 2011, making 
international development cooperation – next to faith-based organisations and health care – 
the third largest charitable cause in the Netherlands (Bekkers & de Wit, 2013). To date, the 
Netherlands is one of the few countries to honour the agreement to contribute 0.7 per cent of 
its Gross National Product to official development aid (OECD, 2012).2 The diversification of 
actors within the field of international development cooperation has been very pronounced in the 
Netherlands. There is a growing number and diversity of actors in the Dutch field of international 
development cooperation (IS Academie NGO Database), a third reason why the Netherlands 
is an interesting case study. In the 1990s, there were just over 100 Dutch non-governmental 
development organisations (NGOs), one of the important development actors in the Netherlands. 
Within ten years this number has almost doubled (IS Academie NGO database; Schulpen et al., 
2011). Similarly, there is a large number of PDIs in the Netherlands (Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005; 
van Voorst, 2005). 
A final reason why we choose the Netherlands as our site of study is that political and public 
debate on international development cooperation and development organisations has been manifest 
for many years (Beerends, 2013; Ruyter, 2011; WRR, 2010). Political parties debate on a regular 
basis whether or not the Netherlands should continue to commit to the agreement to spend 
0.7 per cent of its GDP on development cooperation and the appropriate actors to spend this 
budget on [see Parliamentary questions and answers: Minbuza, June 14, 2013; Minbuza, June 24, 
2013, Minbuza, October 29, 2013 for examples]. Public debate continues on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of development organisations in general and PDIs in particular (see Bodelier & Vossen, 
2007; Coumans et al., 2013; Halsema, 2013; Koch, 2007; Weisglas, 2012).
2   In the most recent coalition agreement the Dutch government announced a reduction in the contribution 
to international development cooperation to approximately 0.5 per cent of  the GNP  (Regeerakkoord, 
2012).
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In the Netherlands, the estimated number of PDIs varies from 6.400 to 15.000 (Brok & 
Bouzoubaa, 2005; van Voorst, 2005).3 Development cooperation is not something exclusively 
done by the government, established development organisations or multilateral organisations, 
being decided upon only by professionals (i.e. trained paid staff) working in buildings or offices 
of established organisations. Development projects and fundraising plans are designed in living 
rooms, churches or schools and executed on a voluntary basis by ‘ordinary citizens’. Development 
cooperation is becoming more and more the task ‘of all of us’, taking place in everyday life 
(Develtere, 2012). Stakeholders of PDIs, their private and institutional back-donors and the 
government have high expectations regarding the potential contributions that PDIs can offer in 
terms of local poverty reduction (in the South) and/or the strengthening of the domestic public 
support base for development cooperation (in the North) (Grotenhuis, 2012; Hivos, 2009; Man 
& van Hemert, 2006).4 PDIs are welcomed as an attractive alternative or as a complement to 
traditional development actors. This holds true not only for private donors; the Dutch government 
and established development organisations also see value in (supporting) PDIs. In 2011, Dutch 
households donated approximately 34 million euro to PDIs (Bekkers & de Wit, 2013).5 In the same 
year, the four largest development organisations that co-finance PDI development interventions 
(Oxfam Novib, Cordaid, Impulsis and Wilde Ganzen), provided nearly 10 million euro (CIDIN, 
NCDO & PI Wijzer, 2013). 
PDIs are founded for different motives, as illustrated in the examples with which we started this 
chapter. They are organised in multiple ways and support a diverse range of activities in developing 
countries. We can see the results of their efforts in the pictures shown on their websites, in their 
leaflets and in other communications. Schools and orphanages have been built or renovated, micro-
credit programmes launched and after-school programmes initiated. The accomplished results 
shown on the many pictures are appealing to (potential) donors: the results are visible (e.g. a school 
has been built) and the effects are clear (e.g. children can finish primary school). But what are the 
stories behind all these pictures? In this study we aim to provide a more detailed insight into the 
characteristics of PDIs, the driving forces and the individual motives for citizen engagement in PDIs 
and how the development interventions that PDIs undertake can be characterised and valued with 
respect to their potential sustainability. Each of the next four chapters presents a story behind the 
pictures; stories regarding the organisations (their foundation and structure), their members (their 
characteristics and motivations), their donors (their preferences and giving behaviour) and their 
interventions (type, sustainability). Studying PDIs from different perspectives and with different 
research methods results in a broad and in-depth insight into PDIs as alternative development 
actors. The central research question is:
Which factors shape the nature of private development initiatives and influence the 
sustainability of their development interventions?
The emergence of alternative actors in the field of international development cooperation is not 
an isolated development (see Section 1.2). Different (public) sectors are faced with similar trends 
resulting in a debate at the macro level (society) on the significance of these agents. There is a broad 
range of studies available on the (rise of ) informal citizen initiatives (Hurenkamp et al., 2006; van 
den Berg et al., 2011; van den Berg & de Goede, 2012; van den Brink, 2012). Generally, these 
studies take a rather broad sociological perspective, addressing questions related to the meaning 
and value of such initiatives for societies as a whole and their meaning for individual participants. 
An important issue relates to the question whether participation in informal groups is at the 
3   Caution is required when using these numbers, since not only is the margin between these estimates 
considerable but it is also unclear which definition of  PDIs was used. 
4  This thesis will not explicitly discuss the role of  PDIs regarding the strengthening or enlarging  
of  public support for development cooperation.
5  In 2011 there were in total 7,443,801 households in the Netherlands, each donating on average 57 euro 
(7,443,801* 8%) * 57 euro  = 33,943,732.56  euro (www.statline.cbs.nl). 
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expense of participation in formal, institutionalised groups, and how these informal groups relate 
to the established order such as the government and (professionals of ) official institutions. These 
studies are hence mainly concerned with analysing the phenomenon in order to interpret actual 
societal developments and to understand their meaning for societal change. They do not, or only 
to a limited extent, discuss the actual contributions offered by these private initiatives to the wider 
public interest.
At the meso level (i.e. the sector of international development cooperation) PDIs are part of 
the debate on the structure of the aid industry. PDIs emerge as alternative agents in the field 
of international development cooperation and sometimes challenge other, more traditional, aid 
organisations. The question arises as to what we might expect of these ‘unusual suspects’. Should 
traditional development agents, such as governments, NGOs and multilateral organisations 
embrace PDIs that enter the development arena for their practical approach, is it proper to have 
high expectations of private foundations because of the resources they have at their disposal and 
their alleged independence and (why) should governments financially support, for example, 
PDIs? Without ignoring the debate at the macro and meso level, this thesis specifically adopts a 
micro perspective and studies in the first place the actor itself and its role as a development actor. 
1.2 The rise of private development initiatives 
Before we start with the empirical chapters, as an introduction to the more detailed micro-level 
study, we will shed light on the macro context in which PDIs emerge. The process of socialisation 
of development cooperation and the rise of PDIs are not isolated developments. Similar 
developments can be observed in different (public) sectors. In 2008, 3.5 million people in the 
Netherlands spent part of their time taking care of a family member, relative or neighbour; an 
increasing number of parents is organising their own daycare centre and currently around 154 
local voluntary initiatives are providing transport for vulnerable groups (KpVV, 2013; Oudijk et 
al., 2010). Little by little, the social welfare state, where the government takes care of its citizens 
from ‘cradle to grave’, is transformed into a ‘do-democracy’ (WRR, 2006; WRR, 2012). Ordinary 
citizens are increasingly taking an active role in areas previously taken care of by the government 
(Hurenkamp et al., 2006; Veldheer et al., 2012). This development is referred to as ‘socialisation’ 
or ‘mainstreaming’ (Develtere, 2009; Develtere, 2012).
Socialisation is the result of both push and pull factors (Veldheer et al., 2012). On the one 
hand, the government makes an increasing appeal to its citizens to assume responsibility for areas 
formerly taken care of by the state, such as health care (push factor). This can be motivated either 
by economic drivers in times of economic recession or from a more ideological perspective. On 
the other hand, in this do-democracy citizens, for different reasons, clamour for more ‘room to 
manoeuvre’, starting for example a daycare centre with a group of like-minded parents (pull factor). 
In general, this ‘do-it-yourself ’ attitude is transforming the way in which society is organised and 
the relationship between the government, the market and citizens. In particular, it influences 
the organisation of the provision of certain services. In this section we discuss the – sometimes – 
interrelated driving forces that underlie the process of socialisation in general and the socialisation 
of international development cooperation specifically. The reform of the social welfare state is 
discussed as an important push factor, followed by individualisation that is considered as an 
influential pull factor. 
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1.2.1 From social welfare state to ‘do-democracy’
Whereas in the nineteenth century governments were mainly concerned with regulating ‘law and 
order’, in the twentieth century, they shifted their attention to creating welfare and providing 
basic care for their citizens (Arts, 2004). These provisions were previously non-existent or made 
within the family context, by religious charity institutions or by the market. It was the process of 
modernisation that increased governments’ concern with the efficiency, effectiveness, calculability 
and structured planning of society. This made the organisation of social welfare thus far, in mainly 
local, informal settings, no longer appropriate (Arts, 2004). Governments thus started organising 
and institutionalising a broad package of social security measures to protect the public against 
social and economic deprivation from ‘cradle to grave’. This marked the transformation of most 
Western societies to social welfare states.
Because of the increasing financial and administrative pressure which the welfare state exerts on 
government expenditure and the capacity of implementing organisations, from the early 1970s 
onwards the notion grew that governments rather than creating prosperous and careful societies 
can no more than stimulate and steer these types of societies. The role of government started to 
change from that of a ‘parent protecting its children’ into a ‘guarantee state providing a shield for 
the weaker in the society’ (Arts, 2004: 1). As a consequence, governments started to withdraw 
from welfare tasks and more than ever before citizens had to assume responsibility for preventing 
or curing social or economic deprivation. Giddens (1994, 1998) refers to this process as the 
transformation of the welfare state into the ‘welfare-society’. In this society, citizens are no longer 
exclusively dependent on (semi)governmental institutions for their (social) well-being but rely on 
their own efforts or the activities of the private, civically organised sector. Governments increasingly 
see a role for the market and for civil society actors as key providers of (social and communal) 
services.
1.2.2 Individualisation
The transformation of the provision of social services is not only instigated by a changed approach 
by governments. The reform of the welfare state is accompanied by processes of individualisation 
characterising many Western societies today (Schnabel, 2004; van Praag & Uitterhoeve, 1998). 
Individualisation is considered as the process of a growing autonomy of the individual in relation 
to its direct environment (Veldheer & Bijl, 2011: 29). Also, in the Netherlands, increasingly 
citizens see themselves as designers and executers of their own life, making choices themselves (van 
der Velden, 2007: 6; Schnabel, 2004: 53). Until the 1960s, associational life in the Netherlands 
was organised around a strongly pillarised civil society. With the de-pillarisation of Dutch society 
in the 1960s, a breakdown of traditional associational life became manifest (Dekker & Ester, 
1996; WRR, 2006). Individual people wanted to decide independently with whom and how they 
preferred to connect. A rising level of education enabled them to adopt a more critical attitude 
towards government services and made them capable of individual action (Veldheer & Bijl, 
2011). 
There are different views regarding the effect this process of individualisation has on the welfare 
state (van den Berg et al., 2011). One group of scholars considers the process of individualisation 
as a threat to further development of the welfare state. They fear that individualisation will break 
down the principle of solidarity, which is considered to be a crucial precondition for the persistence 
of the welfare state and they wonder whether citizens today should be seen as ‘joiners’ (members 
of civil society organisations) or ‘loners’ (individualists) (Putnam, 2000). Others see positive 
influences stemming from increasing individualisation (van Oorschot & Komter, 1998; WRR, 
2006; Wuthnow, 2002). Van Oorschot and Komter (1998) conclude that with the diminishing 
influence of traditional ties (e.g. church, family) the process of individualisation offers opportunities 
for the establishment of new, more informal, networks of solidarity. According to these authors, 
individualisation should not be considered as ‘a threat to solidarity but as an opportunity for it and 
even as a prerequisite for the functioning and viability of complex modern societies’ (van Oorschot 
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& Komter, 1998: 5). In line with this reasoning, it is the process of individualisation that enables 
citizen initiatives to be established.
In summary, it can be concluded that although on the one hand government no longer solely 
wants to take full care of the well-being of its citizens (reform of the welfare state), on the other 
hand the citizens no longer want to be taken care of by the government (individualisation). 
The combination of these developments triggers the overall process of ‘socialisation’, resulting 
in a large number of citizen initiatives in a broad range of public fields such as education, 
health care, elderly care and, the focus of this thesis, international development cooperation. 
1.2.3 Socialisation of international development cooperation
How do these broad societal tendencies rearrange the field of international development 
cooperation? And what sector-specific drivers are bringing about a changed playing field in 
international development cooperation? Van der Velden (2007: 5) defines the socialisation of this 
domain as the process of ‘broadening and deepening of active involvement of people and groups in 
development cooperation’. In this socialisation process, two distinct phases can be distinguished: 
(1) the establishment of non-governmental development organisations (NGOs) and (2) the 
emergence of private development initiatives (PDIs). 
First wave of socialisation: the rise of ‘the big boys’ of today
Until the mid-1960s the multilateral aid channel was predominant in the Dutch aid system. Most 
Dutch governmental development aid was transferred through multilateral organisations such 
as the United Nations and the World Bank. This changed when the Dutch government started 
to channel aid budgets directly to governments and development organisations in developing 
countries. The bilateral aid channel gained in importance (Hoebink, 2010). At that time, there 
was also a first upsurge of  non-governmental development organisations (Beerends & Broere, 
2004; Bieckmans & Muskens, 2012; WRR, 2010). Ordinary citizens felt themselves called to take 
action against the political, social or economic deprivation of  people in developing countries and 
started to organise themselves (pull factor). It was at this time that the large-scale development 
organisations of  today, such as Oxfam Novib, Hivos and ICCO, were established. This resulted in a 
growing third aid channel, the civilateral channel, through which financial support was transferred 
from the Dutch development organisations to local development organisations in developing 
countries. In 1964 for the first time the Dutch government started to financially support some of  
these civil society organisations (push factor). It did so in response to a growing call for financial 
support by these development organisations. There was also growing willingness to support these 
organisations since high expectations were held of  these civil society organisations because of  
their presumed competitive advantage compared with multilateral or bilateral development aid 
actors (Banks & Hulme, 2012; Bebbington et al., 2007; Brodhead, 1987; Drabek, 1987; Dichter, 
1999). In subsequent years the available budget for this civilateral aid channel increased from 5 
million Guilders (6 per cent of  Dutch Official Development Aid (ODA)) in 1965 to around 1 
billion euro (23 per cent of  Dutch ODA) in 2010.6 The receiving organisations at the same time 
transformed themselves from small-scale voluntary support groups to large-scale, professional 
development organisations (Hoebink, 2010). 
6  Today, 5 million Guilders would be worth 2,268,901.08 euro.  
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Second wave of socialisation: ‘your next-door Madonnas and Bonos’
Starting from the 1990s two interlinked sector-specific developments fostered a second wave of 
socialisation in development cooperation that still continues today. In it, the general process of 
globalisation functions as a major push factor. The ‘shrinking of the world’ thanks to mass media, 
the Internet and more accessible travel opportunities has made a rapidly growing number of 
people aware of the poor living conditions of fellow world citizens (Bauman, 1998; Held, 2000). 
This process is accelerated through the development and accessibility of new information and 
communication technologies (Veldheer & Bijl, 2011). More people go on long-distance holidays 
or work temporarily in a foreign branch of their company (NBTC-NIPO, 2008; PwC, 2010). 
These journeys form an important source of direct encounters between people living in (often) 
very different circumstances, encounters that turn out to be of great influence on the decision 
to offer an active contribution to the improvement of living conditions of people in developing 
countries by starting one’s own development organisation (see the examples above). The process 
of globalisation in a strongly individualised society triggers citizen initiatives in the field of 
international development cooperation and can hence be seen as an important push factor for the 
socialisation of this field.
At the same time, traditional established development organisations (NGOs) originating 
from the first socialisation wave offer few opportunities to those individuals who feel urged to 
actively contribute to the fight against inequality, poverty and exclusion. The principles of new 
public management (NPM) have penetrated many organisations of the public sector since the 
1980s. The premise of NPM is that ‘more market orientation in the public sector through the 
adoption of managerialist ideas and practices will lead to better performance’ (Elbers, 2011: 
122). The co-financing system through which the Dutch government co-finances part of the 
established development organisations offers possibilities to impose principles of the NPM on civic 
development organisations as well, resulting in the profound formalisation and bureaucratisation of 
these organisations (Elbers, 2011). This transformed them from classic ‘secondary’ organisations, 
characterised by a democratic structure and a membership base, into more centralised ‘tertiary’ 
organisations (Dekker et al., 2004; Hustinx et al., 2013; Putnam, 1995 & 2000; Wuthnow, 1998). 
Many development NGOs turned into mailing-list organisations with often no more than a role as 
cheque-book activists (donors) reserved for their supporters (Putnam, 2000; Hustinx et al., 2013; 
van den Berg & de Goede, 2012). This type of organisation offers little room for citizens who are 
motivated to make a more extensive, active contribution to development cooperation. Established 
development organisations have outgrown their position as grassroots organisations ‘by the people’ 
(here), ‘for the people’ (there). It is therefore no matter of course that those people who today want 
to become actively engaged in the field of international development cooperation automatically 
approach and/or link up with those (organisations) that are already active players in the field. Some 
of these individuals start their own, small-scale, voluntary development organisation, commonly 
referred to as private development initiatives (PDI). 
From the late 1990s onwards, the Dutch government has been supporting and facilitating the 
process of (second wave) socialisation in the field of international development cooperation (= push 
factor). In 1991, the Minister for Development Cooperation, Jan Pronk, started to facilitate small-
scale development initiatives by introducing the ‘Kleinschalige Plaatselijke Activiteit’ (Small-scale 
Local Activity) programme. From the very start, the approach of the government has, however, been 
rather instrumental. Although the contribution to poverty reduction by citizen initiatives is not 
ignored, the main concern of the government is to increase the public support base for development 
cooperation through co-funding of these initiatives (Beerends & Broere, 2004). Since the beginning 
of 2000 the financing opportunities have substantially increased. At the request of Minister Eveline 
Herfkens (1998-2002) the established development organisations that received financial support 
from the ministry through the so-called Medefinancieringsstelsel (co-financing system) established 
a ‘finance desk’ where small-scale development initiatives of Dutch citizens could receive advice 
and financial support. Her successor, Agnes van Ardenne (2003-07) stated that individuals should 
take up more responsibilities in the field of international development cooperation (van der Velden, 
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2007). The policy framework of the next minister, Bert Koenders (2007-10), explicitly referred 
to socialisation as a goal of its co-financing programme for 2007 to 2010 (Minbuza, 2005). Even 
though in recent years the possibilities of established development organisations supporting PDIs 
with government money have been strongly restricted, State Secretary Ben Knapen (2010-12) and 
Minister Lilianne Ploumen (2012 onwards) continued to express their support for the work of 
PDIs (Knapen, 2012; Minbuza, 2013).
The reform of the welfare state combined with processes of individualisation and globalisation 
triggered the second wave of socialisation in the field of international development cooperation. 
The process resulted in a growing number of ‘unusual suspects’ active in the field of international 
development cooperation (Beerends & Broere, 2004; van der Velden, 2007). This thesis focuses 
on PDIs as a product of this second socialisation wave, and tries to understand more specifically 
the rationale, role and potential of these small-scale voluntary citizen initiatives as players in the 
field of international development cooperation.
1.3 Analytical approach and sub-questions 
Since 2005, PDIs have been at the centre of  the Dutch debate on alternative development 
actors. Supporters believe in their efficient and effective contribution to poverty reduction, in 
their potential to enlarge the public support for development cooperation and in their ability to 
restore the ‘human face’ of  international development cooperation (Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009; 
Grotenhuis, 2012; Hart & van der Velden, 2010; Hivos, 2009; Schuil, 2010). Critics on the other 
hand sometimes doubt PDIs’ professionalism and expect them to step into the same pitfalls as 
the established development actors did (van Genugten, 2013; Koch, 2007). Studies contributing 
to this debate have mainly studied PDIs from a micro or actor perspective: the organisations and 
their members are central to the analysis.7 Within this micro perspective, three questions have 
been dominant in the field: 
What are PDIs?  Identifying distinguishing features of  PDIs (Brok & Bouzoubaa,  
                                        2005; Develtere & Stessens, 2006);
What do PDIs do? Typifying the activities that PDIs initiate and/or support in the  
                                        Netherlands and/or developing countries (Schulpen, 2007);
How do PDIs do it? Evaluating the activities initiated and/or supported by PDIs in the  
                                Netherlands or in developing countries (Chelladurai, 2006;  
                                        De Bruyn, 2011, Schulpen, 2007; van der Velden, 2011).
By posing these questions, earlier studies provided interesting first insights into, among other 
things, the organisational characteristics of PDIs and some valuable lessons have been learned 
regarding their contribution to the process of development (see Chelladurai, 2006; De Bruyn, 
2011; Kinsbergen, 2007; Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; Schulpen, 2007; van den Berg & de 
Goede, 2012; van der Velden, 2011). Studies remained mainly in the explorative, descriptive 
sphere, however, and mostly addressed specific aspects of PDI organisation or performance. As a 
consequence, the insights gained so far have not been fully exploited for a more comprehensive 
understanding of PDIs as alternative development actor since the answers to these different 
questions have not – or only to a very limited extent – been related to each another. For example, 
7  The term ‘members’ refers to those individuals who on a regular basis, either voluntary or paid,  
are actively involved in PDIs.
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studies on the characteristics of PDIs demonstrate that the majority of PDIs are run only by 
volunteers or that they have relatively small annual budgets. The question remains: what does this 
mean for the functioning of the organisation and for the interventions it supports in developing 
countries? In addition, studies have presented a rather uniform picture of PDIs, paying little 
attention to the diversity that can be found within the group. This limits our understanding of 
PDIs as development agents, since empirical data show that – whereas PDIs have some basic 
features in common – they vary widely regarding their organisational structure, their intervention 
types and their intervention manners. All this results in a one-dimensional, uniform understanding 
of PDIs.
This study distinguishes itself from earlier PDI studies because of the selected analytical approach. 
This approach is based on two key principles: (1) integrated analysis and (2) contextualised analysis. 
The first premise implies that in order to analyse PDIs comprehensively, it is not sufficient to study 
different aspects of PDIs separately as we need to understand the linkages between ‘what they are’, 
‘what they do’ and ‘how they do it’. Understanding this link is fundamental to our understanding 
of PDIs in general and as alternative development actor in particular, as can be illustrated by the 
case of established development organisations of today, such as Oxfam or Save the Children. For 
a long time, expectations of these organisations were high because of their different nature.  For 
example, their smaller operational scale and their (financial) independence from governments 
made them more flexible, and this was expected to favour their engagement with grassroots target 
groups, i.e. provision of bottom-up support and facilitating different types of (more politicised) 
activities or organisations. In the same manner, the growth and increased professionalisation and 
bureaucratisation characterising many of these NGOs are seen as compromising their alleged 
comparative advantage as alternative development actor (Banks & Hulme, 2012; Bebbington et 
al., 2007; Brodhead, 1987; Drabek, 1987; Dichter, 1999). It has become increasingly clear in this 
discussion that answers to the questions ‘how NGOs are organised’, ‘what they are doing’ and 
‘how they are doing it’ are strongly related and therefore necessary components of the study and 
debate on understanding NGOs as development actors. The case of NGOs shows that in order 
to understand PDIs as an alternative development actor and to assess their potential contribution 
to poverty reduction, it is crucial to analyse in an integrated manner the different structural and 
behavioural aspects of PDI organisations, their members and their operations.
The second premise is that in order to understand PDIs it is necessary not only to study the 
actor itself (i.e. the organisations and their members) but also to take into account the broader 
environment wherein PDIs are positioned and how this environment (e.g. back-donors, other 
development actors, local governments and communities) responds to PDIs. PDIs do not function 
in a vacuum, but are surrounded by several actors and these contextual developments influence 
PDI activities and performance. An understanding of PDIs as development actor starts by 
analysing them in all their diversity, but also requires a detailed study of the social, institutional 
and governance environment wherein PDIs deploy their activities.8
Studies so far give a number of pieces of the puzzle, but limit our understanding of the whole, 
thus making it hard to understand and value PDIs as development actor to their full extent. 
Insights into their structure, activities and working method are valuable and necessary in order, 
but to appreciate their added value we need to relate these aspects to each other.  This thesis will 
contribute to the micro debate by presenting a comprehensive insight into and understanding of 
PDIs, their members and their activities.
As a result of these two premises, instead of contributing to the understanding of PDIs by adding 
one piece of the puzzle, this thesis analyses different aspects of PDIs in a coherent way, focusing on 
the relations between the voluntary structure of PDIs and their function as development actors. 
In analytical terms, this motivated to employ the structure-conduct-performance framework as 
an overarching integrative approach to understanding of the interactions between these questions 
(Bain, 1956; Mason, 1939; McWilliams & Smart, 1993). The principal assumption of the SCP 
8  Although the context of  developing countries wherein PDIs are operating is not ignored (see Chapter 5), 
here we especially refer to the Dutch context wherein PDIs are operating.
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paradigm is that the performance of a sector is a function of the conduct of agents involved, which 
– in turn – is influenced by the structure of the sector (McWilliams & Smart, 1993: 64). In other 
words, in order to understand a particular sector and its internal performance, it is necessary to look 
at how the sector and its constituent parts (the individual participating actors) are organised and 
characterised (structure), what they are doing (conduct) and how they are doing it. In addition, as 
regards the interplay of these three aspects, key attention is given to the interfaces, e.g. the influence 
of actor motives on activity choice.  This approach is applied as an overarching framework in 
the study, where each of the four central chapters addresses specific aspects of the PDI structure, 
conduct and performance and tries to unravel in conjunction the (mutual) interactions between 
them. Figure 1.1 gives an overview of the linkages between the research issues.
 
Preformance
How do PDI’s do it?
Structure
What are PDI’s?
Conduct
What do PDI’s do?
What do (potentional) donors do?
Societal,  
institutional  
and governance 
context
Figure 1.1 Analytical framework
Starting with our analytical approach, we distinguish four sub-questions to answer our central 
research question:
Chapter 2:  What drives the start of PDIs and what characterises PDIs, their members and their 
activities?
Chapter 3:  What determines time investment of PDI volunteers?
Chapter 4:  How do characteristics of development organisations influence the decision making 
of potential donors?
Chapter 5:  What determines the sustainability of PDI interventions? 
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In Chapter 2, the structure of the PDIs is central, although attention is also paid to the conduct 
and performance of PDIs. We analyse the distinguishing features of PDIs, their establishment 
motives and the internal management of PDI organisations. The specificity of PDIs relative to 
other development actors as well as the wide diversity within the group of PDIs is identified. 
These insights form the starting-point for subsequent chapters. It allows us later in the analysis 
to see if and how organisational features affect the type of activities PDIs undertake. Moreover, 
we discuss here the position of PDIs in Dutch society and the field of international development 
cooperation. 
In Chapter 3, the conduct of PDI volunteers is studied. The structure of PDIs and their volunteers 
are included in the analysis as explanatory factors for the time investment of PDI volunteers. In 
this analysis we look at how financial and time restrictions of PDI volunteers influence their time 
investment. In addition, key behavioural aspects that are likely to influence the expected benefits of 
volunteering, such as the perceived distance between volunteers and beneficiaries and attitudes of 
volunteers towards development organisations, are examined. By studying one of the basic features 
of PDIs (i.e. their voluntary character), we can gain insight into if and how the specificity of PDIs 
affects their role as development actors. The innovative feature of this analysis is that volunteers’ 
time investment is explained by looking not only at the supply side (i.e. considerations by the 
volunteer) but also at the demand side: the extent to which characteristics of PDIs (e.g. budget) 
affect time and resource investments of volunteers and ultimately also influence the ways in which 
PDIs operate in the field. 
In order to understand PDIs as development actor it is not sufficient to study the conduct of PDI 
members since PDIs cannot exist only by grace of their members’ efforts. PDIs are also strongly 
dependent on the conduct of private donors.9 Therefore, in a similar vein to Chapter 3, Chapter 4 
looks at the giving behaviour of potential private donors to development organisations. We analyse 
to what extent characteristics of development organisations affect the decisions of (potential) donors 
to donate money. The conduct of (potential) donors is hence studied in relation to the structure 
of PDIs. Consequently, the understanding of (the rise of ) PDIs becomes more comprehensive 
by including how (potential) donors respond to the structure of PDIs compared with features of 
other development actors. 
In the fifth and final chapter, the performance of PDIs in developing countries is analysed in the 
light of their (potential) sustainability. By outlining how PDIs intervene in developing countries 
and the type of activities they undertake, an effort is made to typify the potential sustainability of 
PDIs’ intervention strategies based on a detailed multi-criteria classification of PDI interventions. 
To gain insight into the diversity of PDIs and their interventions, the conduct and performance of 
PDIs is thus related to their organisational structure. This finally allows us to present a classification 
of PDI field interventions in the light of their potential sustainability.  
The concluding chapter presents a summary of the results based on a combined analysis of the 
structure, conduct and performance of PDIs. We summarise the key findings and focus on the 
linkages between what PDIs are, what they do and how they operate and perform.
1.4 Mixed methods 
In order to answer the central research question and the four sub-questions a mixture of (different 
types of ) data has been collected and several analytical approaches are applied. Both qualitative 
and quantitative data and analytical methods are used to address the research objective. 
Because of the novelty of this field of research, there were no data available allowing us to study 
the structure of individual PDIs and PDIs as a group (Chapter 2) and the time investment of their 
volunteers (Chapter 3). A survey was selected as the most appropriate research method to collect 
the required data. Therefore, in 2008-2009 a standardised electronic survey was conducted among 
a large group of PDIs and their members. 
9  If  not mentioned differently, donors refers to private contributors and hence excludes institutional 
donors.
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This resulted in a unique dataset, the CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009. The survey gathered 
information both on the characteristics of nearly 900 organisations and on the background and 
motives of their members. Further details are provided in Chapters 2 and 3.
The third sub-question required detailed insight into giving behaviour and preferences of 
potential donors regarding a wide variety of development organisations. To obtain the required 
data we complemented the basic questionnaire of the fifth edition of the large-scale Family Survey 
of the Dutch Population (FSDP; Kraaykamp et al., 2009) with a selection of questions on attitudes 
regarding international development cooperation and development organisations. In addition we 
designed a factorial survey experiment that was included in the FSDP to gain insight into how 
organisational characteristics affect the giving behaviour of potential donors. 
To answer the final sub-question a theoretically based analytical framework was designed to 
classify PDIs based on their potential sustainability. This framework has been applied in 49 different 
PDI interventions. By means of semi-structured interviews with PDI members in the Netherlands 
and their partners in Kenya and Indonesia qualitative data were collected. To gain an adequate 
insight into the intervention strategy of the PDI and its partner, the type of (and decisions about) 
PDI-supported interventions and the character of the implementation process were extensively 
addressed during the interviews. In addition, the roles of the different stakeholders (local partner, 
beneficiaries and the broader network) during the design and implementation of the intervention 
were raised as topics. 
1.5 Thesis outline
This thesis is composed of four empirical chapters, each answering one of the sub-questions. 
These four chapters are preceded by this introductory chapter and are followed by a concluding 
chapter. Each chapter is based on an article published in or under review of a peer-reviewed 
scientific journal and can be read separately from the other chapters. The combination of the 
findings from the four chapters provides insights into the main research question. The structure 
of this thesis is summarised in Table 1.1
48
Table 1.1 Structure of  the thesis
Chapter
Research  
Question
Structure-
Conduct-  
Performance Methodology Data
Chapter 2 What drives the 
start of PDIs and 
what character-
ises PDIs, their 
members and their 
activities?
Structure Qualitative: 
literature review 
Quantitative: 
descriptive 
statistics
CIDIN-PDI 
Database  
2008-2009a
Chapter 3 What determines 
time investment of 
PDI volunteers?
Conduct Quantitative: 
multivariate (Pois-
son) regression 
techniques
CIDIN-PDI 
Database  
2008-2009a
Chapter 4 How do 
characteristics 
of development 
organisations 
influence the 
decision making of 
potential donors?
Conduct Quantitative /
factorial survey 
experiment: cross-
classified multilevel 
models
Family Survey 
Dutch  
Population 2009b
Chapter 5 What determines 
the sustainability 
of PDI interven-
tions?
Performance Qualitative: 
semi-structured 
interviews
Field research in 
the Netherlands 
and in Kenya/
Indonesia  
2010-2011c
a Data are available on request from the author
b Data are deposited at the electronic filing system DANS 
c Data are available on request from the author
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2. From tourist to development worker.  
Private development initiatives in the Netherlands1
‘It crossed my path. They asked me for help and I said yes, and then you’re stuck with Kenya. 
And now I’m addicted to Africa.’
 Interview PDI founder2
1  A slightly different version of  this chapter is published in The Netherlands Yearbook on International 
Cooperation (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011) and in Mondes en Développement (Kinsbergen & 
Schulpen, 2013). The results were included in a public report (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2010).
2  The quote is derived from an interview with a founder of  a Private Development Initiative  
(see Chapter 5). The data are available on request.
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Abstract
This chapter describes and analyses the rise of small-scale, voluntary development organisations 
(private development initiatives, PDI) in the Netherlands. The concept of PDI is disentangled 
and this alternative development actor is positioned in the ‘philanteral aid channel’. Using data 
of almost 900 PDIs, the characteristics of the organisations, their founders and members are 
presented. Furthermore, we describe the support they offer to developing countries and shed a 
light on their involvement in development cooperation. 
Keywords: Private Development Initiatives; development cooperation; sustainability
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2.1 Introduction
Traditionally, as in other donor countries, three aid channels are distinguished in the Netherlands. 
Slightly less than 25 per cent of the total government budget for development cooperation runs 
through multilateral organisations like the UN and development banks. Around 30 per cent is 
routed through the bilateral channel directly by the Dutch government (including aid for private 
sector development). The remaining 25 per cent is disbursed via the civilateral channel. Although 
this includes direct funding of southern Nongovernmental Development Organisations (NGOs) 
by Dutch embassies, the largest part of civilateral aid funds go through Dutch NGOs (www.
minbuza.nl). With this, the Netherlands is one of the biggest NGO-funders (Pratt et al., 2006). 
Actors in these three channels are seen as ‘traditional donors’ in the sense that they find ‘their 
raison d’être in international development co-operation’ and they essentially form ‘one community 
[…] with a domain-specific set of values and norms, codes of conduct, and their own discourse and 
vocabulary’ (Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009: 913). In recent years, these traditional actors receive 
increasing ‘competition’ from an onrush of alternative development actors in the Netherlands which 
here are grouped together under a fourth channel called the Philanteral aid channel. Within that 
Philanteral channel, we zoom in on one vast group of alternative development actors that is central 
to the Dutch debate of diversification: Private Development Initiatives (PDIs). This contribution is 
an introduction to PDIs in the Netherlands. The study presented in this chapter started to enlarge 
our understanding of (the rise of ) PDIs as development actors, positioned in the Dutch society and 
field of international development cooperation. The central research question of this chapter reads: 
What drives the start of PDIs and what characterises PDIs, their members and their 
activities?
2.2 Data and methods
The main data presented in this contribution was collected in 2008-2009 from nearly 900 PDIs 
and their members (CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009). In 2008-2009 a standardised electronic 
survey has been conducted among PDIs in the Netherlands to get a thorough insight in the 
structure of individual PDIs and PDIs as a group. There is no national database in the Netherlands 
in which PDIs are registered. Therefore a list of 5,805 valid e-mail addresses of potential PDIs was 
made through an extensive web search and based on information provided by Dutch established 
large-scale development agencies (e.g. Oxfam Novib). These large-scale development agencies 
were or still are involved in co-funding of PDIs. 1,956 respondents started the web survey and of 
these respondents 1,238 completed the survey. Thereby a response of approximately 21 per cent 
was reached (100 * [1,238/5.805]). This is considered a fair response rate given that response 
rates for web surveys are in general between 20-30 per cent (Bernard, 2002). Of those 1,238, 
893 met the criteria of being a PDI (see Section 2.3.2).3 In the results section we discuss the 
representativeness of the sample.
The survey gathered information both on the respondents who filled in the questionnaire and 
on the organisations wherein they are active. The survey included a number of general questions 
on individual characteristics of the respondents and on their personal motivation for donating 
time and/or money. In addition, information was gathered on respondents’ attitude towards 
development cooperation and their views regarding development organisations. Moreover, insight 
was gained in the structure and activities of the PDIs in which they are active. In order to answer 
the central research question, the data of the survey is complemented with a meta-analysis of 
different qualitative and quantitative studies on PDIs carried out by variousre searchers in the 
period 2005-2011.4
3  Respondents required an average of  45 minutes to finish the survey. The length of  the survey explains 
the relative high number of  respondents who started the web survey but did not complete it.
4  The data are available on request.
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2.3 Private Development Initiatives in Perspective
2.3.1 The Philanteral aid channel
A driving force behind the diversification of the field of international development cooperation is 
the process of socialisation or mainstreaming. This refers to the adoption by social actors of tasks 
that previously belonged to the exclusive domain of, in the case of aid, traditional actors such as 
the government, NGOs and multilateral organisations (Develtere, 2009; De Bruyn & Huyse, 
2009; Schulpen, 2007; Develtere & Stessens, 2006; Develtere, 2012). More and more companies, 
‘philanthrocapitalists’, famous stars (or: celebrity humanitarians) and ‘ordinary’ individuals feel 
urged to actively contribute to the global fight against poverty (Severino & Ray, 2010; Develtere 
& De Bruyn, 2009; Samman et al., 2009; Yrjölä, 2009; Bishop & Green, 2008; Cameron & 
Haanstra, 2008). The most distinctive feature of these actors as compared to other development 
actors is the voluntary character: they undertake the activities in the field of development 
cooperation on a voluntary basis.  We therefore decided to group these actors under the heading of 
a separate, fourth channel of development actors, referred to as the philanteral aid channel (Figure 
2.1). The term philanteral refers to the definition of philanthropy as ‘contributing money, goods 
and/or time, voluntarily supplied by individuals and organisations (funds, companies, churches) 
mainly to support the aims of public advancement’ (Schuyt et al., 2009: 18). 
The diversity among the different actors within the Philanteral channel is large. Looking at 
their origin, an important distinction can be made between the actors in this channel. There is 
first of all a group of organisations for which development cooperation is not the main activity. 
In principle, this group contains all social organisations and institutes which are predominantly 
active in a field outside development cooperation and decide for various reasons to initiate some 
development cooperation activities as well (see also: Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005; Schulpen, 2007). 
Within this sub-group of the philanteral channel, we distinguish three different actors: (1) (semi) 
government services (e.g. police, fire brigade); (2) social, non-profit organisations (e.g. schools, 
hospitals, trade unions); and (3) organisations linked to business (e.g. water companies, banks).5 
Perhaps the most important feature of these institutional actors is that they, in principle, become 
involved in development cooperation based on their own expertise. Although there are certainly 
exceptions, fire departments work with other fire departments in developing countries, hospitals 
in the area of health and water companies focus their projects on development projects in water 
and sanitation. In other words, ‘starting from their own field (institutional structure) they develop 
development activities, often with similar organisations in the same sector in the South’ (De Bruyn 
& Huyse, 2009: 18). For the second group of organisations, development cooperation is their main 
task. They came into being in order to contribute to poverty reduction. Based on Schulpen (2007), 
we identify six types of actors within this second group: (1) political lobby groups, (2) fundraisers, 
(3) volunteers, (4) foundations, (5) individual supporters and (6) private development initiatives 
(Figure 2.1). While some of these groups consist of committed individuals (type 3, 5), others are 
organised citizens who want to contribute to development cooperation (type 1, 2, 4 and 6). Apart 
from that, some of these actors are involved in activities in the Netherlands, while others are (also) 
active in the developing countries themselves. 
5  Here one could also mention provinces, city councils or other local authorities although, in principle, 
they are part of  the governmental or bilateral channel. 
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Philanteral aid channel
Development cooperation is not 
main purpose
Development cooperation  
is main purpose
1. (Semi) government 1. Political lobby groups
2. Social institutions 2. Fundraisers
3. Companies 3. Volunteers
4. Foundations
5. Individual supporters
6. Private development initiatives
Figure 2.1 The philanteral aid channel – an initial classification
Source: based on Schulpen, 2007.
2.3.2 A Private Development Initiative
A PDI, the philanteral development actor central in this study, is defined as (1) a group of people 
who (2) give support in a direct way (3) to one or more developing countries. Accordingly, PDIs are 
not only active in the Netherlands and their task is not limited to (financially) supporting Dutch 
development organisations. They offer (4) structural support for organisations, communities or 
groups of people rather than one-off, individual support. The fact that (5) PDIs do not receive 
direct funds from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that they are (6) small in scale and their (7) 
voluntary character form the main distinction between PDIs and established development 
organisations.6 The question hence is: when is an organisation characterised as ‘small-scale’ and 
‘voluntary’? The difficulty in defining PDIs and with that, distinguishing them from actors in the 
civilateral aid channel is the lack of a well-defined demarcation of the type of organisations this 
third aid channel consists of. Based on a comparison between the characteristics of organisations 
that are included in our database and that meet up to criteria 1-5 and data of NGOs in the 
Netherlands (IS Academie NGO Database) we came up with a more detailed elaboration of these 
two final and crucial features of PDIs.  
Small-scale is interpreted in two ways. It means having fewer than 20 regular staff members, 
or an annual budget of less than 1 million euro. The voluntary character is defined on the 
basis of an upper limit of 20 per cent or less of paid members in charge of the running of the 
organisation. Staff member refers to both paid and non-paid staff. Although these demarcations 
 are contestable, since organisations had to meet up to all the 7 criteria mentioned above, our 
sample consists of a group of organisations that distinguishes themselves from established 
development organisations or other alternative development actors. 
Although we aimed at the strongest possible foundation of our PDI definition, a certain degree of 
arbitrary is insuperable because of the lack of clear boundaries and definition of other aid channels. 
6  It should be noted that the criterion of  no direct funding by the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs pertains to 
the Netherlands but might be quite different in other countries where the funding system is structured in 
other ways.
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Estimates on the number of PDIs in the Netherlands vary from 6,400 to 15,000 (Brok & 
Bouzoubaa, 2005; van Voorst, 2005). Not only is the margin between these estimates considerable, 
it is also unclear which definition of PDIs the researchers involved used. Figure 2.2 shows that PDIs 
are not something new; some of the (still existing) PDIs have a history that goes back a century. 
Half of the PDIs in the CIDIN-PDI Database were founded after 2000.7 
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Figure 2.2 Establishment of PDIs (N=878)
It is important to mention that the database only contains information on those PDIs still existing 
at the moment the survey took place. It is therefore difficult to make hard statements on the 
growth of PDIs. However, knowing that travels or longer stays in development countries form an 
important trigger to start a PDI and that there is an increase in long distance holidays, there is a 
strong indication that the number of PDIs, as shown in Figure 2.2, has increased during the past 
years (NBTC-NIPO, 2008). 
2.4  A profile of PDIs8
2.4.1 The people behind PDIs
PDIs are in general run by middle-agers, almost equally divided between women and men. Half 
of them regard themselves as belonging to a religious community. A majority of 60 per cent of the 
people actively involved in PDIs belong to the active working population and therefore combines 
voluntary work with a paid job. With regard to education level and income, the members of PDIs 
come from the average or above average layers of Dutch society: they have an average net monthly 
income of 1,536 euro and almost 70 per cent have completed a higher vocational or university 
education (CPB, 2009). The most important trigger for people to initiate or become actively 
engaged in a PDI is a holiday or longer stay in a developing country (34 per cent). More than 70 
per cent of the people became active after having visited a developing country. For 21 per cent of 
PDI members, a request from an acquaintance was the reason for becoming actively involved in 
a PDI.
7  If  not mentioned differently, the figures presented are based on data from the CIDIN-PDI Database 
2008-2009.
8  If  not mentioned differently, numbers mentioned in these paragraphs are coming  
from the CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009.
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2.4.2 The organisations
The PDIs in the CIDIN-PDI Database have an average annual budget of 50,000 euro. About 40 
per cent of PDIs have five or fewer active members. Organisations expand over the years and older 
organisations have significantly more members than younger organisations. The vast majority of 
these members are active on a voluntary basis. Only around 5 per cent of PDIs have one or more 
paid employees principally with those organisations that have been around for a number of years. 
PDI members devote an average of 42 (voluntary) hours per month to the PDI, with founders 
of PDI spending significantly more hours in the PDI than general members (Kinsbergen et al., 
2013).9 Many established development organisations rely partly on volunteers as well. However, 
the differences with PDIs is that in these organisations volunteers are responsible for the actual 
managing of the organisations whereas volunteers of established organisations are especially 
involved in more supportive task. 
When looking more closely to the organisational characteristics of PDIs, the picture of PDIs 
becomes very diverse. Both within the group as a whole as between PDIs of similar age, the diversity 
is large. For example, within the group of PDIs with 15 years of experience, we find both an 
organisation with 4 voluntary members and an annual budget of 2,000 euro and an organisation 
with 10 members of which 2 of them are paid raising annually 120,000 euro.
The characteristics of our sample of PDIs are comparable to previous PDI samples from other 
studies (Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005; Develtere & Stessens, 2006; Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009). It is, 
hence, likely that our results can be generalised to the entire population of PDIs in the Netherlands. 
However, since the total population of PDIs is unknown, a certain degree of caution is required 
when generalising the results of our study to the entire PDI population.
2.5 Public and governmental support for PDIs
For the majority of PDIs Dutch citizens are the main source of income. In past years, the rise of 
PDIs has been analysed in different studies from the perspective of the donor (WWAV, 2009; 
Ravelli & Verhoeven, 2008; Lampert et al., 2006). These studies demonstrate that the direct type 
of development cooperation attracts people and that they are impressed by the concrete results and 
the speed with which things are realised (Man & van Hemert, 2006). In 2011, 8 per cent of the 
Dutch households supported local small-scale charitable organisations in the field of development 
cooperation with an average amount of 57 euro per year (Bekkers & de Wit, 2013). Assuming 
that these small-scale charitable causes are equivalent to PDIs, they received an amount of nearly 
34 million euro from Dutch households alone in 2011.10 
In the past, established development organisations, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Dutch embassies in developing countries received frequent requests from Dutch citizens for 
operational and financial support for projects executed by them in developing countries. Neither 
the Ministry, nor development organisations had the capacity or the explicit mandate to deal 
with all these requests. However, both did recognise the potential of these PDIs to enforce the 
Dutch public support for development cooperation and to strengthen people’s involvement with 
the work of development organisations. Therefore, in 2001, the then minister for development 
cooperation Herfkens asked five big Dutch NGOs and the National Committee for International 
Cooperation and Sustainable Development (NCDO) to combine their forces in offering financial 
and institutional support for PDIs. In the following years, (part of ) these NGOs, the NCDO and 
the foundation Wilde Ganzen formed an important source of income for Dutch PDIs. 
9  The term ‘volunteer’ has not been pre-determined and thus refers to all people that are considered as 
such by the PDI itself. 
10  In 2011 there were in total 7,443,801 households in the Nederland (7,443,801* 8%) * 57 euro = 
33,943,732.56 euro (www.statline.cbs.nl).
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The three successive (vice) ministers of development cooperation continued to publicly express 
support for PDIs (Knapen, 2012; DGIS, 2009a; DGIS, 2009b; Van Ardenne, 2004). However, 
starting from 2011, severe budget cuts and reforms within the Dutch development cooperation 
resulted in the tightening of the criteria to qualify for subsidy and caused a strong decrease in the 
financial support of PDIs by established development organisations. In 2007 Wilde Ganzen, Oxfam 
Novib, Impulsis, Cordaid, Hivos and NCDO supported PDIs with approximately 40 million euro 
(Linkis, 2007; NCDO, 2007; Wilde Ganzen, 2007). This amount decreased to around 10 million 
euro in 2011 (CIDIN, NCDO & PI Wijzer, 2013). 
In the period 2006-2007, 65 per cent of the PDIs in the CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009 
submitted at least one request with one of the supporting organisations. Although this could be seen 
as a significant part of the PDIs, it means that 35 per cent of the PDIs functioned without support 
of any of these organisations during these years and mainly set their sights on private donors.
2.6 PDIs working on development
2.6.1 Poverty (visions)
Debates on PDIs as development actor focus on the ‘effectiveness and efficiency’, referred to as the 
success of their interventions. Before looking at how PDIs intervene in developing countries and 
the results of these interventions, it is first of all important to gain insight into the visions of PDIs 
on poverty and development aid and their type of interventions. PDIs see restrictive economical 
structures and the absence of, and faulty access to, resources like education and healthcare, as the 
two most important origins of poverty (see Figure 2.3). 25 per cent referred to (armed) conflicts 
as the most important cause of poverty. 
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Figure 2.3 Origins of poverty (N=712, in per cent)
When being asked what then should have priority in development cooperation, a large majority 
of 73 per cent attaches considerable importance to investments that result in improved access to 
basic services like education and health care (Figure 2.4). In second place (with only 10 per cent) 
is the development of the local economy. These two figures show that PDI members hold very 
different convictions concerning the origins of poverty, but that their ideas on the solutions are 
largely unanimous. 
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Figure 2.4 Solutions to poverty (N=721, in per cent)
2.6.2 Where and what?
The PDIs that took part in the CIDIN inquiry are active in 109 different countries. Three 
quarters of them are being active in one country. Some over the years, other PDIs from the start 
distribute their efforts over more than 1 country. 8 per cent is active in two different countries 
and a small number expand their activities to 3 or more countries. When looking at the spread 
of PDIs across the world, we see that well over a third (1/3) of PDIs are active in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, with Kenya and Ghana as leading countries. Asia follows in second (India and Indonesia), 
while Eastern Europe and Latin America compete for the third place (Figure 2.5). Whereas large 
part of the PDIs is active in more obvious tourist destinations (e.g. coastal areas in Kenya or the 
Gambia), other PDIs are active in less accessible countries or regions such as Afghanistan or the 
more isolated north of Kenya. 
The importance of a holiday abroad as a trigger to initiate a PDI is clearly shown by the fact 
that 16 per cent of people became active in the field of development cooperation in the same year 
as their first journey to a developing country. Well over 60 per cent became active in the following 
years, and 20 per cent of these in the course of the following five years. Only a quarter of the 
people decided to become active first before visiting a developing country later. More than 70 per 
cent of the people who became active after having visited a developing country became active in 
that same country.
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Figure 2.5 Countries in which PDIs are active (N=776, in per cent)
It comes as no surprise that PDI projects are mainly aimed at education and health care considering 
the importance attached to investments that result in improved access to basic services (see Figure 
2.4). Besides, many PDI projects are intended to improve the living conditions of children and 
young people (47 per cent). PDIs mainly invest in concrete matters like supplying teaching aids, 
building schools and digging wells. In other words, in practice their preferred intervention type 
is direct poverty reduction. Although they also attach considerable importance to lobbying and 
influencing policy and civil society building, this is not reflected in the overall picture of their 
actual investments. This is not to say that all PDIs are exclusively involved in direct poverty 
reduction. Part of the PDIs extends these concrete investments with lobby & advocacy activities 
or with community building projects or focuses all their efforts on these types of interventions. 
2.6.3 How?
While critics doubt the professionalism of PDIs and fear that they are unable to avoid known 
pitfalls, supporters are convinced that, due to their smallness of scale and direct approach, PDIs 
do make an essential difference to the lives of people in developing countries. Brok and Bouzoubaa 
(2005) investigated what PDIs themselves think about the contribution they can make to poverty 
reduction. 65 per cent expected that PDIs are indeed able to contribute despite their inadequacies. 
36 per cent of the interviewees (N=290) are also convinced that PDIs can tackle the underlying 
causes of poverty. In the past years a number of researchers have carried out critical assessments of 
the work of PDIs in developing countries (see Chelladurai, 2006; De Bruyn, 2011; Kinsbergen, 
2007; Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; Schulpen, 2007; van der Velden, 2011). These studies focus 
on a diversity of matters ranging from cooperation between PDIs and their partners and the 
effectiveness and sustainability of their projects in developing countries. Besides this, researchers 
investigated how the projects are evaluated and how PDIs learn and report. In the following we 
describe the working method of PDIs and subsequently reflect on three of the major risks – related 
to this working method – that came up in different empirical studies.11
11  Daily practice will show many variations of  the working method as presented. However, several studies 
reveal features typifying the working method of  many PDIs.
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2.6.4 Happenchance 
Discussions with PDI members and their partners reveal that the collaboration often stems from 
a coincidental encounter and that in many cases there is no preconceived plan to start a PDI in 
the first place. They are founded mostly due to a concurrence of circumstances, with an inspired 
meeting with an individual, a local organisation or institution leading to a plan being drawn up 
for the joint implementation of a project. The initial phase of collaboration between PDIs and 
local partners is also characterised by tremendous enthusiasm on the part of the PDIs as regards 
‘bringing about’ change. People are confronted by a certain issue and realise there are possibilities 
for improving the situation (Kinsbergen, 2007; Schulpen, 2007). Then implementation of the 
project can start straight away. In most cases, the collaboration between PDIs and their partners 
is characterised by joint responsibility for the projects, with both parties being able to exert some 
influence (Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; Wintraecken, 2008; Kinsbergen, 2006). Irrespective of 
how PDIs and their partners cooperate, at the general output level most of PDI projects are 
reasonably successful (Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; Kinsbergen, 2007). Orphanages have been 
built, hospitals renovated, schools enlarged and income-generating projects start and are used by 
the local population. The logistical problems that most initiatives inevitably come up against are 
faced with patience and creativity. During or after the implementation of a (first) project, part 
of the PDIs start right away implementing new projects or expanding their first project. At first 
sight, the working method of PDIs seems to be efficient (with regard to used time, money and 
manpower) and effective (goals are being achieved). However, various researches have made clear 
that some PDIs fail to complete some crucial steps before, during and/or after the implementation 
of the projects. 
First of all, different studies conclude that the design or implementation of a development 
project is often not preceded by a sound context analysis (Schulpen, 2007; Chelladurai, 2006). 
As a consequence there is limited knowledge about and collaboration with other organisations 
or local authorities active in the same region. In addition participation of the beneficiaries is 
limited or absent (Kinsbergen, 2006). Because of this, there is a danger in all this of projects being 
insufficiently imbedded in the local context, not being (sufficiently) relevant and of duplication 
occurring (Chelladurai, 2006). This means as well, there is a risk for ignoring the underlying 
structures that cause the problems, which in turn could lead to the treatment of symptoms, while 
the structural causes, are ignored (Schulpen 2007; Chelladurai, 2006).
The second risk finds it origin in the cooperation between PDIs and their partners. As described 
above, many people throw in their lot with a local person they originally befriended (Kamara & 
Bakhuisen, 2008: 21), resulting in an informal, personal relationship between PDIs and their 
partners. Things can become complicated when the collaboration continues without making the 
step from being ‘friends’ to being ‘partners’. Schulpen (2007) states that it is therefore difficult 
both for the PDI and for the partner
to develop a critical attitude towards each other. Furthermore, it means that discussions of 
each other’s expectations and the division of roles and capacities are seldom held (Zindel, 2009). 
A series of important questions therefore remain unanswered, such as, how long will the PDI 
support the local partner, what kind of support is the PDI willing to offer and what capacities 
does the local partner and the PDI have? Findings of different studies demonstrate that this can 
result in disappointments, misunderstandings or projects exceeding the partner’s or PDIs capacity 
(Kinsbergen, 2007; Schulpen, 2007). 
The third risk we discuss here is related to the process of monitoring and evaluation. Various 
studies have demonstrated that (structured, external) evaluations are mostly lacking (Hento et al., 
2011; Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; Bosmans, 2008; Schulpen, 2007; Chelladurai, 2006). As in the 
case of the project realisation, the focus of reports is mostly limited to the output of the projects. 
They describe the intended concrete results, what has been achieved and who has benefited. As a 
result, the back donor only receives limited feedback consisting of a description of how the project 
was executed, illustrated by photographs. 
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The lack of extensive evaluations hinders PDI learning processes. There is the risk that PDIs 
themselves will be convinced that all is going well and that there is no reason to make any changes 
to their procedures, those of its partner or their cooperation. There is a danger of going from one 
project to another without any structural changes being made to the working methods. 
These three risks originating from the working method of PDIs mainly endanger the 
sustainability, as in longevity, of the projects supported and/or initiated by PDIs. Building the 
hospital (output) has provided a region of 5.000 inhabitants with health care facilities (outcome), 
but the question is who is going to pay for the management, doctors, nurses, medicines and 
maintenance today and in three years time period (sustainability)? The project may function today, 
but what about tomorrow, next year or in ten years time? Money is needed for salaries, training 
and maintenance. However, the question is whether the PDI is willing to invest in this and, if so, 
whether its back donors are willing to contribute. Clearly, if sustainability is not guaranteed up to 
a certain level, the project’s output and outcome may be at risk. If there is no money to maintain 
the hospital and pay the staff members, it will not be long before the hospital will have to close 
its doors and the building will be left unused. The huge enthusiasm, the personal ties and the ‘not 
talking but doing’ mentality are, on the one hand, the driving force behind many PDIs and their 
projects but, on the other hand, it is clear that these are qualities that may in the end cause their 
downfall. The risks described find their origin in (1) a focus on the project, the execution and the 
results (Looij, 2008) and less attention being paid to processes and (2) a short-term focus neglecting 
long term challenges.
 
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter offers an introduction with Dutch Private Development Initiatives. These small-
scale, voluntary development organisations contribute in particular to direct poverty reduction, 
especially in the field of education and healthcare. They are strongly represented in the (Sub 
Sahara) African and Asian continent, in countries such as India, Indonesia, Ghana and Kenya. 
Whereas as a group they have some organisational features in common, the results of the study 
show that diversity regarding the organisational structure and type of development interventions 
supported is large.
Research on the working method of PDIs shows that there is room for improvement. Whereas 
PDI members are strongly motivated and committed, the sustainability of the projects would 
improve if they started from the outset with more extensive and more rational assessments. In the 
meantime, it is advisable not to focus only on the (short-term) results and the ‘here and now’, but 
to look forward from the start and devote more attention to processes (e.g. cooperation between 
PDI and partner). This is linked to the need to slow down and to build in more time for critical 
(self-) reflection. The research results promote an open attitude by PDIs, based on the questioning 
and testing of their own ideas and work processes by entering into conversations and thus making 
the transition from ‘meaning-well’ to ‘doing good’.
During the last few years, in the Netherlands a lot has been written about and a lot of discussions 
have taken place on PDIs as alternative actor in the field of development cooperation. Whereas 
some years ago, PDIs were still rather unknown and looked at with suspicion and sometimes-even 
disdain, in the past years research and debate contributed to the positioning of PDIs in the Dutch 
field of international development cooperation. This does not mean that critical voices are no longer 
there or that the influence of PDIs within the field of development cooperation is equal to that of 
established development actors. However, it does mean that in a few years a whole new sub-sector 
within the Dutch sector of international development cooperation became recognised. For various 
reasons, different actors decided to financially and institutionally support PDIs, training courses 
were developed, PDI networks were established and a PDI interest group was formed. Some PDIs 
are proponents of these developments, some even claim to have right to a position in the field of 
development cooperation. Others want nothing to do with the official development cooperation 
and consciously take a distance from it while some others are unaware of these developments. The 
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reforms and budget cuts taking place in the field of international development cooperation are 
a reason to reflect on this development of PDIs from outsiders to insiders. Are PDIs willing to 
comply with subsidy requirements from potential subsidisers and take up their ‘common, field-
specific language; manners; methodologies; instruments; values and standards’ (Develtere, 2009: 
231)? And what would becoming part of the development establishment mean for their own 
identity? Are established development actors willing to open their so far closed ranks (Develtere, 
2009)? In this matter, there is a call for PDIs but also for established development actors to pay 
attention to and reflect on (possible consequences of ) this development and decide for themselves 
how to respond to this. 
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Chapter 03
3. From tourist to development worker. Bringing the beneficiary closer: 
Explanations for volunteering time in Dutch Private Development 
Initiatives1
‘And sometimes it has been very tough, because it takes a lot of our time and leaves little room for 
other things. But I never thought: I should not have started it.’
 Interview PDI founder2
‘And now [name of husband] has more time, we said to one another: we see this [involvement in 
PDI] as a way to give meaning to life. We do not want to suffer from the empty-nest syndrome. I have 
many friends who are playing golf, or tennis or bridge, … that is not my cup of tea. We are healthy, 
we are still capable of doing things and in the first place: we find it great fun to do this.’
Interview PDI founder
‘I once said: I have never worked so hard as now, now I’m old. It costs a lot of time, but I do this 
with great pleasure. I’m not that kind of lady to go on a coffee all the time.’
Interview PDI member
‘Right now, we are with the four of us. But the young ladies, they are having their first or second 
child. They just graduated as a doctor or they are still specialising. They are just very busy. They 
cannot go [on a fieldtrip] every year or once every two years. […] Lately I notice that it is getting a bit 
more exhausting, because you are getting older.’
 Interview PDI member
1  A slightly different version of  this chapter is published in Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 
(Kinsbergen, Tolsma & Ruiter, 2013).
2  The quotes are derived from interviews with founders/members of  Private Development Initiatives (see 
Chapter 5). The data are available on request.
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Abstract 
In the Netherlands, charitable behaviour for international development purposes is subject to 
important changes. Whereas established development organisations suffer from a declining 
support base, private development initiatives (PDIs) that execute concrete, small-scale projects 
within direct personalised aid networks can count on increasing enthusiasm from individual 
donors of money and time. We investigate to what extent the cost-benefit evaluations of 
volunteers (supply side) and the characteristics of PDIs (demand side) affect the time allocation 
for volunteering in these organisations. The study is based on a survey of 661 volunteers active in 
Dutch PDIs. PDI volunteers face time and budget restrictions, partly due to their position on the 
(paid) labour market. Volunteers who are sceptical about established development organisations 
increase voluntary time investment in PDIs. Corroborating the proximity hypothesis, volunteers 
perceiving a smaller distance to beneficiaries spend more volunteering hours in PDIs. Volunteers 
also spend more hours volunteering for PDIs with larger budgets and more staff.
Keywords: Charitable behaviour; international development cooperation; volunteering hours; 
private development initiatives; distance to beneficiaries
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3.1 Introduction
Numerous studies attempt to explain the charitable behaviour of individuals (Bekkers & 
Wiepking, 2011; Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2007 for a recent review of the literature).3 The evidence 
gathered largely centres on questions regarding who gives money to charitable causes and why 
people donate money. Other research has analysed the motivations and the time investment of 
volunteers (Allison et al., 2002; Bekkers, 2004; Hayghe, 1991; Okun, 1994; Okun et al., 1998; 
Rotolo & Wilson, 2004). Even though time investment can be regarded to be just as important 
for voluntary organisations and their beneficiaries as is the number of volunteers that are involved 
or the amount of money donated, the question concerning how much time people actually donate 
is still understudied (Van Ingen & Dekker, 2011). In this study we aim to explain differences in 
the time people spend on volunteer work. The focus of our study is volunteering in small-scale 
private development initiatives (PDIs), which have been growing in number in recent years both 
in the Netherlands (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011) and in surrounding countries such as Belgium 
(Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009).
In the Netherlands, established international development organisations can count on a relatively 
wide support from Dutch citizens. In 2011, this group of organisations received 281 million euro in 
total from Dutch households, which makes it – next to faith based organisations and health care – 
the third  largest charitable cause in the Netherlands (Bekkers & de Wit, 2013). Financial donations 
are not the only way that Dutch citizens express their concern about developing countries. In 2008 
1,4 per cent of the population claimed to have volunteered in a development-related organisation 
(Schuyt & Gouwenberg, 2009). However, in recent years, traditional development organisations 
have experienced declining public support in the Netherlands because of an emerging distrust 
regarding their effectiveness and efficiency. 
At the same time, an increasing number of citizens voluntarily participate in – or even initiate – 
small-scale voluntary development initiatives (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). This development is 
part of a larger international trend: worldwide, a growing diversity of actors is taking up an active 
role in the field of international development cooperation. 
Companies, philanthropists, famous stars – referred to as celebrity humanitarians – and ordinary 
individuals feel urged to actively contribute to the global fights against poverty (Bishop & Green, 
2008; Cameron & Haanstra, 2008; Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009; Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011; 
Samman et al., 2009; Yrjölä, 2009). 
In contrast to traditional development organisations, private development initiatives can count 
on growing support and represent concrete opportunities for greater identification and active 
involvement with development activities (Lampert et al., 2006; Ravelli & Verhoeven, 2008; 
Bekkers et al., 2011). In 2011, 8 per cent of Dutch households donated to these small-scale 
development organisations with an average amount of 57 euro, resulting in a total amount donated 
of approximately 34 million euro (Bekkers & de Wit, 2013; Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). 
However, it is unknown how many people in the Netherlands are actually active as volunteers in 
PDIs. 
PDIs can be distinguished from other, traditional, development organisations by their small 
scale (i.e. limited number of staff and budget) and their voluntary character (i.e. low percentages 
of paid staff). The majority of these initiatives are initiated and entirely run by volunteers and 
have an average annual budget of less than 50,000 euro (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). PDI 
volunteers are actively involved in fundraising, public awareness raising and the implementation 
of development projects. 
In this contribution, we investigate how the financial and time restrictions of PDI volunteers 
influence their time investment. In addition, we examine aspects that possibly affect the benefits of 
volunteering, such as the perceived distance between volunteers and beneficiaries and attitudes of 
volunteers towards development organisations. A novel aspect of this study is that we not only aim 
3  When not specified, ‘charitable behaviour’, ‘donations’ and ‘donors’ refer both to donations and donors 
of  time and money. 
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to explain time investment by looking at the supply side (i.e. the volunteers’ considerations) but also 
at the demand side, namely the extent to which some of the characteristics of PDIs (e.g. budget) 
affect the time investment considerations of volunteers. The research question of this chapter reads: 
What determines time investment of PDI volunteers?
This study also distinguishes itself from earlier studies since we focus on a specific group of 
volunteers, namely people that are active in small-scale private development initiatives with 
distant beneficiaries. We test our hypotheses using unique primary data on 661 volunteers – 316 
of them being founders of PDIs – working in a similar number of small-scale private development 
initiatives with projects in 101 developing countries. We acknowledge that this hampers the 
generalisation of findings to a broader volunteer population. However, using this dataset enables 
us to tests hypotheses derived from a cost-benefit framework on the impact of a wide array of 
characteristics of volunteers and of voluntary organisations on time investment decisions.  
 
3.2. Voluntary time investment in PDIs: supply and demand 
Previous studies on charitable behaviour point to the strong influence of a donor’s cost-benefit 
analysis on decisions regarding time and money donations (Allison et al., 2002; Bekkers, 2004; 
Okun 1994; Unger, 1991; Wiepking, 2008; Wilson, 2000). As Bekkers (2004) argues, the first 
thing people will do when considering whether or not to help is to weigh the immediate material 
costs for them compared to the social or psychological benefits involved. When the costs increase, 
higher benefits are needed to persuade a donor. On the other hand, it can be argued that when the 
benefits of donating are low, the willingness to donate decreases.  
3.2.1 Constraints
The costs of volunteering depend on the value of people’s time. This value is determined by the 
availability and the price of time (Bekkers, 2001; Bekkers, 2004; Van Ingen & Dekker, 2011; 
Wilson, 2000). When people have less leisure time available, it becomes more precious to them, 
making it more costly to engage in volunteering (Bekkers, 2004). The role overload theory 
predicts that people with a full-time occupation are more restricted in their time, and therefore 
they will be more reluctant to donate time compared to people working part-time or without 
any job (Markham & Bonjean, 1996). Indeed, being employed is found to negatively affect both 
the decision to volunteer (Bekkers, 2001; Hayghe, 1991) and – for those who do volunteer – the 
number of hours spent on volunteering work (Van Ingen & Dekker, 2011; Wilson, 2000). Thus, 
in line with findings from earlier studies, we expect that volunteers who have a paid job spend less 
time on voluntary PDI activities than volunteers who do not have a paid job.
The availability of time is not only determined by the employment status of people. Being 
engaged in numerous organisations implies that people have to distribute their time and have on 
average less time available to invest in each of these organisations, in comparison to people who 
are affiliated with only one organisation. Thus, in line with the role overload theory, we expect that 
people who are members of several civic organisations are more limited in their time and, hence, 
that the number of memberships negatively affects voluntary time investment. 
The price of people’s time is also an influence on the value of their time. Opportunity cost theory 
proposes that higher income groups are usually more willing to donate money than lower income 
groups (Bekkers, 2004). The contribution of a certain monetary amount represents a smaller share 
of income for higher income groups in comparison to lower income groups, which makes the 
marginal costs of a similar financial contribution relatively lower for high income earners, as is 
confirmed by findings from Wiepking (2008). On the other hand, for people with higher hourly 
wages, the costs of donating time are higher than for low-income groups, making it less evident 
for them to engage in volunteering (Bekkers, 2004) and to volunteer a large number of hours 
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(Freeman, 1997; Wolff et al., 1993). Although the results of earlier studies on the effect of income 
on voluntary time investment are ambiguous (Wilson, 2000), we anticipate that the income level 
determines the cost of volunteering and expect that higher income groups will spend less time 
volunteering compared to lower income groups. In summary, our constraint hypothesis reads:
H1. Volunteers (a) with a paid job, (b) who are members of multiple civic organisations and 
(c) with higher hourly wages spend fewer hours PDI volunteering. 
3.2.2 Benefits and distant beneficiaries
An important benefit of donating is often referred to as ‘the warm glow’ (Andreoni, 1989). This 
psychological reward implies that donors feel that their contribution can make a real difference to 
the lives of beneficiaries (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). The reward – the warm glow – that results 
from donating to international development organisations is usually judged to be rather low 
because these organisations are commonly dealing with geographical and psychological distant 
beneficiaries (Micklewright & Wright, 2004; Schuyt et al., 2007). 
When there is a geographical distance between the donor and the beneficiaries it becomes 
more difficult to be aware of their needs and, most importantly, to observe the positive effect 
of a donation (Bekkers, 2004). In addition, the anthropological literature shows that people are 
more inclined towards pro-social behaviour when it concerns their own kin, tribe or community, 
with whom they can identify (Eberhard, 1975). Similarly, potential donors try to identify with 
the beneficiaries and find this harder when the psychological distance is larger, for example, when 
beneficiaries are inhabitants of an ‘exotic’ country with unfamiliar social and cultural norms 
and practices. Results of previous studies on charitable behaviour empirically showed that both 
geographical and psychological distance have a negative influence on people’s willingness to donate 
time or money (Bekkers, 2004; Micklewright & Wright, 2004; Schuyt et al., 2007; Wiepking, 
2008). 
(Mass) media coverage is one way to inform people about the needs of beneficiaries and to bridge 
(geographical and psychological) distance through indirect contact. Media coverage increases the 
money raised for victims of disasters (Adams, 1986; Bennett & Kottasz, 2000; Simon, 1997; 
Wiepking, 2008). Direct contact between potential donors and distant beneficiaries is expected 
to have an even larger impact. Encounters with the local population and confrontation with 
their needs will decrease the distance between the donors and the beneficiaries. No longer are 
inhabitants of developing countries unknown and far away. They have a face and a name now. A 
possible obstruction to donating is removed. In line with this rationale, Kinsbergen and Schulpen 
(2011) showed that the most important trigger for setting up or participating in PDIs is a visit to 
a developing country. We not only expect the reduction of distance to influence the decision to 
volunteer per se, but also to affect the intensity of volunteering. We therefore expect that volunteers 
who visited one or more developing country spend more hours PDI volunteering. 
Volunteers with a non-Western background engaged with an organisation supporting 
beneficiaries in their or their parents’ home country tend to experience a smaller (psychological) 
distance from the beneficiaries and are hence expected to invest more hours than their counterparts 
with Western background. 
Volunteers already active for some years in an organisation will get to know the country, 
the region and the beneficiaries that they are supporting. This will increase the involvement of 
volunteers in the lives of the beneficiaries and decrease the (perceived) inhibiting distance between 
the volunteers and the beneficiaries over the years. Following this line of reasoning, we expect that 
the number of years volunteers are active in a PDI positively affects time investment. We now 
formulate a proximity hypothesis: 
H2. (a) Volunteers who visited (more) developing countries, (b) non-Western volunteers 
supporting projects in their (parents’) home country and (c) volunteers who are active for a 
longer period will spend more hours PDI volunteering.
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3.2.3 Benefits and volunteers’ attitudes and motives
The warm glow people receive from volunteering is not only affected by their perceived distance 
from the beneficiaries. Previous studies demonstrated that the reward of a donation is negatively 
affected when people are uncertain that donations will make a valuable contribution (Bekkers, 
2004; Micklewright & Wright, 2004). This can be the case when donors are uncertain that an 
organisation is capable of spending the money well (Bekkers, 2004) or when the problems at 
hand are so large that donors do not expect that their contributions will make a (substantial) 
difference (Micklewright & Wright, 2004). The psychological reward of volunteering increases 
when volunteers believe that development organisations can make a genuine difference in the 
livelihood of beneficiaries. Volunteers who have trust in the efficacy and efficiency of development 
organisations will gain greater benefits from volunteering and experience a stronger ‘warm glow’. 
They are therefore expected to spend more hours volunteering. 
In addition to the warm glow donors receive from volunteering activities, the fulfilment of 
certain personal motives is commonly referred to as a key benefit of volunteering, outweighing the 
costs involved in donating (Clary et al., 1998). The Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI), designed 
by Clary and Snyder (1991), takes a functional approach to people’s motives for volunteering, 
arguing that these motives represent functions served by volunteering (Allison et al., 2002; Clary 
et al., 1998). According to the model of Clary and Snyder (1991), becoming a volunteer may 
serve six possible functions. People may volunteer (1) in order to express or act upon important 
values (values), (2) to gain a better understanding of the world (understanding), (3) to strengthen 
social relationships (social), (4) to improve one’s career opportunities (career), (5) to protect 
oneself from negative feelings such as guilt (protective) and, finally, (6) to feel better about oneself 
(enhancement) (Allison et al., 2002; Clary et al., 1998; Clary & Snyder, 1999). 
Previous research on time investment shows that motives not only influence the decision to 
volunteer but also the extent of volunteering (Allison et al., 2002; Okun et al., 1998). Volunteers 
who want to feel useful spend considerably more hours volunteering than volunteers not driven 
by the usefulness motive (Okun, 1994). On the other hand, people volunteering for social reasons, 
i.e. to strengthen social relationships, spend less time on their voluntary activities (Allison, et al., 
2002). The study of Allison et al. (2002) also demonstrated that the values and understanding 
motives are positively related to time investment. Given the considerations above, we formulate 
the attitude and motives hypothesis as: 
H3. (a) The higher the belief in development organisations, (b) the stronger the motivations 
to volunteer in order to give expression to important values and (c) in order to get a better 
understanding of the world, and (d) the weaker the motive to strengthen social relationships, 
the more hours volunteers will spend PDI volunteering.
3.2.4 The demand side
A novel aspect of our study is that we assume that time investment is not only a result of the 
characteristics of volunteers affecting cost-benefit considerations, but that it is also related to the 
demand side, that is, the characteristics of PDIs. To date, the effect of organisational features on 
donations remains understudied (Sargeant et al., 2008). We first of all expect PDIs with more 
small-scale development programmes – determined by the number of countries in which a PDI is 
active and by the budget of the organisation – can be run with less (total) time investments of their 
volunteers. In line with this, it is anticipated that organisations with larger budgets supporting 
development projects in numerous countries offer more opportunities for volunteers to spend 
more hours volunteering, and that volunteers in such organisation are more likely to be asked to 
volunteer more. In addition, we expect that organisations with more staff are better able to divide 
the tasks among their volunteers. Our last, demand side, hypothesis reads:
H4. (a) The larger the budget of a PDI, (b) the more countries in which a PDI is active and 
(c) the fewer staff a PDI has, the more hours volunteers will spend PDI volunteering. 
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We are of course aware that the number hours volunteered could also affect the size of the 
development programme. Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to make unambiguous 
statements about the direction of the effects of the demand side. 
3.2.5 Controls
In this contribution we will take into account several individual characteristics known to 
influence volunteering decisions such as: educational attainment, age, religiosity and gender. In 
most studies, higher educated, younger and married people turn out to be more willing, or more 
frequently asked, to volunteer (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Rossi, 2001; Smith, 1994; Wilson, 
2000). Protestants and frequent church attendees are generally more inclined to donate time and 
money and to do so not only for religious causes (Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008; Ruiter & de Graaf, 
2006). Both the likelihood of being asked and the religious context, which includes pro-social 
values, have a positive influence on the giving behaviour religious donors and frequent church 
attendees (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). The results of earlier studies on the effect of gender on 
volunteering are not consistent (Wilson, 2000). We will also control for the position of volunteers 
within the PDI, as we expect that the founders of PDIs spend more hours volunteering than 
regular volunteers. 
3.3. Data, measurements and methods
3.3.1 Data
To address the research question, primary data was collected by conducting a standardised 
electronic survey in 2008 and 2009. There is no national database in the Netherlands in which 
PDI volunteers are registered. We therefore made a list of 5,805 valid e-mail addresses of potential 
PDI volunteers through an extensive web search and based on information provided by Dutch 
based large-scale development agencies (e.g. Oxfam Novib). These large-scale development 
agencies are involved in the co-funding of PDIs. 1,956 respondents started the web survey and, of 
these respondents, 1,238 completed the survey. We thereby reached a response of approximately 
21 per cent (100 * [1,238/5,805]). This is considered a fair response rate given that response 
rates for web surveys are in general between 20-30 per cent (Bernard, 2002). After excluding 
respondents who did not fit our PDI volunteer definition (N=556), we started with a working 
sample of 682 respondents.4 We excluded respondents who did not provide information on the 
dependent variable (volunteer working hours; N=10) and for whom we could not construct our 
VFI scales (N=11). Hence, our final sample consisted of 661 respondents.  In the results section 
we discuss the representativeness of the sample5
 
3.3.2 Characteristics of volunteers
Time investment, the key dependent variable in this study, is measured with a single item. 
Respondents were asked how many hours per month on average they spend volunteering in the 
PDI. Two variables are included to assess the time restrictions of volunteers. First, the occupational 
status of respondents is registered in six categories: (1) employed; (2) unemployed; (3) disabled; (4) 
student; (5) household; (6) pensioned. Secondly, the variable membership refers to the number of 
4  Respondents required an average of  45 minutes to finish the survey. The length of  the survey 
explains the relative high number of  respondents who started the web survey but did not complete 
it. Respondents who did not complete the survey do not differ in relevant characteristics such as 
volunteering hours compared to respondents who completed the questionnaire. It was impossible to 
define prior to conducting the survey whether or not contacts included in the database belonged to the 
group of  PDI volunteers. This would require information on the organisations in which they volunteer 
(e.g. Budget) upon which we base our PDI definition. Organisational characteristics are not publicly 
available and were thus collected through the survey.
5  The data are available on request.
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organisations in which the respondent is engaged. Respondents were asked to indicate whether or 
not they are members of organisations other than PDIs.6
The variable monthly net income is constructed using both an open-ended question and a question 
measuring income in categories for those respondents unwilling to give their exact income. The 
income categories have been recoded into interval values by assigning the mean of each category to 
respondents. We subsequently substituted reported incomes of 0 euro with 20 euro and corrected 
for the skewness of this variable by taking the natural logarithm. Three variables were constructed 
to qualify the distance between the volunteer and the beneficiaries. Countries visited refers to the 
number of developing countries visited at least once. Remittances indicates whether respondents 
have a non-Western background and if they are supporting projects in their country of origin. This 
latter variable is divided into three categories: (1) Western; (2) non-Western, no remittances (3); 
non-Western, remittances. The interval variable volunteering years refers to the number of years the 
respondent has been active as a volunteer in a specific PDI. 
We also constructed a scale-variable belief in development organisations that measures respondents’ 
attitudes towards development organisations. It consists of nine statements such as: ‘Development 
organisations spend too much money on staff and organisation’ and ‘Most projects of development 
organisations fail’. The Cronbach’s Alpha of the belief in development organisations scale is 0.74, 
where higher scores indicate a more positive attitude towards development organisations. 
Our survey also included information on the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) as outlined by 
Clary et al. (1998). The VFI consists of six different functions for engaging in voluntary activities: 
(1) Values, (2) Social, (3) Career, (4) Enhancement, (5) Understanding, (6) Protective. Each function 
is measured with three specific items, following the practice of previous research. All scales show 
sufficient reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha range from 0.70 to 0.86). 
3.3.3 PDI characteristics
Information on the organisational characteristics ‘budget’, ‘number of staff ’ and ‘number of 
project countries’ are collected among the members of the PDIs themselves. A large majority 
of the PDIs in this study (N=661, 96 per cent) are entirely managed by volunteers (Kinsbergen 
& Schulpen, 2011), implying that PDI volunteers are involved in or even responsible for the 
(financial) management of the PDIs. Hence, we assume that PDI volunteers are well informed 
concerning the budget, number of staff and the number of project countries. Budget refers to the 
annual budget of the PDI. Our questionnaire collected information on the budget in the year 
2006 and 2007. For organisations founded before 2008 we calculated the mean budget across 
2006 and 2007. If only information for one year was available, we used this information. We 
constructed the following categories: (1) first quintile (0 -5,850 euro); (2) second quintile (5,856-
15,000 euro); (3) third quintile (15,001-28,636 euro); (4) fourth quintile (28,637-59,000 euro); 
(5) fifth quintile (> 59,000 euro); (6) PDI founded after 2007. We have no budgetary information 
for PDIs founded after this period (N=22, 3.3 per cent).
 In addition, the number of staff active in the organisation is taken into account. Given the 
skewed distribution of this variable, we took the natural logarithm. The variable project countries 
refers to the number of developing countries in which the organisation is supporting projects.  
3.3.4 Controls, missing values and estimation method
Age is included as an interval variable and the dummy variable sex refers to the gender of a volunteer. 
Marital status of respondents consists of five categories: (1) single; (2) couple; (3) married; (4) 
divorced; (5) widow/widower. Education is measured in years, covering seven categories: primary 
education (6 years); lower secondary vocational education (Lager Beroeps Onderwijs [LBO], 8 
6  These include: Trade unions, political parties, religious groups, nature associations, youth associations, 
sport associations, school associations (such as parents’ council), welfare associations and music or 
theatre associations.
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years); lower general secondary education (Middelbaar Algemeen Voortgezet Onderwijs [MAVO], 
10 years); upper secondary vocational education (Middelbaar Beroeps Onderwijs [MBO], 
10.5 years); higher secondary education (Hoger Algemeen Voortgezet Onderwijs [HAVO], 
Voorbereidend Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs [VWO], 11.5 years); higher professional education 
(Hoger Beroeps Onderwijs [HBO], 15 years); university (16.5 years). The denomination of the 
respondents is measured with four categories: (1) non-religious; (2) Catholic; (3) Protestant; (4) 
other. Church attendance is measured in times per year, with non-religious respondents set to zero 
times a year. The dummy variable founder indicates if the respondent is a founding member of 
the organisation. 
Missing values on interval variables were replaced by the average score. We included dummy 
variables in the explanatory model indicating whether or not missing values were replaced for 
respondents. For categorical variables, an additional category ‘missing’ was included if  necessary. 
Interval variables were centred on their mean value to facilitate interpretation (i.e. ). 
Our dependent variable, time investment, is a count variable, and not normally distributed (see 
Figure 3.1). The mean and variance are approximately equal; we therefore opted for log-linear 
Poisson regression analyses (Land et al., 1996).
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Figure 3.1 Distribution number of volunteering hours
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Descriptives
Descriptive statistics of the variables are summarised in Table 3.1. Nearly 60 per cent of the 
volunteers are male. Half of the volunteers consider themselves to be religious, almost a quarter of 
them being Catholic, close to 20 per cent Protestant and nearly 10 per cent consider themselves 
to belong to a different denomination. On average, the volunteers earn slightly more than modal 
income. In general, the volunteers can be considered as higher educated with more than 40 per 
cent having a higher vocational education degree (BA) and nearly 30 per cent having a university 
degree. 70 per cent of the volunteers are married. More than 60 per cent of the respondents have 
a paid job. 
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They volunteer specifically to obtain a better understanding of the world around them or to 
express important values.
PDI volunteers spend on average 37 hours per month volunteering, but some volunteer up to 
190 hours per month. We find a significant difference (t-value= -5.48) between the average time 
spent by non-founders (Mean=28 hours per month) and that of PDI founders (Mean=46 hours 
per month). 
Compared to other studies on volunteering in the Netherlands, PDI volunteers (both founders 
and non-founders) spend a relatively high number of hours per month volunteering (Schuyt 
& Gouwenberg, 2009; Van Herten, 2009, Van Ingen & Dekker, 2011). The average age of 55 
years could explain the relatively high average of time spent volunteering, since it is known that 
volunteering reaches its peak after middle age (i.e. >40 years) when external obligations related to 
family and work decrease. The high average level of education could be another explanation for 
the comparatively high average number of volunteering hours of PDI volunteers (Smith, 1994; 
Van Ingen & Dekker, 2011; Wilson & Musick, 1997; Wilson, 2000).   
The characteristics of our sample of PDI volunteers are comparable to previous PDI volunteer 
samples from other studies (Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005; Develtere & Stessens, 2006; Develtere & 
De Bruyn, 2009). It is, hence, likely that our results can be generalised to the entire population of 
PDI volunteers. Just as the characteristics of PDI volunteers do not deviate from those reported in 
previous studies, the organisational characteristics of the PDIs we studied are highly comparable 
with other studies (Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005; Develtere & Stessens, 2006; Develtere & De Bruyn, 
2009). Since PDI volunteers differ from volunteers in general, we should be cautious about 
generalising the results of our study to all volunteers. However, the hypotheses derived from the 
charitable behaviour literature should also hold among the subgroup of volunteers. 
79 Chapter 03
80
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics (N=661) 
 Mean %    SD
Dependent Variable
Time investment (1-336 hours) 37.23 41.37
Independent Variables
Time and Financial restrictions
Membership (0-8 types of organisations)  2.44 1.68
Occupational status
Employed 59.60
Unemployed  0.80
Disabled  3.00
Student  1.80
Household  4.70
Pensioned 29.00
Monthly net income (€ 0-50,000,-) 1,534.78 3,581.03
Distance to beneficiaries
Countries visited (0-100) 4.47 5.72
Remittances
Western 93.50
Non-Western, no remittances 2.10
Non-Western, remittances 4.40
Volunteering years 11.03 8.76
Attitude
Belief in Development Organisations  
(1.41-4.65) 
3.07 0.50
Motives (VFI)
Values 3.69 0.80
Social 3.22 0.75
Career 2.28 0.90
Enhancement 3.08 0.90
Understanding 3.97 0.63
Protective 2.56 0.80
Continued on next page>.
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 <Table 3.1 continued.
 Mean   %    SD
Organisational characteristics
Budget
Budget<5,850 15.60
Budget<15,000 18.00
Budget<28,636 17.90
Budget<59,000 18.30
Budget>59,000 18.30
PDI founded after 2007   3.30
Project countries (2-56)  2.51  5.05
Number of staff (2-100) 10.10 11.03
Control variables
Age (22-82 years) 55.12 11.25
Sex
Male 59.80
Female 39.90
Denomination
No religion 50.00
Catholic 23.00
Protestant 18.30
Other   8.50
Church attendance (0-75 p.a.) 17.72 26.00
Marital status
Single 14.20
Couple   8.90
Married 70.30
Divorced   3.30
Widow/widower   2.70
Education (6-16.5 years) 14.17 2.43
Founder 47.80
Source: CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009
82
3.4.2 Bivariate relationships
Table 3.2 presents the bivariate relationships between time investment and the independent 
variables. Results show that there is a significant negative relationship between both financial 
and time restrictions and time investment. The available material resources (e.g. income) of the 
volunteers are clearly negatively related to the volunteers’ engagement in PDI activities. 
When the distance to beneficiaries is larger, volunteers devote significantly less time to their 
voluntary job; the more countries that volunteers have visited, the more hours they volunteer 
(r=0.09), and non-Western volunteers active in their home country volunteer more hours. 
A stronger belief in development organisations is negatively related to PDI volunteers’ time 
investment. Of the six functions related to volunteering benefits, only the function ‘understanding’ 
has a significant (positive) relation with time investment. Not only the characteristics of 
the volunteer, but also the features of the PDI are related to time investment. The number of 
volunteering hours relates significantly and positively to both the budget (F=1.45) and the number 
of staff (r=0.90) of the organisation.
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Table 3.2 Determinants of time investment in Dutch PDIs: bivariate relationships
Mean time 
investment
f
Spearman
 Correlation
Time and Financial restrictions
Membership -0.12 **
Occupational status 2.00 **
Employed 31.41
Unemployed 76.40
Disabled 53.15
Student 32.75
Household 47.55
Pensioned 42.71
Monthly net income (Ln) -0.18 *
Distance to beneficiaries
Countries visited 0.09 *
Remittances 2.13 **
Western 35.62
Non-Western,  
no remittances
46.10
Non-Western, remittances 67.34
Volunteering years -0.55
Attitude  
Belief in Development 
Organisations
  - 0.14 **
Motives (VFI)
Values -0.04
Social  0.02
Career -0.02
Enhancement -0.01
Understanding      0.12 **
Protective   0.05
Organisational characteristics
Budget 1.45 *
Budget<5,850 28.77
Budget<15,000 29.10
Budget<28,636 40.33
Budget≤59,000 38.70
Budget>59,000 47.44
PDI founded after 2007 37.72
Project countries -0.06
Number of staff (Ln)   0.90 *
Source: CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009  
~p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 (two sided test of significance)
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3.4.3 Poisson regression analyses
We now turn to the multivariate model in order to test our hypotheses. Table 3.3 shows the results 
of the Poisson regression of the time investment of volunteers in Dutch PDIs. 
First, we briefly discuss the impact of our control variables. Contrary to the findings of earlier 
studies, education negatively affects PDI voluntary time investment. In line with the results of 
previous research, men volunteer more frequently than women, married people spend more 
hours volunteering than singles, and older people spend a larger number of voluntary hours than 
younger volunteers. Whereas in other studies on charitable behaviour religious people often turn 
out to be more generous (both in financial and time donations), we find that in comparison to 
non-religious volunteers, religious volunteers spend fewer hours volunteering with PDIs. While 
church attendance is often referred to as an important, if not the most important, determinant 
for charitable behaviour, in this study the effect is insignificant. A recent study by Van Ingen and 
Dekker (2011) finds that church attendance positively affects voluntary participation, but it has 
no effect on voluntary time investment. The results of our study are thus in line with the results of 
this study and seem to affirm the suggestion of Van Ingen and Dekker (2011) that the recruitment 
function of religious communities is stronger than their function as stimulators of pro-social values. 
Table 3 clearly shows that being a member of other civic organisations has a negative effect on the 
time volunteers spend in the PDIs in which they are actively engaged. Every additional organisation 
a volunteer belongs to, decreases PDI time investment with a factor 0.94 (e-0.05), thus indicating 
that there is a clear trade-off between volunteering in different organisations. The negative effect of 
having a paid job on time investment is even stronger. In general, volunteers who also have a paid 
job volunteer 22 per cent less hours compared to volunteers without a paid job ((1 - e-0.25)*100). 
Time investment is negatively affected by financial restrictions too. The higher the income, the 
fewer hours that are spent volunteering; the parameter estimate is -0.18 and significant. We can 
thus conclude that both time and financial restrictions have the expected negative influence on 
time investments for PDI volunteering.
Next, we analyse the effect of distance to the beneficiary on PDI time investment. In our 
proximity hypothesis, we stated that the number of developing countries visited by a volunteer, 
the duration of volunteering, whether the volunteer has a non-Western background and if the 
volunteer supports projects in its country of origin will positively influence time investment. 
Our results largely corroborate this hypothesis. Visits to developing countries influence time 
investment, with the number of volunteering hours increasing with the number of developing 
countries visited, although effects are small, as indicated by the parameter estimate of 0.01. To 
the best of our knowledge we are the first to demonstrate that visits to development countries 
decrease the perceived distance between volunteers and beneficiaries and positively affect voluntary 
time investment.  Non-Western volunteers spend more hours volunteering than volunteers with 
a Western ethnic background. In particular, non-Western volunteers supporting projects in their 
(parents’) country of origin spend more volunteering hours compared to Western volunteers, 
namely twice as much (e0.76=2.14). Surprisingly, in contradiction to our proximity hypothesis, the 
longer people have volunteered, the fewer hours they spend (e-0.01  =0.99). 
In contrast to what we formulated in our attitude and motives hypothesis – volunteers with less 
belief in development organisations (i.e. stronger doubts) invest more time in PDIs, as indicated 
by the parameter estimate -0.15. The more sceptical people are regarding the work of development 
organisations, the more they seem motivated to bring about change by means of small-scale PDIs. 
Contrary to earlier studies (e.g. Allison et al., 2002) and hence to our expectations, we find 
a significant negative effect for volunteering as an expression of important values (i.e. values 
function). In further contrast to our expectation, volunteering for social motives is (significantly 
and) positively related to volunteering. We only find evidence for our attitude and motives 
hypothesis with regard to the volunteering function ‘understanding’; volunteering in order to gain 
a better understanding of the world increases voluntary hours (the parameter estimate is 0.22 and 
significant).
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As we described above, 47 per cent of our respondents are not merely volunteers of PDIs but also 
the founders of PDIs. PDI founders are more active than general PDI volunteers (the parameter 
estimate is 0.45 and significant). In additional analyses, we investigated whether the motives for 
volunteering, as expressed by the VFI, are conditional upon being the founder of the organisation. 
This proved to be the case (see Table 3.4). For non-founders the effect of the VFI functions 
‘values’ and ‘social’ are in line with the results of earlier studies (i.e. respectively significant positive 
(parameter estimate is -0.13) and negative (parameter estimate is 0.07)). We hence conclude that 
the deviating results of Table 3.3 are due to a relative large number of PDI founders in our sample. 
Finally, we included the organisational characteristics. Our expectation formulated in the demand 
side hypothesis that the budget of the organisation is positively related to PDI time investment is 
confirmed.  But in contrast to this hypothesis, we did not find a significant effect for the number of 
countries in which a PDI implements development projects. This could imply that PDI volunteers 
are mainly involved in fundraising activities, i.e. concerned with increasing the PDI budget, and 
only to a lesser extent involved in the implementation of the actual development programme. 
Another finding that contradicted our expectations is that organisations with more staff are better 
capable of mobilising volunteering hours.  
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Table 3.3 Coefficients from Poisson regression: Time investment of PDI volunteers  (N=661)a
                       β S.E.
Intercept 4.59 ** 0.09
Time and Financial restrictions
Membership -0.05 ** 0.00
Occupational status  (Unemployed=ref.)
Employed -0.25 ** 0.08
Disabled -0.51 ** 0.06
Student -0.81 ** 0.08
Household -0.58 ** 0.06
Pensioned -0.64 ** 0.06
LN (Monthly net income) -0.18 ** 0.02
Distance to beneficiaries
Countries visited 0.01 ** 0.00
Remittances (Western=ref.)
  Non-Western, no remittances 0.21 ** 0.04
  Non-Western, remittances 0.76 ** 0.03
Volunteering years -0.01 ** 0.00
Attitude 
Belief in Development Organisations -0.15 ** 0.02
Motives (VFI)
Values -0.04 ** 0.01
Social 0.02 * 0.01
Career  -0.06 ** 0.01
Enhancement  -0.02 ** 0.01
Understanding 0.22 ** 0.01
Protective 0.10 ** 0.01
Continued on next page>.
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 < Table 3.3 continued.
                       β S.E.
Organisational characteristics
Budget (>59,000=ref.)
Budget<5,850 -0.57 ** 0.02
Budget<15,000 -0.48 ** 0.02
Budget<28,636 -0.24 ** 0.02
Budget≤59,000 -0.20 ** 0.02
PDI founded after 2007 -0.53 ** 0.04
Project countries 0.00 0.00
LN (Number of staff)  0.22 ** 0.01
Control variables
Sex (Male=ref.) -0.12 ** 0.02
Age  0.01 ** 0.00
Denomination (Non religious=ref.)
Catholic -0.25 ** 0.02
Protestant -0.29 ** 0.03
Other 0.03 0.03
Church attendance -0.00 0.00
Marital status (Married=ref.)
Single -0.02 0.02
Couple  0.04 0.03
Divorced  0.20 ** 0.03
Widow/widower 0.11 ** 0.04
Education -0.01 ** 0.00
Founder (No=ref.) 0.45 ** 0.01
△ Deviance 21,424.29
△ Df 30b
Source: CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009
*~p < 0.10; *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01 (two sided test of significance)
Notes: 
a: Dummies for missing values are included but not shown 
b: Compared to empty model.
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Table 3.4 Coefficients from Poisson regression: Differential effects of personal motives (VFI) for founders 
and non-founders of PDIs on time investment a
Founders Non-founders
β S.E. β S.E.
Intercept 3.78 0.14 3.83 0.16
Motives (VFI)
Values -0.13 ** 0.01 0.09 ** 0.02
Social 0.07 ** 0.01 -0.04 * 0.02
Career -0.04 ** 0.01 0.02 0.01
Enhancement 0.03 ** 0.01 -0.07 ** 0.01
Understanding 0.12 ** 0.01 0.44 ** 0.02
Protective 0.05 ** 0.01 0.04 ** 0.02
N 316 345
Source: CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-2009
*~p < 0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two sided test of significance)
Notes: 
a: Models were run separately for founders and non-founders, controlled for all other variables included in 
Table 3.3. 
 
3.5 Conclusions
International development cooperation as a charitable sector is characterised by features known 
to have a discouraging effect on (potential) individual donors. It is first of all more difficult for 
potential donors to be aware of the needs of the beneficiaries from international development 
organisations in comparison to local charitable causes (Bekkers, 2004; Chueng & Chan, 2000; 
Macaulay, 1975; Unger, 1991; Wiepking, 2008). Secondly, the psychological and geographical 
distance to beneficiaries hampers the possibility for donors to identify with beneficiaries and 
to observe the effect of a donation (Bekkers, 2004). Finally, the size and the complexity of the 
problems dealt with by most international development organisations make it difficult for donors 
to be convinced that their donation will make a substantial contribution (Micklewright & Wright, 
2004). For these reasons, donations to local charitable causes are more attractive to (potential) 
donors than to international development organisations (Bekkers, 2004). 
In the Netherlands, charitable behaviour for international development purposes is subject 
to important changes. Established development organisations suffer from a declining support 
base. In contrast, new private development initiatives (PDIs), that execute concrete, small-scale 
development projects, can count on a strong support of money and time. This study investigates 
the determinants of voluntary time investment among a sample of 661 Dutch PDI volunteers. We 
aimed to understand which factors make donating time beneficial and interesting for those engaged 
in volunteering work with PDIs. We derived four hypotheses from cost-benefit considerations and 
took into account both the supply side (i.e. characteristics of the volunteer) and the demand side 
(i.e. characteristics of the organisation) of volunteering work. 
Both financial and time restrictions are found to affect the time spent volunteering. When 
volunteers are restricted in their time, because they have a paid job or due to membership of other 
civic organisations, they tend to spend significantly less time volunteering. Also when free time is 
more costly, i.e. when volunteers receive a higher income for their paid job, volunteers spend less 
hours doing voluntary work. We thereby find corroborative evidence for our constraint hypothesis.
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Frequent visits to developing countries are related to more voluntary PDI work. Previous 
research on PDIs demonstrated that encounters with people in developing countries represent the 
most important trigger to initiate or become actively engaged in PDIs (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 
2011). This study shows that involvement in the lives of people in developing countries makes 
the distance to beneficiaries smaller and not only positively affects the willingness to volunteer in 
a PDI, but also increases the time investment of PDI volunteers. The distance to beneficiaries is 
also mediated through the ethnic background of the volunteer. Volunteers with a non-Western 
ethnic background implementing development projects in their country of origin – maybe even 
in their town or village of origin – are more strongly engaged in PDIs. In comparison to Western 
volunteers, the psychological distance between non-Western PDI volunteers and the beneficiaries 
is smaller, increasing the motivation to devote more voluntary hours. Contrary to our expectations, 
the number of years spent volunteering negatively relates to voluntary time investment. This could 
indicate that motivation levels decline with years resulting in a lower number of volunteering hours. 
Still, our proximity hypothesis met strong corroborative evidence.
On the other hand, our attitudes & motives hypothesis is only partly confirmed. Contrary to 
our expectations, we observed that volunteers with a stronger belief in development organisations 
volunteer fewer hours. PDI volunteers that have doubts about the effectiveness and efficiency 
of development organisations may perceive their voluntary time investment in PDIs as an 
alternative and more successful way to give expression to their involvement with the lives of 
people in developing countries and to contribute to poverty reduction than supporting established 
development organisations. The results of the VFI functions (motives for volunteering) demonstrate 
that volunteers’ engagement in PDIs is seen as a way for them to buy off negative feelings such 
as guilt and to enlarge their understanding of the world around them. The impact of the VFI 
functions ‘social’ and ‘values’ on voluntary time spending deviates between PDI founders and non-
founders. The results for founders are not in agreement with the results of earlier studies; we find 
a positive effect for volunteering for social reasons and a negative effect for volunteering to express 
important values for founders. Since we expect PDI founders to recruit volunteers mainly from 
their own network, it might be that  – compared to general PDI volunteers – PDI volunteering is a 
way to spend time with their friends, family or acquaintances (‘social’ function) for PDI founders. 
Further research is required to explain how and why the impact of the VFI functions for PDI 
founders diverges from that of general (PDI) volunteers.  
Asides from the characteristics of volunteers, organisational characteristics also influence 
voluntary time investment in PDIs. Volunteers in organisations with larger budgets spend more 
hours on voluntary work. Although we did not expect this, the same can be said for volunteers 
in PDIs with more staff. Contradicting our hypothesis, the number of project countries does 
not relate to the number of voluntary hours. Although our demand-side hypothesis is only 
partly confirmed, our study does demonstrate the importance of organisational characteristics 
for voluntary time investment. Future research – preferably with data that allows controlling for 
problems of endogeneity – is necessary to further extend our knowledge of how the demand side 
(i.e. organisation characteristics) affects voluntary time investment.
Whereas many (non PDI) organisations mainly engage volunteers in supporting their paid staff 
members, the existence of most PDIs is totally dependent on the efforts of volunteers. Most of them 
were initiated on a voluntary basis and a large majority continues to depend solely on the efforts 
of volunteers. Compared to general volunteers, PDI volunteers spend a much larger number of 
volunteering hours, but even among this specific group of volunteers time investment is the result 
of a deliberate decision-making process wherein both costs and benefits resulting from volunteering 
are included. More research is needed to explain why PDI volunteers spend more time on voluntary 
work than general volunteers. The specific characteristics of the PDI organisations may constitute 
an important part of the explanation. 
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Current developments in Dutch society indicate a growing donor-potential for PDIs. Our 
results suggest that PDI volunteering could be considered as a substitute for official development 
aid, fuelled by a sceptical attitude towards established development cooperation. In a time when 
established development organisations are criticised for not being fully effective and efficient, 
PDIs can attract volunteers by presenting their organisations as an alternative way to contribute 
to poverty reduction. 
Travelling to developing countries seems to enable Westerners to bridge the geographical and 
psychological gap between them and the beneficiaries of development projects and hence brings 
the beneficiaries closer to a potential donor. The shrinking of the world through, among other 
things, increased travel possibilities and the internet, provides increasing possibilities for overcoming 
the limitations associated with donating to organisations with distant beneficiaries. Bringing the 
beneficiary closer could result in an increasing donor-potential for organisations that have distant 
beneficiaries, such as Private Development Initiatives.
We are aware that the sample used in this study is very particular: we tested our hypotheses on 
a group of volunteers active in international development cooperation and even more specifically 
in Private Development Initiatives. Hence, we should be cautious of generalising our results 
and conclusions to the volunteer population at large. The fact that the impact of motives to 
volunteer affect volunteering time differently for PDI founders and non-founders illustrates that 
the determinants of volunteering may be conditional on the type of volunteer. We have shown that 
the characteristics of PDI organisations affect the time investment decisions of PDI volunteers. It 
remains open for future research to establish which organisational characteristics are important for 
which type of voluntary sector and volunteer. Similarly, scholars in the field may wish to investigate 
how other types of voluntary organisations can bring the beneficiaries closer and to assess the extent 
to which a smaller perceived distance to these beneficiaries positively affects donating. 
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Chapter 04
4. Explaining monetary donations to international development 
organisations:  
A factorial survey approach1
‘They [private donors] have trust in you, and you are running the foundation. If tomorrow we will 
tell them we are going to do something else, they will continue to support us. They trust us.’ 
Interview PDI member2
‘In the beginning I have told many people about our plan. Of course, they all spontaneously 
donated money because they liked the idea and because others were donating as well. And all of them 
remained loyal as donor. Because they believe in what we believe.’
Interview PDI founder
‘I noticed that having a good network is crucial; you can achieve many things through your 
network. When I post a very concrete story on Facebook or LinkedIn, within a month there is a new 
amount of money on our bank account. And then people want to know how it is going, and then I 
send them some pictures. It is all pretty amateurish, but people really like it.’
Interview PDI founder 
1  A slightly different version of  this chapter is published in Social Science Research  
(Kinsbergen & Tolsma, 2013). 
2  The quotes are derived from interviews with founders/members of  Private Development Initiatives  
(see Chapter 5). The data are available on request.
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Abstract
This chapter investigates what type of international development organisations potential 
donors would prefer to donate to. We constructed 960 scenarios in which a fictive development 
organisation was described. The scenarios were randomly varied across eight characteristics of the 
organisation: size, familiarity, experience, religious character, number of different projects run 
by the organisation, number of countries in which the organisation is active, overhead costs and 
staff composition. A large representative sample of the Dutch population (N=2,758) received six 
randomly allocated scenarios and had to decide if, and if so, how much they would donate to the 
depicted (fictive) organisation. Results demonstrate that donors have a preference for familiar 
organisations with several years of experience. Although donors have a strong aversion regarding 
overhead costs, we find that donors seem to value the capacities of paid staff members and are, 
to a certain extent, willing to pay a price for these. The ideal development organisation combines 
features typical of small(er) scale voluntary development organisations (e.g. mainly run by 
volunteers) and large(r) scale professional organisations (e.g. running development programmes 
in numerous countries). 
Keywords: International development organisations; trustworthiness; giving intentions; scenario 
study; factorial survey
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4.1 Introduction
Why people donate to charitable organisations and how much they are willing to donate are 
questions that have been extensively investigated by marketers, (social) psychologists, economists, 
anthropologists and sociologists (see: Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011, Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2007 
for reviews). Most previous studies focused on giving behaviour in general, on giving behaviour 
to a specific charitable sector (e.g. healthcare) and – to a lesser extent – on the preferences of 
donors for different charitable sectors (e.g. international development cooperation versus nature 
conservation) (Atkinson, 2008; Bennett, 2003; Micklewright & Wright, 2004; Schlegelmilch & 
Tynan, 1989; Wiepking, 2010). How characteristics of charitable organisations active within the 
same sector influence giving behaviour has received relatively little attention. A notable exception 
is Nunnenkamp & Öhler (2011). Thus far, insights on giving behaviour do not provide an 
answer to the question of why a given organisation is more attractive for potential donors than 
another operating in the same in the same sector. To fill these lacunae, the present study takes 
an intra-sector perspective in order to analyse how characteristics of international development 
organisations affect monetary donation decisions of potential donors.  The research question of 
this chapter is:
How do characteristics of development organisations influence the decision making of 
potential donors?
International development organisations are characterised by features known to have a discouraging 
effect on (potential) donors (Bekkers, 2010). First, it is more difficult for potential donors to be 
aware of the needs of the beneficiaries of international development organisations compared to 
those of local charitable causes (Bekkers, 2004; Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Chueng & Chan, 
2000; Macaulay, 1975; Unger, 1991; Wiepking, 2008). Second, the psychological and geographical 
distance to beneficiaries hampers the possibility for donors to identify with beneficiaries and to 
observe the effect of a donation (Bekkers, 2004; Kinsbergen, et al., 2013). Third, the size and the 
complexity of the problems dealt with by most international development organisations make 
it difficult for donors to be convinced that their donation will make a substantial contribution 
(Micklewright & Wright, 2004). Finally, as compared to local charitable causes (such as ‘health 
care’ or ‘arts & culture’), donations to international development organisations offer no direct, 
personal benefit for donors. 
Unsurprisingly, public attitude towards international development organisations is sceptical. 
People are doubtful about the effectiveness of international development organisations and the 
efficiency with respect to how their money is spent (Bekkers & Boonstoppel, 2011; Carabain et 
al., 2012; Council on Foreign Relations, 2012; European Commission, 2010; Gijsbers & van 
der Lelij, 2010; Hento, 2011; Lindstrom & Henson, 2011; Pollet, 2012; PQR, 2010; Ravelli 
& Verhoeven, 2008). People are sceptical about the achievability of poverty reduction and pose 
critical questions on the share of the budget that international development organisations spend 
on overhead costs (PQR, 2010). 
This critical tuning is accompanied by an increasing number and diversity of actors taking 
up an active role in the field of international development cooperation. Growing numbers of 
companies, philanthropists, famous stars – referred to as celebrity humanitarians – and ‘ordinary’ 
individuals feel the urge to actively contribute to the global fight against poverty (Bishop & Green, 
2008; Cameron & Haanstra, 2008; Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009; Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 
2011; Samman et al., 2009; Severino & Ray, 2010; Yrjölä, 2009). One of these rising alternative 
development actors is the group of Private Development Initiatives (PDIs) (Develtere & De Bruyn, 
2009; Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). These organisations are characterised by their small size (i.e. 
small budget and limited number of staff) and voluntary character (i.e. low percentage of paid staff 
members) (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). As a consequence, nowadays, there is a wide range of 
development organisations – from small to large, from experienced to novice, from professionally 
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run, to run by volunteers only – competing for financial support. The question to which of these 
international development organisations the public prefers to donate money is more relevant than 
ever before.
Trust in philanthropic organisations is crucial, both for retaining existing donors and for 
attracting new donors (Bekkers, 2003a; Bekkers, 2003b; Bowman, 2004; Sargeant & Lee, 2002a; 
Sargeant & Lee, 2002b; Zalpha van Berkel & WWAV, 2005). In a study of Dutch citizens 60 per 
cent of donors trust charitable organisations, whereas only 12 per cent of non-donors do so (Zalpha 
van Berkel & WWAV, 2005). Moreover, donors that have trust in charitable organisations donate 
50 per cent more than those without trust in these organisations (Independent Sector, 2002). 
Trust in charitable organisations thus results in both a higher number of donations and donations 
of larger amounts (Sargeant & Lee, 2004). Hence, our main expectation is that development 
organisations that are able to signal trustworthiness receive a larger number of donations and 
donations of a higher value. But in which cases are development organisations considered 
trustworthy? And do other characteristics, not (directly) related to trust, also influence the giving 
behaviour of individuals? 
Our site of study is the Netherlands. Notwithstanding the negative features (described above) 
that all development organisations share, the Netherlands is known for its generous donations 
to charitable causes in general and to international development cooperation in particular 
(Micklewright & Wright, 2004; OECD, 2012; Schuyt et al., 2013). To date, the Netherlands is 
one of the few countries that honours the agreement to contribute 0.7 per cent of its Gross National 
Product to Official Development Aid (OECD, 2012).3 International development organisations 
received 281 million euro from Dutch households in 2011, making international development 
cooperation – next to faith-based organisations and health care – the third largest charitable cause in 
the Netherlands (Bekkers & de Wit, 2013). The diversification of actors within this philanthropic 
sector has been very pronounced in the Netherlands. In the 1990s, there were just over 100 
Dutch Non Governmental Development Organisations (here abbreviated as NGO’s), one of the 
important development actors in the Netherlands. In ten years time, this number almost doubled 
(IS Academie NGO database). Similarly, there is a large number of PDIs in the Netherlands 
(Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). 
To investigate to what extent characteristics of development organisations affect the decisions 
of (potential) donors to donate money, we included a factorial survey design in the fifth edition 
of the Family Survey of the Dutch Population (FSDP) completed by 2,758 respondents in 2009 
(Kraaykamp et al., 2009). We constructed 960 standardised scenarios that each describes a fictive 
international development organisation. The scenarios varied systematically across 8 dimensions: (1) 
size (i.e. small or large), (2) familiarity (i.e. known or unknown to potential donor), (3) experience 
(i.e. in years), (4) religious character (i.e. denominational or non-denominational), (5) number of 
different projects run by organisation (i.e. few or many), (6) number of countries in which 
the organisation is active (i.e. one or several), (7) overhead costs (in percentages) and (8) staff 
composition (i.e. mainly volunteers or paid staff). Out of the 960 scenarios, six were randomly 
allocated to each respondent of the FSDP. Respondents were told they could donate 0 to 100 
euro to each of the fictive organisations described in the scenario. We will investigate when people 
decide to donate and, if they do so, how much they decide to donate. The FSDP includes extensive 
measures for individual characteristics known from previous research to be predictive for donating 
to charitable organisations (e.g. age, education, general social trust) as well as information on the 
actual monetary donations of the respondent in the past (Kraaykamp et al., 2010). We will show 
below that the known determinants of donating behaviour and previous donations are related to 
fictive donation decisions. This demonstrates the internal validity of our design. Furthermore, 
the wide array of individual characteristics allows us to investigate heterogeneity in the impact of 
organisational characteristics on (fictive) donation decisions. 
3  In the most recent coalition agreement the Dutch government announced the contribution to 
international development cooperation will be reduced to approximately 0.5 per cent of  the GNP 
(Coalition agreement, 2012).
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4.2 Expectations 
4.2.1 Characteristics of development organisations affecting monetary donations 
Having trust in the effective and efficient use of their donation is pivotal in the decision-making 
process of donors (Bekkers, 2010; Cheung & Chan, 2000; Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2007; Supphellen 
& Nelson, 2001). Duncan (2004) uses the term ‘impact philanthropists’: donors want to have 
the feeling that they personally make a difference in the lives of the beneficiaries of a charitable 
organisation. They will be reluctant to donate when they are of the opinion that their contributions 
cannot make an immediate difference because the problems dealt with by the organisation are too 
big or too complex (Micklewright & Wright, 2004). Donors also want to be convinced of the 
organisation’s capability to spend their money wisely and feel less rewarded and less willing to 
donate when they are uncertain that their donation will make a valuable contribution (Bekkers, 
2010; Micklewright & Wright, 2004). Consequently, the psychological reward will increase when 
donors trust development organisations to make a genuine difference in the lives of beneficiaries 
because they ‘do the right things’ and ‘do these things rightly’. For international development 
organisations dealing with complex, problems and distant beneficiaries, signalling trustworthiness 
is especially crucial and challenging (Bekkers, 2006; Wiepking, 2010).  
According to Supphellen and Nelson (2001), when deciding if they should donate or not, the 
first important aspect for potential donors is whether they are familiar with the requesting charitable 
organisation. Donors’ trust in the efficiency and effectiveness of charitable organisations will be 
enhanced if they are already familiar with the organisation (Saxton, 1995; Supphellen & Nelson, 
2001). We therefore expect that people are more likely to donate money to known development 
organisations and also that donors donate more to known development organisations. We formulate 
the familiarity hypothesis:
H1. People have a higher probability of donating (more) money to a development 
organisation they know. 
To overcome barriers to donating to international development organisations, (potential) donors 
have to be convinced that their donation makes a difference in the lives of the beneficiaries of the 
organisation. Donors want to be able to assess the impact of their donations and to identify with 
the beneficiaries of the organisation as well. Small-size development organisations, organisations 
working in one developing country and organisations supporting fewer development projects 
will be better able to respond to these requirements. We will refer to these three features as the 
scale of the organisation. It is easier for donors to monitor the work of small-scale development 
organisations and see the impact of individual donations on their work (Borgloh et al., 2013; 
Duncan, 2004; Man & Van Hemert, 2006; Micklewright & Wright, 2004). In this study, we 
test whether donors really have a preference for small-scale development organisations. Our scale 
hypothesis reads: 
H2. People are more willing to donate (more) money to (a) small development 
organisations, (b) organisations working in fewer development countries and (c) carrying 
out fewer development projects.
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The desire of donors to have an impact on the lives of the beneficiaries suggests a preference 
for organisations where the budget is mainly spent on development programmes rather than 
on management. Results of different studies show that, when assessing the performance of 
an organisation, people attach great weight to the overhead ratio, namely the ratio between 
administration and fundraising costs and total expenditures (Bekkers, 2003a; Bowman, 2006; 
Callen, 1994; Sargeant, et al., 2001; Tinkelman & Mankaney, 2007). Not only may high overhead 
ratios signal inefficiency, they may also be associated with malpractice or even corruption by 
(potential) donors. The effect this can have on the charitable organisation is illustrated by the case of 
the Dutch development organisation, ‘Plan Nederland’, who lost almost half of its donors after the 
media reported on ‘overhead ratios reaching 50 per cent’ and ‘the exorbitant salary’ of the interim 
manager (Velthuis, 2006). We therefore formulate the overhead hypothesis:
H3. People are more willing to donate (more) money to development organisations with a 
lower overhead ratio.
Sargeant and Lee (2002a) argue that potential donors will consider the role competence of an 
organisation to spend money effectively and efficiently when evaluating the impact of their 
donation. They define role competence as the ‘degree to which the non-profit has the necessary 
skills, abilities and knowledge for effective task performance’ (Sargeant & Lee, 2002a: 784). 
They conclude that the higher the degree of perceived competence of the individual and the 
organisation pleading for a financial contribution, the more likely they are to earn the trust of the 
donor. We expect the age of the organisation – as a proxy for its experience – to positively affect 
the extent to which people perceive an organisation as competent. Moreover, potential donors will 
base their judgment of the competency of the organisation on the skills, knowledge and abilities 
of the staff carrying out the work. If this holds true, it is to be expected that people perceive an 
organisation with professional staff (i.e. people who are trained in a certain profession and earn a 
living from it) to be more competent than organisations mainly run by volunteers. Therefore, we 
formulate the role competence hypothesis:
H4. People are more willing to donate (more) money to (a) experienced development 
organisations and (b) development organisations run by professional staff.
4.2.2 The combination of organisational characteristics
Although potential donors may have a preference for both professional staff and low overhead ratios, 
paid employees are obviously more expensive than volunteers and may therefore lead to higher 
overhead ratios. In the cost-benefit analysis of potential donors, a preference for organisations 
run by professional staff is likely to be accompanied by a higher tolerance towards overhead costs; 
competence does not come for free. We formulate the staff and overhead (interaction) hypothesis:
H5. The negative impact of overhead ratios on monetary donations is smaller for 
development organisations run by paid staff. 
Empirical studies find that overhead ratios decrease as the scale of organisations increases (Hager 
et al., 2001; Malki & Brown, 2011). Large-scale organisations experience the advantages of 
economies of scale, whereas small-scale non-profit organisations have to spend a larger proportion 
of their budget on administration costs. We therefore could expect a lower tolerance towards 
overhead ratios for larger development organisations, organisations active in more than one 
country and organisations running several development projects. On the other hand, qualitative 
research shows that (potential) donors assume small-scale development organisations to spend 
(nearly) all of their budget directly on their development programmes while they expect larger 
scale development organisations to have higher overhead ratios (PQR, 2010). This may result 
in a stronger aversion towards the overhead costs of small-scale development organisations. 
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In this contribution we will explore which of both argumentations is reflected in (potential) donors’ 
decision-making process.  Since we do not have a preference for either of these two argumentations, 
we do not formulate a hypothesis. 
Furthermore, we expect that the age of the organisation – functioning as a proxy for its 
experience and reputation (Tinkelman, 1999; Weisbrod & Dominguez, 1986) – will moderate 
the effect of the familiarity of the organisation on the preparedness of donors to donate money. We 
expect that the familiarity of the requesting organisation will be less important to (potential) donors 
for organisations with more experience. We formulate the experience and familiarity (interaction) 
hypothesis:
H6. The positive impact of the familiarity of development organisations on monetary 
donations is smaller for experienced organisations.
4.2.3 For whom do organisational characteristics matter more?
As stated above, in order to receive monetary donations it is important to signal trustworthiness, 
but not all potential donors are easily convinced that a voluntary organisation can be trusted. We 
expect the impact of organisational features to be conditional on characteristics of the donor. The 
Netherlands is traditionally considered a high trust country (CBS, 2012). Of our respondents, 
67.6 per cent indicated that people in general can be trusted but generalised social trust varies 
considerably across individuals.4 General social trust is positively related to trust in institutions, 
and individuals high in (general and institutional) social trust are more willing to donate to 
charitable organisations (Bekkers, 2003b). One could therefore expect that for potential donors 
low in trust, it is more important that an organisation signals trust, for example by being known. 
We therefore formulate the trust and familiarity (interaction) hypothesis:  
H7. The positive impact of the familiarity of development organisations on monetary 
donations is larger for individuals low in general social trust. 
Similarly, scepticism regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of development organisations 
varies among potential donors (see Table 4.2). Sceptical donors are convinced that, in general, 
development organisations are ineffective and inefficient: money is being wasted on fundraising 
and administration. The sceptical donor, in particular, may perceive a high level of overhead 
costs in development organisations as an indication of this waste: the budget spent on, among 
other things, management, fundraising and staff is seen as money that has not been (directly) 
transferred to the projects of a development organisation. We therefore expect that overhead costs 
have a stronger negative effect on more sceptical (potential) donors. Our scepticism and overhead 
(interaction) hypothesis reads:
H8. The negative impact of overhead ratios on monetary donations is higher for people with 
a low belief in development organisations.
Donors express a preference for those organisations that are in keeping with their values because 
‘philanthropy is a means to reach a desired state of affairs that is closer to one’s view of the ‘ideal 
world’’ (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011: 941). As different charities adhere to different worldviews 
and thus strive for different goals, donors can choose to donate to an organisation that fits their 
worldview best. Different studies demonstrate that people indeed donate to organisations that 
have similar values to their own (Bennet, 2003; Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2007; Saxton, 1995; 
4     Following the statement ‘In general, most people can be trusted’, participants could give an answer on a 
scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means ‘completely disagree’ and 5 ‘completely agree’. The mean value is 3.61 
with a standard deviation of  0.85 (see also Table 4.2).
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Supphellen & Nelson, 2001; Wiepking, 2008). Religious people are found to donate more than 
the non-religious and are especially inclined to donate both time and money to organisations 
with a religious character (Bekkers, 2003a; Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008; Ruiter & de Graaf, 2006; 
Wiepking, 2010). We expect this relationship to also be evident when potential donors have 
to choose between different organisations within one sub-sector, international development 
cooperation. Our, final, religiosity (interaction) hypothesis reads:
H9. The religious background of the development organisations will positively affect 
monetary donations for religious individuals. 
4.3 Controls
In this contribution we take into account several other individual characteristics known to 
influence the decision to donate to charitable organisations and we will also use the self-reported 
giving behaviour of respondents in the past to predict giving intentions. The inclusion of these 
known determinants of giving behaviour allows us to check the internal validity of the scenario 
design. In most studies, income, age and level of education positively affect people’s willingness 
to donate (more) money (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2007). Protestants 
and frequent church attendees are generally more inclined to donate (more) and not only to 
religious causes (Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008; Ruiter & de Graaf, 2006). Both the religious context 
– including pro-social values – and the likelihood of being asked have a positive influence on 
their giving behaviour (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). The results of earlier studies on the effect 
of gender on donating are ambiguous (Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2007). Most studies do not reveal 
differences between the giving behaviour of men and women. However, some studies revealed 
that although women are more likely to donate, men donate higher amounts (Andreoni et al., 
2003; Bekkers, 2004). We include (the level of ) people’s general social trust and their belief in 
development organisations in the analysis, and we expect it to positively affect the giving intentions 
of respondents (Bekkers, 2003b; Bekkers, 2006; Wiepking et al., 2007). Lastly, we expect visits 
to development countries to decrease the distance between (potential) donors and beneficiaries 
resulting in a higher probability of donating (more) money (Bekkers, 2010).
4.4 Data and methods
4.4.1 Family Survey of the Dutch Population
We tested our hypotheses with the use of the fifth edition of the Family Survey of the Dutch 
Population (FSDP) wave 2009 (Kraaijkamp et al., 2009). The survey is designed by the Sociology 
Department of the Radboud University Nijmegen in the Netherlands and aims to gain insight 
into the living conditions and life course of the Dutch population. The target population of 
the survey are Dutch-speaking people aged between 18 and 70 years.5 The data was collected 
from individuals within households, using Computer Aided Personal Interviewing (CAPI) and 
a written self-completion questionnaire. Field research took place in the period from January 
until December 2009. A response rate of 49.4 per cent (N=3,269) was obtained. We excluded 
respondents in our sample (about 14 per cent) that did not fill out the self-completion part of 
the survey because this part contains the relevant items for this study. After listwise deletion 
of respondents with missing data (about 1.5 per cent), our working sample consists of 2,758 
respondents. 
5  For the present study we also include the 55 respondents (2 per cent) whose self-reported age was older 
than 70.
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The FSDP consists of a large (more or less) representative sample of the native Dutch population.6 
For more information on the FSDP we refer those interested to the codebook (Kraaijkamp et al., 
2010).7 
4.4.2 Scenarios on development organisations
We used a factorial survey approach to assess people’s preferences for particular development 
organisations. We constructed 960 standardised fictive scenarios. Each standardised scenario 
consisted of one or more short sentences in a fixed order that described a specific development 
organisation. The development organisations within the 960 scenarios were systematically varied 
on eight dimensions: (1) size of the organisation (small-big), (2) familiarity (unknown- known), 
(3) experience (5, 10 or 20 years), (4) religiosity (non religious-religious), (5) number of projects 
run by an organisation (some-many), (6) the number of countries an organisation is working 
in (one-several), (7) overhead ratio (0%, 20%, 40%, 60% and 80% spend on overhead costs) 
and (8) staff composition (whether the organisation is mainly run by volunteers or paid staff ).8 
Randomly combining these features, resulted in 960 unique scenarios (2*2*3*2*2*2*5*2). The 
factorial survey design was incorporated in the Computer Assisted Personal Interview of the 
Family Survey of the Dutch Population. A laptop was given to the respondents. They started 
by reading an introduction. They were told they had, in each case, a maximum of 100 euro 
to donate to the organisation described.9 Respondents could also decide not to donate to the 
depicted organisation. Each scenario was presented on a separate page, respondents could not 
return to a previous scenario. The outline of the scenario, including the introductory text, is 
described below: 
[Introductory text]
Six different development organisations will be presented to you. The organisations differ 
from one another in several of their characteristics. You will be requested to donate to each 
of these organisations, and each time you will have a maximum of 100 euro to spend. It is 
of course possible not to donate to the depicted organisation. 
[Scenario] 
Imagine you have 100 euro to spend on charitable causes. A [small-big] [unknown-
known] development organisation with [5-10-20] years of experience asks for your support. 
[The organisation has a religious background-‘blank’]. The organisation is supporting 
[some-many] projects in [one country-several countries]. For each euro given to the 
organisation, [100-80-60-40-20] cent reaches the beneficiary. The organisation is mainly 
run by [volunteers-paid staff ]. How much would you like to donate to this development 
organisation? 
6  We observe no substantial differences in the explanatory variables of  interest (e.g. age, church attendance, 
education, general social trust) between a weighted and unweighted dataset  (results available on request). 
Therefore, we present results for an unweighted dataset. 
7  The data are deposited at the electronic filing system DANS and available after permission of  the 
researcher.
8  The size of  the organisation refers to a combination of  its budget and the number of  staff  members. 
We decided not to include both of  these features separately in the scenarios since this would make it too 
complex for respondents to weigh all the different features in their decision-making process.
9  The endowment of  100 euro has been set in the same order of  magnitude as the average annual 
donation to development organisations in the Netherlands (87 euro; Gouwenberg et al., 2011). We 
thought it was also a manageable number to work with for the respondents.
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The 960 constructed descriptions of development organisations map most, if not all, real 
development organisations. The observed impact of organisational characteristics on intentions 
to donate can be generalised to development organisations, but not to different types of 
organisations. 
Six scenarios out of the total of 960 were randomly allocated to every respondent. This resulted 
in 16,548 observations (No=2,758 * 6) on monetary donations. These 16,548 observations (No) 
are nested in respondents (Ni=2,758) and in scenarios (Ns=960). The nesting is non-hierarchical; 
observations are nested both in respondents (for each respondent we have 6 observations) and in 
scenarios (for each scenario we expect approximately 17 observations (16,548/960)). We therefore 
applied cross-classified multilevel methods in order to obtain non-biased standard errors (Shi et 
al., 2010; Luo & Kwok, 2009). Figure 4.1 presents the frequency distribution of the (intended) 
donations to development organisations. We constructed two dependent variables related to the 
willingness to donate to development organisations. First we recoded all observation into the 
variable intention to donate which takes up the value 0 (no donation) or 1 (donation) (see dashed 
black line Figure 4.1). We then selected only those observations in which a donation was made 
(10,323 observations, approximately 62 per cent) and recoded these observations into the variable 
donate40. This variable reflects whether donations were lower than 40 euro (the mean value is 40.7, 
dashed grey line Figure 4.1) or above 40 euro.
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Figure 4.1 Histogram of (intended) donations to development organisations
Note: The spaces between the bars represent a frequency of zero. The two dashed lines represent the two cut-
off values for our dependent variables (and thus not frequencies). Of all 16,548 donation observations, 10,323 
are larger than zero, demarcated by the black dashed line. The mean value of all 10,323 positive donations is 
40.7 (dashed grey line).
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The factorial survey approach is a quasi-experiment within a survey (Bekkers, 2010; Rossi & 
Anderson, 1982). It incorporates the advantage of surveys and experiments. Whereas experiments 
often struggle with the rather low disparity of socio-demographic and personality characteristics 
due to relatively small samples, surveys have large sample of respondents (Bekkers, 2010). 
Randomisation within the scenarios and in their allocation gives the factorial survey the robustness 
of an experimental method (Taylor, 2006). An important challenge related to the factorial survey 
approach discussed in the literature is the correspondence between the intended and actual 
behaviour of individuals (Bekkers, 2010; Eifler, 2007, Tolsma et al., 2012). We dealt with this 
in the present study by including the self-reported giving behaviour of the respondents in the 
analysis. Unfortunately, the survey only contains information on whether or not respondents 
donated to development organisations in the past but does not provide information on the 
amount respondents’ donated.
We decided to construct scenarios that could also include less true-to-life development 
organisations (e.g. organisation mainly run by professionals with 100 per cent of the donations 
reaching the beneficiary), because (1) we wanted to find out if people prefer organisations with 
(as yet) less likely combinations of features; and (2) in order to come as close as possible to a real 
experiment, all characteristics of the development organisation had to be randomly varied. 
4.4.3 Individual characteristics
The dummy variable Female refers to the gender of a respondent, with male being the reference 
category. Age is included as a continuous variable. To see whether the religiosity of an individual 
affects monetary donations, we measured the Denomination of the respondents in four categories: 
(1) non-religious; (2) Catholic; (3) Protestant; (4) other. Church attendance is measured in times 
per year for both individuals who do and do not belong to a specific denomination. Education was 
measured in years: primary education (6 years); lower secondary vocational education (8 years); 
lower general secondary education (10 years); upper secondary vocational education (10.5 years); 
higher secondary education (11.5 years); higher professional education (15 years); university 
education (16.5 years). Income refers to the personal net monthly income of the respondent. We 
constructed four income categories of approximately equal size with the following ranges (1) 0-750 
euro; (2) 751-1,500 euro; (3) 1,501-2,100 euro; (4) >2,100 euro. We also included a missing 
category. We measured respondents’ General social trust with a single item: ‘In general, most people 
can be trusted’. Response categories ranged from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). 
We constructed a scale to measure people’s attitude towards development organisations, Belief in 
development organisations. This scale consists of nine items related to the accountability, efficiency 
and effectiveness of development organisations (see Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1 Items ‘Belief in Development Organisations’-scale
Construct Items
Effectiveness Many development organisations deliver a bad job. 
Most projects of development organisations fail. 
Development organisations are good at poverty reduction. 
Efficiency Development organisations waste little money. 
Development organisations spend too much money on staff and organisation 
in the Netherlands.
Development organisations could achieve the same results with less money.
Accountability Development organisations give enough information on their achievements in 
development countries.
Development organisations only tell what goes right and hide their failures.
Development organisations should not spend money on communication.
Notes:
a Answer categories: (1) Completely agree, (2) Agree, (3) Neither agree, nor disagree, (4) Disagree, 
Completely disagree.
b Items were (re)coded in the same direction so that higher scores indicate a more positive attitude towards 
development organisations.
For each item response categories ranged from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). 
The Cronbach’s Alpha of this scale is 0.77, where higher scores indicate a more positive attitude 
towards development organisations. We included the dummy variable Visit to developing 
country, indicating whether or not a respondent visited a developing country. The variable Self-
reported donation to development organisation shows whether or not the respondent donated to a 
development organisation in the past year. 
Because of the small number of missing values we applied listwise deletion. All metric variables 
are centred on their mean value to facilitate interpretation. Descriptive statistics of the individual 
variables are summarised in Table 4.2. Almost half of the respondents are male and their average 
age is 50 years. Nearly 60 per cent of the respondents are non-religious, 21 per cent belong to 
the Catholic Church and close to 15 per cent consider themselves as Protestant. On average, 
respondents attained 11 years of education. The mean score of 2.89 on the ‘Belief in Development 
Organisations’ scale is just above the ‘neutral’ midpoint of 2.5 and demonstrates there is, in 
general, only to some extent a positive belief in development organisations. Nearly 20 per cent of 
the respondents said they visited at least one developing country. In the past year, 40 per cent of 
the respondents reported to have donated to a development organisation. 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics (Respondent level, Ni=2,758)
Mean %
Standard 
deviation
Sex
Male 48.91
Female 51.08 
Age (20-92 years) 50.41 11.55
Denomination
Non religious 58.92
Catholic 21.10
Protestant 14.93
Other 5.04
church attendance (0-75 p.a.) 9.07 19.29
education (6-16.5 years) 11.42 3.26
Monthly net income
0-750 euro 19.36
751-1,500 euro 19.86
1,501-2,100 euro 18.02
>2,100 euro 18.99
missing 23.74
General social trust (1-5) 3.61 0.85
Belief in development organisation (1- 5) 2.89 0.53
Visit to developing country
NO 79.91
Yes 20.08
(Self-reported) giving to development 
organisations
NO 55.18
Yes 40.24
missing 4.56
Source: Family Survey Dutch Population, Wave 2009 
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Internal validity
Table 4.3 presents the estimated logit coefficients of cross-classified multilevel logit models and 
the corresponding average marginal effects.10 Before we discuss the effects of the organisational 
characteristics on donors’ giving intentions, we discuss the results of the individual characteristics. 
The inclusion of individual level characteristics does not affect the estimates of the organisational 
level characteristics because the scenarios were successfully randomly allocated to respondents 
(results for models without individual level characteristics are available on request). 
Our results are mostly in line with those of  earlier studies on actual monetary donations to 
charitable organisations, affirming the internal validity of  our design. In line with previous research, 
women have a higher probability to donate and, among donors, women are more likely to donate 
more than 40 euro, the respective estimated logit coefficients are 0.67 for Intention to donate and 
0.47 for Donate40. Although, this latter finding contrasts with the studies on charitable behaviour 
of  Andreoni and colleagues (2003) and Bekkers (2004), it is in line with Chang (2005). 
The age of  respondents negatively affects the intention to donate: older people have a lower 
probability to donate money to development organisations (β = -0.03 for Intention to donate). 
However, older donors are more often inclined to donate more than the mean donation of  40 
euro (β = 0.01 for Donate40).
 Protestants and Catholics donate more frequently (on average, the probability that Protestants 
and Catholics donate is approximately 0.1 higher than that non-religious donate, as indicated by 
the respective marginal effects). Church attendance positively and significantly affects both the 
intention to donate and, for donors, the intention to donate more than the mean donation of  40 
euro. Education only positively affects the intended amount donated (β = 0.05 for Donate40). 
In contrast to earlier studies, we find that income has no effect on giving intentions. This is likely 
the result of  how we constructed the scenarios. We asked respondents to imagine they had 100 
euro to spend on each of  the six charitable causes presented to them in the vignettes. They could 
also decide to keep the ‘fake’ money for themselves. Because we are dealing with fictive money, 
this may make the actual income of  respondents irrelevant. On the other hand, as stated above, in 
approximately 38 per cent of  our observations respondents were unwilling to give ‘fake’ money 
to the presented organisation.11 Although this seems to indicate that participants treated the 100 
euro as real money – thereby lending credibility to our study design – it makes it harder to explain 
the null finding with respect to income. 
A higher general social trust results in a higher probability to donate money to development 
organisations, but among donors it does not affect the chance to donate more than the mean 
donation. A more positive attitude towards development organisations does result in a higher 
likelihood of  giving a donation to these organisations, as indicated by the significant coefficient 
1.38 for Intention to donate. However, among those who decide to donate, the intention to donate 
more or less than the mean donation is not significantly affected by people’s attitude towards 
development organisations (see Table 4.3). 
Visits to development countries have a negative effect on the willingness to donate to 
international development organisations (β = -0.37 for Intention to donate). In contrast, for 
donors who visited a developing country the chance to donate more than 40 euro increases (on 
average) with 0.03. Kinsbergen and Schulpen (2011) argue that a visit to a developing country is 
of time invested in the voluntary organisation. 
10  The models are estimated in R (http://CRAN.R-project.org) with the function glmer of  the package 
lme4. The command for the null model – without explanatory variables – looks like: model0 <- glmer
(Y1~(1|RESPONDENT)+(1|SCENARIO), family=binomial, data=FSDP). To calculate the average 
marginal effects we took into account the predicted random parts, next to the values of  the covariates,  
as well.  
11  Approximately 13 per cent of  respondents did not give anything to the six organisations presented to 
them (not shown).
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However, both of these studies suffered from selection bias; their sample consisted only of 
already active volunteers. The results of the current study show that, for potential donors, visits 
to development countries have an inhibiting effect on their willingness to donate money to 
development organisations. 
Finally, we find a strong positive effect of self-reported giving behaviour on the decision whether 
or not to donate: the odds of donating to a (fictive) development organisation is approximately 
twice as large (exp(0.72)= 2.07) for respondents who donated money to charitable causes as 
compared to respondents who did not donate to charitable causes in the past. Self-reported giving 
behaviour is not predictive for the intention to donate more or less than the mean donation of 40 
euro (see Table 4.3). 
4.5.2 Impact of organisational characteristics on monetary donations
We now discuss the effects of the organisational characteristics of donors’ giving intentions. In 
line with our familiarity hypothesis, donors have a preference to donate (more than the mean of 40 
euro) to development organisations that are familiar to them (β = 0.56 for Intention to donate, β 
= 0.37 for Donate40). In our scale hypothesis, we expected that the preference of donors would be 
to donate (more than the mean of 40 euro) to small size development organisations, which run 
only a few projects and are active in only one country, in order to be better able to control the 
effect of their donation. However, contrary to our expectations and Duncan’s (2004) theory on 
impact philanthropists, we find insignificant effects from the size of the organisation and from 
the number of projects organisations run on both the willingness to donate and on the intention 
to donate more than 40 euro. In contrast to our expectation, we find that organisations running 
projects in several countries receive more donations and more donations above 40 euro (β = 
0.13 for Intention to donate, β = 0.13 for Donate40). It seems that in their search for ‘impactful’ 
donations, donors prefer development organisations running development programmes in several 
countries.  
In line with our role competence hypothesis, we find that for development organisations with 
20 years of experience the odds of them receiving a donation is approximately 28 per cent larger 
than that of 5 year old organisations ((1 - e0.24 )*100 = 27.89). The intention to donate more 
than the mean donation of 40 euro increases significantly for development organisations with 
10 years of experience (β = 0.28 for Donate40). We also expected (potential) donors to prefer 
organisations mainly run by professionals. However, it emerges that – even if we hold overhead 
ratios constant – people prefer organisations mainly run by volunteers; they are less likely to donate 
if the organisation is run by paid staff (β = -0.47 for Intention to donate) and donors are less inclined 
to donate more than 40 euro to organisations run by paid staff (β = -0.69 for Donate40). Hence 
our role competence hypothesis meets only partial corroborative evidence.
Not surprisingly, higher overhead ratios of an organisation have a (very) strong negative influence 
on donation decisions. People prefer organisations that spend their money mainly on their 
programmes instead of on managing the organisations. Compared to an organisation spending its 
entire budget on its development programme, the chance to receive a donation for organisations 
with an overhead ratio of 80 per cent is (on average) decreased by 0.4 (as indicated by the respective 
marginal effect of -0.40). Our overhead hypothesis is corroborated.
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Table 4.3 Cross-classified multilevel estimates on willingness to donate (more) to development 
organisations
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4.5.3 The combination of organisational characteristics 
We present the estimated interaction terms in Table 4.4, which can be interpreted as the ‘interaction 
effect’ with respect to the logit. The interaction effect on the predicted probability depends, just 
as marginal effects, on other covariates (and random parts) as Ai and Norton (2003) show. We 
therefore include in Table 4.4 the average interaction effect (and the standard error thereof ) on 
the probability as well. The interpretation of the true interaction effect is easiest to understand for 
an interaction between a continuous variable and a dummy variable. This interaction effect may 
then be interpreted as the difference in the marginal effect of the continuous variable between 
the two categories of the dummy variable (conditional on the covariates and the random parts). 
To calculate these interaction effects – there is no standardised function to calculate average 
interaction effects and the standard errors thereof for cross-classified multilevel models – we 
developed an R-script (available on request).12
When organisations are mainly run by paid staff potential donors are in general more tolerant 
towards higher overhead ratios. Remember that on average the probability to donate decreases 
with 0.4 when overhead ratios are 80 per cent as compared to organisations without overhead costs 
(Table 4.3). This decline is however 0.03 points less for organisations with paid staff as compared to 
organisations run by volunteers (Table 4.4). The same effect is observed for donors whether or not 
to donate more than 40 euro. We conclude that our staff and overhead hypothesis is corroborated: 
donors seem to value the capacities of paid staff members and are, to a certain extent, willing to 
pay a price for these.  
Higher overhead ratios have the same negative impact on monetary donations for small and large 
organisations; the interaction terms referring to ‘Overhead ratio*Size of the organisation’ are not 
significant, neither are the interaction effects (Table 4.4). 
We find that, among donors, the negative impact of (high) overhead ratios on monetary donation 
decisions is weaker when organisations run many projects; the average interaction effects referring 
to 60 per cent and 80 per cent overhead ratios and many projects are positive and significant 
(for Donate40). On the other hand, potential donors have a stronger reluctance to donate to 
development organisations with overhead ratios when organisations are implementing projects in 
several countries. Note that although the respective interaction terms are negative and significant, 
the average interaction effects are negative but do not reach significance. 
We do not observe corroborative support for our experience and familiarity hypothesis. When
 organisations have more experience it remains just as important to be familiar among (potential) 
donors. 
12      The interaction effect is the cross-partial derivative of  the expected value of  y: d2F(x, β)/dx1dx2, 
where F(·) is the inverse logit (see Ai & Norton, 2003). Our models include interactions between two 
continuous variables, between a continuous variable and a dummy variable and between a continuous 
variable and a categorical variable. General formulas are provided in Norton et al. (2004) but only for 
interactions with continuous and/or dummy variables. For our somewhat more complicated interactions 
we followed the same principle: we took the appropriate derivatives and discrete differences.
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Table 4.4 Interaction estimates of Cross-classified multilevel estimates on willingness to 
donate (more) to development organisations 
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4.5.4 For whom do organisational characteristics matter more?
The results of the cross-level interactions between organisational characteristics and individual-
level characteristics are summarised in the bottom panel of Table 4.4. Familiar organisations 
attract more donations and more donations above 40 euro (see Table 4.3) and, as Table 4.4 
shows, this effect does not depend on individuals’ level of general social trust. Even for individuals 
with high levels of general social trust, it remains of importance that they are familiar with the 
requesting development organisation. We therefore refute our trust and familiarity hypothesis (see 
Table 4.4). 
When deciding whether or not to donate to a development organisation, we find that potential 
donors with more positive attitudes towards development organisations are more tolerant towards 
overhead ratios of 60 per cent. Although the respective estimated interaction term does not reach 
significance, the average interaction effect does (the average interaction effect is 0.04). Among 
donors, a stronger belief in development organisations dampens the negative effect of overhead 
ratios of 40 per cent. We therefore find weak evidence in favour of our scepticism and overhead 
hypothesis. 
Finally, corroborating our religiosity hypothesis, we find convincing evidence for our claim 
that in their search for value congruity, religious people and frequent church attendees are 
especially inclined to donate (more) to religious development organisations; with one exception, 
all interaction effects are in the predicted direction and significant. 
4.5.5 The ideal development organisation
For each of the 960 scenarios we calculated the predicted probabilities, based on a model that 
solely included (main effects of ) organisational level characteristics. In Table 4.5 we present the 
predicted probabilities for the five most ideal types of organisations and the five least ideal types of 
organisations. We do this both for the intention to donate (upper panel of Table 4.5) and for the 
intention to donate more than the mean donation of 40 euro (bottom panel of Table 4.5). The 
complete order is available on request. 
Development organisations with the highest probabilities of receiving a donation and of receiving 
a donation higher than 40 euro are, in general, familiar, have 10-20 years of experience, have no 
religious background, are active in more than one country, do not have any overhead costs and are 
mainly run by volunteers. The least ideal types of organisations consist of unfamiliar organisations 
with 5-10 years of experience that are active in only one country, have 80 per cent overhead costs 
and are mainly run by paid staff. All but one of these least ideal types of organisations have a 
religious background. 
It is almost eight times more probable that the most ideal type of development organisation 
will receive a donation (p = 0.98) than that the least ideal type will (p = 0.12). Although we find 
that potential donors do not prefer organisations with unrealistic combinations (e.g. run by paid 
staff and 0 per cent overhead costs), we do find that the ideal type of development organisation 
is more rare. 
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Table 4.5 Predicted Probabilities conditional on the variance components
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4.5.6 Robustness checks
In this contribution we investigated the extent to which organisational characteristics affect the 
decision whether or not to donate and the amount of monetary donations. To investigate the 
latter, we constructed a variable that indicates whether donations were lower or higher than the 
mean of all donations (40.7 euro). Alternative cut-off points (e.g. lower or higher than the median 
of all donations (30 euro)) lead to similar conclusions. 
We performed several other robustness checks. First we investigated whether possible sequence 
effects biased our results. Respondents are significantly more likely to donate in the third and fourth 
scenario offered to them as compared to the first. Moreover, some of the depicted organisations (i.e. 
87 out 960) combined the unrealistic characteristics of being run mainly by paid staff members 
with a 0 per cent overhead ratio. We observed that potential donors, when being confronted with 
such a scenario, donate significantly, but not substantially, with greater frequency and more often 
make donations above the average donation of 40 euro. Why this is so is not clear to us, but it 
demonstrates that there are indeed sequence effects. However, controlling for these sequence effects 
does not alter our main conclusions because scenarios were randomly allocated to the respondents. 
In contrast to previous research, we did not find that income positively affects the intention to 
donate or the amount of the donation. We ran alternative models that included a variable referring 
to the employment status of the respondent instead of income. For this we used a condensed 
version of the original eleven-category EGP classification scheme created by Erikson, Goldthorpe, 
and Portocarero (1979) with additional categories for the unemployed and non-employed. Donors 
of the higher service class (Class I) donate larger amounts more often than other categories. The 
self-employed (Class IVabc) are the least likely to donate more than the mean donation. However, 
using employment status instead of income does not alter our main conclusions. All our additional 
analyses are available on request. 
4.6 Conclusions
There is a growing number and a growing diversity of international development organisations 
requesting financial support. In this contribution, we set out to determine which one of these 
organisations the public prefers to donate money to. In order to answer this question we used 
a factorial survey design. The results of our scenario study show that next to characteristics of 
(potential) donors, organisational features also affect whether or not potential donors decide to 
donate and the amount donors donate. 
Potential donors are more likely to donate to familiar, experienced and voluntary development 
organisations, and donors are inclined to donate more than the mean donation of 40 euro to 
organisations with these characteristics. We argued that the familiarity of organisations signals trust. 
Based on our results, we conclude that for organisations it is just as important to signal trust to less 
sceptical potential donors high in social trust as it is to sceptical potential donors low in social trust. 
Potential donors’ quest for impactful donations results in a reluctance to spend money on 
overhead costs. Donors with stronger beliefs in development organisations are somewhat more 
tolerant towards overhead ratios. Steinberg (1986, 1988-1989) argues that the height of the 
overhead ratio should be meaningless to donors who are searching for an organisation with high 
output because, according to his findings, there is no relation between overhead ratios and the 
output of an organisation. Development organisations may wish to better communicate that 
overhead ratios do not necessarily signal mismanagement or inefficiency. 
Hager and Flack (2004: 4) argue that donors’ fixation on overhead ratios can even have an inverse 
effect on organisational management: it could induce an underinvestment ‘in good governance, 
planning, compliance and risk management’; Tinkelman and Mankaney (2007) state that it might 
lead to underreporting of administrative expenses. The height of the overhead ratios is also central 
in the Dutch public debate on the functioning of international development organisations. Many 
Private Development Initiatives (PDIs), characterised by their small scale and voluntary character, 
119 Chapter 04 
use their low overhead ratio as an important feature to distinguish themselves from larger scale 
development organisations, which they criticise for their (purportedly) high overhead ratios (Brok 
& Bouzoubaa, 2005). This strategy might explain, in part, the popularity of PDIs because our 
results indicate that the chances of receiving a (larger) donation are diminished with increased 
overhead ratios. 
Critics of PDIs question the quality of PDI development projects and state that qualitative 
development work comes at a price (Aangeenbrug, 2011). They question how volunteers, some of 
whom have no education and/or no or little experience in the field of international development 
cooperation or organisational management, can cope with the daily challenges related to strategic 
choices concerning poverty reduction or the supervision of (co-)volunteers. Based on this 
conviction, making an impactful donation would not imply donating to a voluntary development 
organisation with no or low overhead costs, but instead entails looking for an experienced 
organisation with qualified, experienced staff. This argument may be used to convince potential 
donors because, as our results indicate, (potential) donors are willing to pay for competence; they 
more easily accept overhead ratios when an organisation is run mainly by paid staff than when an 
organisation is run by volunteers.
In conclusion, we reflect upon what constitutes the ‘ideal development organisation’ for a donor. 
Potential donors’ decision-making processes indicate they are looking for experience and reputation 
without excessive amounts being spent on organisational management. They are looking for a 
hybrid type of development organisation combining a mixture of features of both large-scale, 
established, development organisations (experience, working in several countries) and small-scale, 
upcoming, voluntary development organisations (voluntary staff, low overhead ratio). Most, if not 
all, of the traditional, established, large-scale development organisations are run by professional (i.e. 
paid) staff. Hence traditional development organisations do not constitute the ‘ideal’ organisation. 
Since PDIs are mainly run by volunteers they can take their advantage of their voluntary character 
in their search for donors. In addition, many PDIs will be able to benefit from donors’ preferences 
to donate to a familiar development organisation. Since PDI members look for financial support in 
the first place in their network of family, friends and relatives, there is a greater chance that potential 
donors will not only be familiar with the name of the organisations, but also with the person 
requesting for a donation. This in contrast to larger scale, established development organisations 
of which one is maybe familiar with the name, but most probably not with the person requesting 
for a donation. However, PDIs are, in general, not the ideal organisation either, as most PDIs are 
active in only one developing country and many have only been established recently (Kinsbergen 
& Schulpen, 2011). We find that those PDIs that comply with the ideal type have a significantly 
larger budget than organisations that do not meet these criteria (CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-
2009). We have to be careful in making causal relations: it could very well be that because of their 
experience, these organisations have a larger network allowing them to generate larger budgets. 
Although the ‘ideal type’ of development organisation is rather rare, it does exist and can be found 
within the group of PDIs.
As far as we know, this study is the first to analyse how a wide array of organisational 
characteristics affect the decision making process of (potential) donors. Building on the insights 
offered by this study, future research could further extend our understanding of this process. As 
we have shown, this could be done by adopting a factorial survey approach. Different scenarios 
could be constructed, for example, scenarios in which more specific information on the scale of 
the organisations (e.g. 100 paid staff members versus 10 paid staff members) or on the type of 
support offered to their beneficiaries (e.g. building schools versus handing out food) is mentioned. 
Additionally, in order to enlarge our understanding of the aversion of (potential) donors’ to 
overhead costs, it would be worthwhile to include lower levels of overhead ratios and to introduce 
information on the competency of the staff. This would allow us to see if, and under which 
circumstances, certain levels of overhead ratios are acceptable to (potential) donors.
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The Netherlands is known for the relatively high amounts it donates to international 
development cooperation. The extent to which our findings on the impact of organisational 
characteristics on donations to international development organisations can be generalised to other 
countries would prove an interesting topic for future research.
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Chapter 05
5. Understanding Sustainability of Private Development Initiatives. What 
Kind of difference Difference do they make?
‘We need the freedom of lots and lots of small, autonomous units, and, at the same time, the 
orderliness of large-scale, possibly global, unity and co-ordination.’ 
Schumacher (1973) 
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Abstract
In the Netherlands there is a large group of small-scale, voluntary development organisations, 
referred to as private development initiatives (PDIs). By classifying PDI interventions based 
on their potential sustainability, we aim to enhance our understanding of PDIs as alternative 
development actor and to gain insight into the diversity within this group. We rely on detailed 
data of 49 Dutch PDIs active in Kenya and Indonesia. The classification is based on a combined 
analysis of both the intervention type (‘what’ they do) and the intervention manner (‘how’ they 
work) of PDI activities. This results in a typology that outlines the potential sustainability of 
PDI intervention strategies. We find considerable diversity regarding the potential sustainability 
of PDI interventions. Whereas several organisational characteristics influence the choice of 
the intervention strategy (e.g. independence of local partner, budget), intrinsic drivers such as 
motivation and the personal or professional background of PDI members tend to have a great 
influence on the potential sustainability of the intervention strategies adopted by the PDIs. 
Keywords: Private development initiatives; classification; intervention strategies; sustainability; 
Kenya; Indonesia
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5.1 Introduction
For a long time, the field of international development cooperation was inhabited by three types 
of development actors: (1) national governments of donor countries (bilateral aid channel); (2) 
international agencies such as the World Bank and the United Nations (multilateral aid channel); 
and (3) non-governmental development organisations (NGOs) such as Oxfam or Save the Children 
(civilateral aid channel). The last two decades have marked a worldwide trend of alternative 
players joining these traditional actors in their struggle against worldwide poverty and inequality. 
For different reasons, celebrities (e.g. Madonna, Bono), foundations (e.g. Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation), companies (e.g. Nestlé) and ordinary citizens have increasingly become active players 
in this field. The rise of these alternative development actors is referred to as the socialisation or 
mainstreaming of development cooperation. This is the process in which societal actors adopt 
tasks that previously belonged to the exclusive domain of traditional development cooperation 
actors such as the government, NGOs and multilateral organisations (Develtere & Stessens, 2006; 
Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009; De Bruyn & Huyse, 2009; Schulpen, 2007).
Also, the playing field of  international development cooperation is diversifying in the 
Netherlands. In addition to the three traditional channels mentioned above, the socialisation 
of  development cooperation has resulted in a fourth channel of  development cooperation: the 
philanteral aid channel. This channel consists of  alternative development actors including social 
institutions (e.g. hospitals), foundations and ordinary citizens (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). 
The term philanteral refers to the definition of  philanthropy as ‘contributing money, goods and/
or time, voluntarily supplied by individuals and organisations (foundations, companies, churches) 
mainly to support the aims of  public advancement’ (Schuyt et al., 2009: 18). 
A large group of  ordinary citizens actively engaging in international development cooperation 
has long been the most prominent alternative development actor. In addition to one-off  or regular 
monetary donations to existing development organisations, people, for different reasons, start their 
own development organisation, and these are referred to as private development initiatives (PDIs). 
Their voluntary character and their small scale characterise these PDIs.1 Journeys to or longer stays 
in development countries represent the most important trigger for starting or becoming active in 
a PDI (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011) (see Box 5.1). 
Box 5.1 Starting a PDI
In 2006, Bob and Ann, both in their fifties, went on a two-
week holiday to Kenya. They stayed in a hotel in the coastal 
town of Mombasa. During their stay, they met a local 
guide who took them to his hometown. Bob and Ann were 
appalled by the basic construction of the primary school in 
the village. The roof was leaking, and some of the children 
had classes outside. Ann and Bob decided they wanted to 
help to improve the school. Back home they celebrated 
their silver wedding anniversary and asked their friends and 
family for a donation to the school instead of gifts. At the 
end of the evening, they had collected 2,500 euro. One year 
later, they were running their own foundation, supporting 
the local villagers in different aspects of their lives.
 
1   In this study small-scale is interpreted in two ways. It means having fewer than 20 regular members or 
an annual budget of  fewer than a million euro. Voluntary character is defined on the basis of  an upper 
limit of  20 per cent or less of  paid members in charge of  the running of  the organisation (Kinsbergen & 
Schulpen, 2011).
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5.1.1 PDIs as development actors
PDIs hold rather positive expectations with regard to their role as development actors. In a study 
among 290 PDIs conducted in 2005, 65 per cent expected that they would be able to contribute 
to poverty reduction. Moreover, 36 per cent of the interviewees were convinced that PDIs could 
tackle the underlying causes of poverty (Brok & Bouzoubaa, 2005). In contrast, critics doubt the 
professionalism of PDIs and fear that they are unable to avoid the well-known pitfall of becoming 
sustainable development alternatives. They expect PDIs to support orphanages without orphans, 
build schools without thinking of the teachers’ salaries or construct wells that no local person is 
able to maintain and that they will do all this in a top-down, paternalistic manner. Supporters on 
the other hand are convinced that PDIs turn every penny collected into low-cost support reaching 
the genuine poor and do all this in close cooperation with local people. Because of their smallness 
of scale and direct approach, they expect PDIs to make an essential difference in the lives of people 
in developing countries. 
Since 2006, several studies have analysed the development interventions of PDIs (Chelladurai, 
2006; De Bruyn, 2013; Kinsbergen, 2007; Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; Schulpen, 2007; van 
der Velden, 2011). These studies are rather positive with regard to the achievements of PDI 
interventions: schools have been built, credit programmes launched and hospitals equipped with 
up-to-date instruments. In addition to these positive, concrete results, van der Velden (2011) calls 
on us to ‘celebrate and preserve the unique characteristics and comparative advantages [of PDIs] 
such as relevant activities, low overhead costs, committed volunteers, voluntary spirit’ (2011: 41). 
Kamara and Bakhuisen (2008), studying PDI interventions and partners of PDIs in Ghana, were 
‘moved by the commitment and enthusiasm of many Dutch people [...] and the warm feelings for 
the country and its people. This passion is at the heart of the program, and has motivated many 
partners in Ghana in their continuous efforts to contribute to the development of the country’ 
(2008: 4). 
Notwithstanding these positive statements, independently of one another these studies also 
raise critical concerns about the interventions undertaken by PDIs and their local partners. The 
activities are mainly micro in nature, activity-based and focused on the immediate needs of specific 
target groups without tackling the structural causes of poverty (Chelladurai, 2006; van der Velden, 
2011; De Bruyn, 2011). Not only is the type of intervention brought up as a concern, but the 
adequacy of local capacities to (independently) manage the interventions is also questioned in 
several studies (Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; van der Velden, 2011). In addition, many PDIs and 
their partners are not building on or linking to local government or other civil societies such as 
NGOs, people’s organisations or community networks (Chelladurai, 2006). This could induce 
continued dependence of the project on external donors, since PDIs and their partners do not 
always approach the government to support their activities. Although they put it differently, these 
studies above all conclude that results are in general positive at output and outcome level, but that 
the prospects for sustainability of many interventions are certainly not guaranteed.
Because of the novelty of this field of research, studies performed so far have merely aimed 
at a general understanding of PDIs and their interventions. Moreover, available data on PDIs’ 
interventions do not allow structural study of the diversity in the sustainability potential of PDI 
interventions. This limits our understanding of PDIs as development actors, since empirical data 
show that although PDIs have much in common they vary widely in their intervention strategies 
(Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). The main aim of this chapter is (1) to classify PDI interventions, 
and (2) to offer an in-depth analysis of the diversity of intervention strategies of PDIs in order 
to understand the likelihood of their sustainable contribution to poverty reduction. Our central 
research question is: 
What determines the sustainability of PDI interventions? 
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Our approach includes three stages. We first construct an analytical framework that enables us to 
understand the potential sustainability of PDI interventions and to study the diversity that can be 
found within this group. Second, we apply this framework to an empirical sample of 49 PDIs and 
their interventions. The subjects of this study are in different stages of the project cycle. Some are 
completed; others are still in the process of implementation. We therefore decided not to focus on 
sustainability itself (ex post), but to assess the likelihood of the sustainability of PDI interventions 
by analysing the intervention type and the intervention manner of PDIs (ex ante). The third 
and final step in our analysis identifies attributes of PDIs that shape their intervention strategy. 
We therefore look for common denominators of PDIs (e.g. organisational characteristics, driving 
forces) with similar intervention types and intervention manners. 
5.2 Towards a meaningful PDI classification
We start the study by designing a classification system to analyse potential sustainability of PDI 
interventions. Classifying non-profit organisations in general and development organisations in 
particular is a much studied and described challenge (Bebbington, et al. 2008; Brodhead, 1987; 
Elliott, 1987; Handy, 1988; Korten, 1987, 1990; Salamon & Anheier, 1992; Vakil, 1997). 
According to Salamon and Anheier (1992) formulating a classification of organisations entails 
systematically identifying differences among organisations and constructing an appropriate basis 
for grouping them. They point out that in the design of a classification system, two basic issues 
have to be clarified: (1) the unit of analysis and (2) the basis of classification (e.g. size, type and 
character of activity). For our purpose, the unit of analysis is clear: we focus on the development 
interventions of a specific type of development organisations, namely private development 
initiatives. The basis of the classification should provide insight into the potential sustainability 
of the development interventions of PDIs. That brings us to a more complex part of the intended 
classification since sustainability is still a rather elusive concept. Authors addressing sustainability 
in the context of development cooperation often start by stressing its importance and then 
pointing out the lack of a clear definition of the concept (Stockmann, 1997; Mog, 2004; Pretty, 
1995). It is also difficult to pin down sustainability because it is very dynamic, largely indefinite 
and highly contested (Mog, 2004). 
Since the 1980s, sustainability has been one of the five yardsticks by which development 
interventions are evaluated (Brown, 1998). It is related to other measures concerning relevance, 
efficiency, effectiveness and impact (OECD, 1986). In the literature on sustainability of 
development interventions, roughly two approaches can be distinguished. The first approach offers 
a more formal definition and focuses on the sustainability in lifetime of projects, programmes or 
institutions: do projects, programmes or organisations continue to exist after the withdrawal of 
external donor support (DAC; Brown, 1998; Finsterbusch & Van Wicklin, 1989)? The second 
approach provides a more substantive analysis with a stronger focus on the extent to which the 
interventions aim at fundamentally tackling structurally constraining factors that induce, maintain 
or strengthen poverty and inequality.
The first approach is widely adopted and illustrated by the description of sustainability by the 
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC): ‘measuring whether the benefits of an activity 
are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn’; or as defined by the World Bank 
(2002: 2) ‘to what extent will […] projects continue to produce net benefits as long as intended, 
or even longer?’. This implies that development projects or programs are considered sustainable 
when they are able to deliver an appropriate level of benefits for an extended time period after 
major financial, managerial and technical assistance from external donor is withdrawn (OECD, 
1989: 13). Local ownership and sufficient local capacities (human and financial resources) are two 
important interlinked preconditions for project, programme or organisational sustainability (World 
Bank, 2002). In order to become sustainable, local stakeholders should feel responsible and should 
be able to continue the project, programme or organisation after external support ends.
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Critics of this first sustainability approach generally point to its narrowness (Brinkerhoff 
& Goldsmith, 1992; Edwards, 1999; Fowler, 2000; Stockmann, 1997; Wilkinson-Maposa & 
Fowler, 2009). Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (1992: 371) articulate their critique by stating that 
‘just because a project, program or organisation endures, does not necessarily mean it is valuable’. 
The main concern should not merely be whether the project, programme or organisation will last, 
but whether it makes a lasting impact on poverty (Edwards, 1999). In order to be sustainable, 
development interventions should be aiming at the causes of poverty and bring structural change. 
The most important difference between both approaches is that the formal approach could be 
considered purely analytical: why does one project, programme or institution endures whereas 
another one does not? The substantive approach poses the more fundamental question of whether 
or not it is desirable to support certain projects, programmes or institutions on the basis of what 
they contribute to structural change and poverty reduction (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 1992). 
In this study we combine both approaches of sustainability. We analyse the sustainability of a 
PDI development intervention by assessing (1) the extent to which an intervention aims to address 
and change underlying causes of poverty, and (2) the extent to which the intervention is locally 
owned (and thus can be continued without external financial and technical support). The former 
criterion reflects the substantive sustainability dimension; the latter provides insight into the formal 
sustainability dimension. 
Finally, we need to identify practical and observable aspects that characterise PDIs and their 
operations and are linked to the aforementioned sustainability dimensions. We therefore rely on 
two aspects: (1) the type of interventions PDIs carry out in developing countries (what activities are 
undertaken) and (2) the intervention manner of PDIs (how they are organised) as the basis for the 
empirical classification. Together these aspects will be referred to as the intervention strategy. This 
approach is comparable to that of Fowler (2000), who states that the probability a development 
organisation contributes to sustained change depends on both the content of a development 
intervention and the process through which change is brought. In the following we describe how 
we will analyse the intervention type (what) and the intervention manner (how) of PDIs. 
5.2.1 Intervention types and prospects for sustainability 
We classify the intervention types of PDIs in the light of their potential sustainability. The 
four generations of strategies distinguished by Korten (1990) in his attempt to classify non-
governmental development organisations (NGOs) represent a helpful framework for assessing the 
sustainability of the intervention type of PDIs. (1) First-generation strategies, relief and welfare, are 
aimed at alleviating directly observable needs by service delivery; (2) second-generation strategies, 
community development, pursue the strengthening of local capacities of people to better meet their 
own needs; (3) in third-generation strategies, sustainable system development, there is a focus on 
the elimination of institutional and policy constraints; and (4) the fourth and final strategies, 
people’s movement, are characterised by a vision of people-centred development with development 
organisations being facilitators of a global people’s development movement.
The starting point of this classification is ‘a pattern of evolution […] away from more traditional 
relief activities […] towards greater involvement in catalysing larger institutional and policy 
changes’ (Korten, 1990: 115). Elliot (1987) and Brodhead (1987) also recognise this evolutionary 
process in the practices of NGOs. Progressive insights in and experience of limitations with certain 
intervention strategies can mean revising the strategic approach of a particular development 
organisation (Korten, 1990). For example, most NGOs start by taking a welfarist approach; they 
act as service deliverers and offer direct relief to meet immediate needs. The recognition that 
relief and welfare do not tackle underlying causes of poverty may result in a strategy with greater 
attention for self-reliant local action, referred to as second-generation strategies (Korten, 1990). 
Through similar processes, the main strategy of an NGO can evolve from systems development 
(third-generation strategies) into people’s movement (fourth-generation strategies) (Korten, 1990). 
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In more or less explicit terms, all these authors imply that in order to be able to offer a sustainable 
contribution to poverty reduction, development organisations should focus on structural causes 
of exclusion and poverty. 
To further refine the differentiation of intervention types of PDIs we also consider the level of 
operation. We distinguish four different levels: the individual or family level, the community level 
(micro), the regional level (meso) and the national level (macro). For every intervention we can 
identify the intervention type pursued (using the generation strategies of Korten) and the level at 
which the PDIs intervene. 
5.2.2 Intervention manners and prospects for sustainability 
Korten (1990) suggests that generational strategies are inextricably linked to specific intervention 
manners. First-generation NGOs are usually considered as ‘doers’, second as ‘mobilisers’, third as 
‘catalysts’ and fourth as ‘activists/educators’. This indirectly defines the position and role of both 
the local partner organisation and the beneficiaries. For example, in the first-generation strategy 
Korten (1990) describes the role of the NGO as ‘the doer’, whereas a passive position is reserved 
for the beneficiaries. 
With regard to intervention manner, we will mainly assess sustainability by looking at the degree 
of participation of local stakeholders. Participation of local stakeholders is referred to as one of the 
most, if not the most, important preconditions for interventions to become sustainable (Chambers, 
1994; Edwards, 1999; Finsterbusch & Wicklin, 1989; Fowler, 2000; Mog, 2004; Stockmann, 
1997). By co-defining change, local actors are more committed and motivated to take ownership 
of processes needed to bring it forward (Fowler, 2000). The recognition in the 1970s that many 
development projects or programmes failed because of their top-down approach made the concept 
and practice of participation a major influence in the field of international development cooperation 
(Chambers, 1994; Cornwall, 2008). 
Arnstein (1969: 216) defines participation as ‘the redistribution of power that enables the have-
not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately 
included in the future’. According to Fowler, (2000) participation can be analysed from three 
different perspectives: (1) depth (measure of stakeholders’ influence on decision-making); (2) 
breadth (measure of the range of stakeholders involved); and (3) timing (stage of the process 
at which different stakeholders are involved). We will mainly consider the depth dimension by 
characterising the role of stakeholders in the project cycle. In order to gain an insight into the 
breadth of participation we look at the degree of involvement of (1) beneficiaries, (2) local partners 
and (3) other local stakeholders (e.g. local government). This is done particularly for the design 
phase and the implementation stage of the interventions in order to obtain an impression of the 
timing of the participation. Figure 5.1 presents the analytical framework applied.
Because of the novelty of the research approach used in this study we do not want to foreclose 
the correlation between the intervention type and the intervention manner. In addition, in order 
to grasp the diversity among PDIs as much as possible we will look explicitly and separately at what 
PDIs do (intervention type) and how they intervene (intervention manner).
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Figure 5.1 Analytical framework for classifying interventions of private development initiatives 
5.3 Data collection
We started by selecting our sample from two target countries wherein PDIs intervene. Kenya and 
Indonesia were chosen because of the relatively large proportion of PDIs active in these countries 
(Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2011). We drew up a sample of 49 PDIs, 25 active in Kenya and 24 
in Indonesia. The sample was drawn from a database of almost 900 PDIs. This database was the 
result of a large-scale survey conducted among Dutch PDIs in 2008-2009 (CIDIN-PDI Database 
2008-2009). The sample was purposely diverse with respect to the background characteristics 
of the organisations: the age of the organisations, their budget and the number of members. 
However, the target group and themes where the PDIs focus on were not predefined leaving 
us with a diverse group of interventions. Although we aimed to arrive at a sample of PDIs and 
interventions that offered an adequate reflection of PDIs as a group, we need to be careful about 
generalising the results of this study to the entire PDI population. 
Table 5.1 presents some of the background characteristics of our sample. The average age of the 
PDIs is 11 years. On average, PDIs have an annual budget of nearly 50,000 euro and almost nine 
members on whom they can rely. The majority of the PDIs are active in the field of education (e.g. 
school construction), followed by health care (e.g. dental clinic) and providing shelter for vulnerable 
groups (e.g. orphanage). A smaller group of PDIs supports interventions related to environmental 
issues, water & sanitation and art & culture. The diversity within the sample allows us to look for 
common denominators of PDIs with a similar intervention strategy. 
Table 5.1 Background information on PDIs (N=49)
Characteristics Range Average
Age of the PDI (in 2009) 1-45 years 11.21 years
Budget (in 2007) € 0-262,594 € 49,783 
Number of members  
(in 2009)
3-40 members 8.65 members
Basis of classification
Intervention strategy
Private  
development 
Initiatives
Interventions 
of private  
development 
Initiatives
What
How
Intervention type
Generation
Level of operation
Intervention 
manner
Local ownership 
through participa-
tion of beneficiaries, 
local partners, other 
local stakeholders
(Potential) 
Sustainability 
of development 
intervention
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The main researcher executed the research with the help of two trained research assistants. The 
data collection started in the Netherlands (2.5 months) and continued in Indonesia and Kenya 
(five months). We opted for semi-structured interviews as the most appropriate method to obtain 
the required data. The approach during the interviews can best be typified as a reconstructing a 
‘life history’ of the PDI, the local organisation and the intervention. With the use of an interview 
guide, we discussed the emergence of the PDI and the local organisation, their organisational 
characteristics, developments over the past years, donor profile, type of interventions in developing 
countries, (cooperation) partner/PDI relations, challenges, motives, future plans, visions and 
dreams. To obtain an adequate insight into the intervention strategy of the PDI and its partner, 
we extensively discussed the type of (and decisions about) PDI-supported interventions and the 
character of the implementation process. In addition, the role of the different stakeholders (local 
partner, beneficiaries and the broader network) during the design and implementation of the 
intervention was discussed.  
Most interviews were conducted with the founder or key person of  the PDI and the local 
organisation. In addition to interviews, PDI interventions were visited and observed during 
the field research. The data were processed with ATLAS.ti. Anonymity was guaranteed to the 
participating PDIs and their partners. This was done in order to stimulate an open, trusting 
atmosphere during the interviews. More importantly, in the central analysis of  this study it is not 
the individual cases that make up the story but the collective emerging pattern that allows us to 
answer the central research question.2 
5.4 Results
In this section we present the findings of our study. We first discuss the differences in intervention 
type of PDIs (what), followed by a review of major differences in the intervention manner (how). 
Here we discuss the role of the beneficiaries, the role of local partners and the role of the broader 
network in order to better understand the degree of local ownership. In Section 4 we classify 
the intervention strategies of PDIs in the light of their potential sustainability by combining the 
intervention type and intervention manner for every PDI, providing the basis for the classification 
of PDIs. In the final paragraph we identify common determinants of PDI types that share a similar 
intervention strategy and discuss their prospects for sustainability.
5.4.1 PDI intervention types
At first sight, there is a large variety in interventions that PDIs undertake: from installing solar 
panels to starting a community bank, and from assisting an orphanage to supporting a peace 
process. A closer look at the intervention types reveals that all PDIs in this study are involved in 
relief and welfare provision. Every single one of them undertakes activities that can be typified by 
what Korten (1987, 1990) defines as ‘first-generation strategies’. In these cases PDIs respond to 
immediate, often visible, needs, mostly basic. They act in response to something that is, according 
to their or others’ perspective, ‘lacking’: lack of (proper) schooling, lack of (proper) health care, 
lack of (proper) water and sanitation. This results most of the time in ‘hardware’ investments: 
construction, renovation and the supply of goods. 
For the majority of PDIs in the study (N=38) relief and welfare type of interventions are their 
main and only focus. Within this first group a distinction can be made between those PDIs that 
support only one project (e.g. a specific orphanage) and those that support more of the same 
type of project (e.g. building several schools). For both of these groups, but especially for the 
former, it counts that they are strongly involved in a specific project, linked to a specific group of 
beneficiaries and a specific locality. Their interventions are directed at individuals, families or groups 
of individuals that share a common need (e.g. schoolchildren). Most of these PDIs intervene at the 
level of individuals or families; others spread their activities over several villages or a certain region. 
2  The data are available on request.
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It is characteristic of PDIs in this group that they are strongly focused on the symptoms of 
poverty and not, or to a lesser extent, on the structural causes of poverty. Their interventions are 
aimed at visible needs and they tend to offer concrete solutions to these problems. This does not 
mean that these ‘first-generation’ type of PDIs are not tackling the root causes of poverty but that 
their interventions do not intentionally aim at it. 
A smaller, second group of PDIs (N=7) complements its relief and welfare type of activities with 
interventions in the field of community development (i.e. Korten’s second-generation strategies). 
For example, one of the PDIs in this study is supporting a waste-processing project. They cooperate 
with a community-based organisation (CBO). Group formation is an explicit part of this project. 
These types of interventions transcend the individual or family level and are focused at community 
or regional level. Interventions aim at a group of people and the strategies are often structured in 
such a way that the group and group formation are integral parts of the intervention. 
A small minority of PDIs in our sample forms a third group (N=4). They undertake activities 
that are deliberately aiming at changing constraining structures. Following Korten (1990), their 
interventions can be typified as third-generational: they ‘look beyond the individual community 
and seek changes in specific policies and institutions at local, national and global level’ (Korten, 
1990: 120). In that sense, they also look beyond the more visible needs, the symptoms of poverty, 
and try to address the underlying forces. They deliberately direct their interventions to (help to) 
restructure policies and institutions in order to overcome their disempowering function. PDIs 
within this group are all involved in lobby and advocacy activities, principally at local or regional 
level. These interventions are less visible, less concrete and have a longer-term horizon, but all of 
them combine third-generation strategies with first and/or second-generation types of interventions. 
For example, one of the PDIs in this group is supporting the construction and renovation of 
schools. The PDI and its partner have frequent contact with local government officials on future 
plans and policy development. Moreover, they try to stimulate the local government to contribute 
financially to the construction or renovation plans and motivate it to focus more on the quality of 
education in their policy and plans. Within our sample no PDIs undertaking fourth-generation 
strategies can be identified.
5.4.2 PDI intervention manner
In this paragraph we analyse how PDIs decide on the type of interventions they undertake, 
who is involved in the design and implementation of these interventions and how these roles 
are articulated. We therefore subsequently discuss the opportunities for local participation by 
beneficiaries, the type of cooperative relationships between PDIs and their local partners and the 
character of local and regional networks.
Role of beneficiaries 
Our study shows that the role of beneficiaries during the design of an intervention is rather 
limited. In the most extreme case, PDIs may even disregard all opportunities to actively involve 
the local population. When asked if the local population is an active partner for the PDI, one 
interviewee responds:
 ‘No, that is not an option.’  
(Interview PDI founder) 
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In the initial phase of starting a PDI or a (new) intervention, however, the local population often 
functions as a source of inspiration. Encounters with local people and their living conditions 
usually instigate the decision to start a PDI or a certain intervention, as is illustrated by a PDI 
member: 
‘And we were so shocked, the showers were so dirty. Yes, that really appalled us. And then we 
continued our trip to the coast and at a certain moment we said to one another, ‘We have to 
do something about this’.’  
(Interview PDI founder)
The needs observed among the local population influence the choice of a specific theme (e.g. 
education) or a specific target group (e.g. children). For more than half of the PDIs in our sample 
(N=26), the role of the beneficiaries remains limited to that of ‘receivers’ throughout the design 
and implementation of the intervention. 
A second, smaller group of PDIs (N=7) expands this role of the beneficiaries in the design and/or 
implementation phase. This is done by informing the beneficiaries about the (possible) plans of the 
PDI and its partner, by consulting with beneficiaries about their needs or by organising meetings 
during which they inform beneficiaries on the progress of an intervention or on future plans. A 
third group is made up of 12 PDIs that more actively engage their beneficiaries, mainly during 
the implementation. In most of these cases this is based on the beneficiaries being organised in 
small groups through which the intervention is implemented (e.g. group of neighbours managing 
a shared water pump). In a fourth and final group (N=4) the beneficiaries are not only actively 
engaged in the implementation but their representatives are also part of the design phase of 
the intervention, in the management of the organisation or in the planning of future projects. 
Consequently, beneficiaries have a greater, and sometimes decisive, influence on the actual design 
and execution of the intervention.
What most interventions have in common is that many PDIs and their partners request or 
oblige beneficiaries to offer a contribution in kind or in cash. By doing so they hope or expect to 
enlarge their feeling of responsibility, stimulate local ownership and/or preserve their dignity:  
 
 ‘Most of them do not have any money, and if they do not have it, they have to pay. That 
means that one time they bring along a bunch of wood or a chicken or whatever. There 
must be something in return. […] To prevent people too easily saying […] ‘They will solve 
this’. Or make beggars of them.’  
(Interview PDI founder)
‘We do not sponsor the whole amount. We want the parents to contribute themselves, so that 
children cannot tell their parents ‘You did not pay for my schooling, they [the PDI] did.’ So 
that parents can keep their pride, and can continue to fulfil their parental role. That’s what 
we find important.’  
(Interview PDI founder)
Some of the PDIs seem to expect that local ownership, responsibility and dignity can be ‘bought’ 
by a contribution in kind or in cash by beneficiaries during implementation. Although the role 
of beneficiaries in this phase is in general more extended compared with their role in the design 
phase, in most cases beneficiaries are requested or even obliged to participate within a framework 
determined in a process from which they were excluded or in which they only participated in a 
limited way.  
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Cooperation relations between partners and PDIs 
Looking at how PDIs and their partners cooperate, we can distinguish three groups based on the 
way roles are divided among PDIs and their partners. In the first group (N=21), the influence of 
the PDI on the type, design and implementation of the intervention is greater than that of its 
partner. PDIs adopt the role of manager and their partners are the executers of their ideas and 
plans. In some cases, the PDI is also active in the actual implementation of the intervention. 
When asked about the number of beneficiaries he expects to support in the future, one partner 
responds: 
‘I don’t know, I think they [PDI] have big plans.’ […] They have the vision in Holland, we 
carry it out. We share the vision.’  
(Interview PDI partner) 
When more direct involvement, through e-mail or telephone or personal visits, is difficult, some 
of the PDIs in this group make use of intermediaries (in many cases this is a Dutch person living 
in Kenya or Indonesia) to facilitate the cooperation between them and their partners: the PDI 
instructs the intermediary to go and check on progress or bookkeeping. Consequently, the go-
between eases cooperation between the PDI and its partner and removes distrust within the PDI. 
Others opt for a more radical control mechanism and even become a member of the board of their 
local partner. 
In a second group (N=18) the role division between PDI and partner is characterised by a higher 
degree of consultation. Compared with the first group, partners here have a stronger influence on 
design and implementation. The PDI and its partner are sparring partners, being jointly responsible 
for the design and implementation of a certain intervention.  
A third and final group of PDIs (N=10) takes up a low profile and more distant position in 
cooperation with their partners. Their role is that of an adviser, coach and financier. The partner is 
the one in charge and is responsible for the development and implementation of the intervention. 
‘We support all projects of [partner]. Because she knows what to do there, what is needed 
there. […] [Partner] does what she thinks is good. And we give advice but if she doesn’t 
want that, then it doesn’t happen.’  
(Interview PDI member)
‘They decide what to do there; we sometimes make a suggestion, but not more than that. We 
are no big brother.’  
(Interview PDI member)
In most cases, the relationship between PDIs and their partners is very warm and close. They give 
expression to this by using family and friendship terms.
‘He sees me as… he says ‘You are more like a brother to me’; that’s how close we are. [name 
of partner] is great, we kiss and hug… when we are there, … that is also why we do not 
want to grow big. When we are there, we always go out for dinner with 10 to 15 people. 
That costs 50 or 60 euro and then we have a whole evening of fun.’  
(Interview PDI founder)
In response to the question how the cooperation between a PDI and their partner is going, one 
PDI member responds:
‘They are very good friends, we have a bond of trust.’ 
 (Interview PDI member) 
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The local networks of partners and their knowledge of local circumstances, needs, customs 
and structures is an asset that gives most partners a significant amount of influence on, among 
others, the intervention type, the implementation and the selection of the beneficiaries. We find, 
however, that many PDIs remain relatively influential as they find it hard to leave the design, 
implementation and day-to-day management to their partners. 
Making use of networks  
During the design phase of an intervention most PDIs make limited use of broader networks. 
This is especially the case when it is the first intervention they support. At that stage, networks are 
rather small and PDIs in general do not invest a lot of time in developing this network. Through 
time, PDIs start to develop their (local) networks. The size and the composition of PDI networks 
differ strongly, varying from small solely Dutch PDI networks to large and more diversified 
networks consisting of, among others, other civil society actors, local government officials and 
private companies. 
Looking at the type of network of PDIs and their partners and how they use it, we can 
distinguish three groups of PDIs. A first group (N=26) has a rather small network. The design 
and implementation of their intervention is mainly based on their own and their partners’ 
insights and, to a greater or lesser extent, input gained from their beneficiaries. Most of these 
PDIs have no contact with local government. Some of them even fear the government. They are 
afraid of corruption when interference by government officials takes place, of losing control or 
that cooperation means compromising the quality of their intervention. This is illustrated by the 
following:
‘It is risky to say, ‘We have problems regarding the exploitation [of the school], let the 
government solve this’. That would be a logical solution, a quick solution, but when this 
same government subsequently decides to completely change the policy and decides to kick 
out the beneficiaries out of the project […].’  
(Interview PDI founder)
‘We do make ourselves known to the government. But we do not cooperate with the 
government. When the government asks us to do something, we do so. But we do not 
participate in the development discussions of the government. We are not involved in those 
local development programmes. The reason for this is that we do not trust the government 
for a penny […]. We only inform them of what we have done.’  
(Interview PDI founder)
A second group of PDIs (N=21) has access to a larger, more diversified local network useful during 
the design and/or implementation of their intervention. These PDIs use their networks mainly to 
learn from others by sharing tips and tricks, to try to avoid duplication by informing other PDIs 
on their activities and to search for (financial) support, as is illustrated by the next quote:
 ‘From the hotel where we are staying we got towels and we also asked for blankets, […]. 
Yes, I have to be this cheeky, it is just asking, asking, asking.’  
(Interview PDI founder)
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Most of the PDIs in this second group make sure to be on good footing with the government 
and to have their official blessing for their presence and interventions in the area. They therefore 
make ‘mandatory’ visits to local government officials in order to keep the relationship going. Their 
cooperation with the local government could be typified as ‘formal-informative’. 
‘That is something we also do, visiting other children homes, how they work, […] maybe 
you can learn from each other, give each other ideas.’  
(Interview PDI founder)
A very small third group (N=2) distinguishes itself, particularly from the second group, by its 
constructive cooperation with the local government. They request the government to contribute 
to their projects and vice versa, they are invited to participate in the design of new government 
policies, with their interventions they ‘set a good example’ and inspire and stimulate the government 
to take up their responsibilities. This type of relationship is illustrated by the next case: 
 ‘At a certain point the project is finished […]. With the handover [of the project], the 
government comes. The government is co-financing more and more of the projects in 
which we are involved.  That is one of the great developments. Because in the end, they are 
responsible.’ 
(Interview PDI founder)
Whereas the size of the networks and their composition differ, PDIs have in common that they 
mostly start using and/or developing a network after they have decided on the target group, the 
theme and the intervention. They thus principally use their network within the framework of a 
pre-determined plan. When starting a second or third project, some PDIs start to involve their 
networks earlier on in the project cycle:
 ‘And what I’m doing right now, with [name of the new project], I am mapping all 
organisations […]. I’m finding out which NGOs are working in school that has to do with 
HIV, hygiene, sanitation, to link this up with [project of PDI].’  
(Interview PDI founder)
5.5 Classification of PDIs
5.5.1 Typology
In this section we apply the previously outlined approach for classifying PDIs based on their 
intervention type and on their intervention manner. Table 5.2 presents an overview of the 
different (sub) groups we distinguished and the score assigned to each category. There are two 
variables related to the intervention type (1.1 generation strategy and 1.2 level of operation) 
and three variables related to the intervention manner (2.1 participation of beneficiaries, 2.2 
participation of local partners and 2.3 participation of other local stakeholders). Each PDI has 
been assigned a score for each of these variables. The sum of the scores on variables 1.1 and 1.2 
characterises their intervention type. The total of the scores of variables 2.1 to 2.3 characterises 
their intervention manner. We apply categorical coding and thus assume equal distances amongst 
the scoring categories.
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Table 5.2 Overview of different intervention types and intervention manners
Variables Typology Score
1.  
Intervention 
type
1.1 Generation strategy First-generation 1
Second-generation 2
Third-generation 3
1.2 Level of operation Individual/family 1
Village/community 2
Regional 3
2.  
Intervention 
manner
2.1 Participation of 
beneficiaries
Inspirational role 1
Consultative role 2
Active in implementation 3
Active in design & implementation 4
2.2 Participation of local 
partner
Executive 1
Shared responsibility 2
In control 3
2.3 Participation of other 
local stakeholders
Absent/limited 1
Extended, formal relationship with local 
government
2
Extended, constructive relationship with 
local government
3
Figure 5.2 presents the final results of our analysis. The total score for the intervention type and 
the intervention manner determines the position of the PDI on, respectively, the X-axis and the 
Y-axis. The size of the circles refers to the concentration of PDIs within a certain category: the 
larger the circle, the larger the number of PDIs relying on a certain intervention strategy. Looking 
at Figure 5.2 we can distinguish four categories of PDIs.
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Figure 5.2 Categorisation of PDI intervention strategies
Group # 1
In the lower left side of the graph, we find the largest number of PDIs (group 1). Relief and 
welfare type of activities with strong involvement of PDIs in the design and implementation of 
the intervention characterise the intervention strategy of these PDIs. 
From a sustainability perspective, both the intervention type and the intervention manner of 
the PDIs within this group are potentially risky in terms of sustainability. In particular, the limited 
participation of local stakeholders can have a strong negative influence here. Although it seems 
acceptable that certain needs of the local population are observed, it is harder to guess the (root) 
causes of needs, priorities in terms of needs and interventions that appropriately respond to the 
observed needs and underlying causes. There is a risk of subjective interpretation of needs with 
consequent development of projects without ‘real’ beneficiaries/suggested beneficiaries or the 
development of inappropriate projects. This is illustrated by the next examples, where the lack 
of beneficiary participation and limited role of the local partner resulted in projects with a short 
lifetime.
One of the PDIs recalls the story of a donor who joined him on a field trip. He was shocked 
when he saw the kitchen in which a group of women was preparing their food: a corrugated shack, 
with a lot of smoke in the absence of good ventilation. He decided that a new kitchen was needed 
and donated a certain amount of money to realise this project. Both the PDI and its local partner 
were convinced and, without any consultation with the women, the Dutch PDI built the new 
kitchen, with big kettles and an air outlet. To the astonishment of the PDI and the generous donor, 
the women did not use the new kitchen and continued to cook in their old kitchen. They did 
not know how to use the modern equipment installed in the new kitchen and therefore preferred 
their old one. 
The data also show several interesting examples illustrating the consequences of limited ownership 
by local partners. In order to ensure the longevity of interventions, in several cases it was decided to 
start an income-generating project. Although in some cases this was a locally-owned idea, in others 
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the PDI came up with the idea. This was, for instance, the case in a school construction project. 
Before starting the construction, the PDI informed their local partner they would only support 
them with the construction of the school and that running and maintenance costs would be the 
responsibility of the school itself. Following their suggestion, the partner started to keep chickens 
and tried to sell the eggs to generate income. The poultry failed as there was not enough money 
to construct a proper shelter and there was insufficient experience and time to make the poultry 
project viable. Instead of a source of income it became a financial burden.
Group # 2 
The intervention strategy of the second group of PDIs (group 2), in the upper left side of the graph, 
distinguishes itself from the first group by its higher levels of local ownership. Both groups of PDIs 
undertake similar intervention types but the way they intervene differs. They support the same 
type of interventions (first-generation) but the extent to which local stakeholders, in particular 
local partners, actively participate in the design and implementation of these interventions is 
stronger compared with PDIs in group 1. PDIs in this second group are more often active as 
funders and advisers of their local partner. 
The different consequences both intervention have on the potential sustainability of the 
interventions is best illustrated by comparing the answers of the partners of group 1 and 2 to the 
hypothetical question: what would happen if the PDI stopped cooperating with you tomorrow? 
In their response to this question, the partners of the first group in general indicate they would be 
faced with severe financial problems and a drop in the necessary capacities needed to continue the 
intervention. As one of the partners of the first group stated:
‘If they had not been here, the programme would not be going on. […] For a programme to 
run, it needs finance. If they were to stop, we would miss many things.  
We would be like a vehicle without gas. […] The programme would die.’  
(Interview PDI partner)
A partner of a PDI from group two responds as follows to the same question:
‘For the running costs it would not be a problem.  
It would only affect some renovation projects.’  
(Interview PDI partner)
Although this partner (like other partners in group 2) affirms that if the cooperation with the PDI 
ended it would affect their (future) interventions, it would affect them only partly whereas in the 
first group the impact of the ending of the cooperation on the programme would be total. 
Group #3
A small third group of PDI interventions can be typified as second-generation with strong 
involvement of the PDI. At first sight the potential sustainability of the interventions within this 
group looks more favourable compared with those within groups 1 and 2. PDIs within group 3 
adopt second-generation strategies and by doing so they aim to contribute to lasting, structural 
change. Our results show, however, that the intervention manner opted by the PDIs within this 
group impedes the achievement of this objective. This is illustrated by an income-generating 
project which is designed in such a way that it has potential to contribute to local community 
development. On paper and to a certain extent in practice, the beneficiaries and the local partner 
involved have a rather large say in the implementation of the intervention. The relatively strong 
influence of the PDI, however, leaves the local actors involved little room to manoeuvre, thus 
jeopardising the possible achievement of their second-generation strategy. 
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The local manager indicates that at the start of cooperating with the PDI he had the idea they 
were starting a joint project based on shared responsibilities but gradually he started to feel like an 
employee at the service of the PDI.
Group # 4
Towards the top middle and right-hand side of the graph we find a group of PDIs that extended 
their relief and welfare type of activities with community development and sustainable systems 
development (group 4). To a greater or lesser extent all of these interventions are, compared with 
the interventions of group 1, characterised by a relatively high degree of local ownership. 
From a sustainability perspective, the potential sustainability of the interventions in the fourth 
group is higher compared with those of groups 1 and 2 because of the chosen intervention type and 
the intervention manner. Albeit in a subtle way, these PDIs focus their interventions on the causes 
of poverty and try to contribute to structural changes. Also in this fourth group, however, we find 
examples of interventions whereof the sustainability is at risk. In the case of a waste project aimed at 
processing plastic waste into materials that could be sold to plastic-processing factories, initially not 
a lot of time was invested in mapping other actors involved in this subject and thoroughly studying 
the market for this product. After the machine was bought and installed, the local organisation had 
trouble in finding buyers for its product. It turned out that two other similar (commercial) projects 
had operated in the area for several years, both experiencing similar difficulties in selling processed 
plastic. The founder of the PDI involved had a professional background in waste management and 
clearly persuaded the local organisation to focus on this issue without investing enough time in 
getting to know the context wherein the intervention would take place.
5.5.2 Drivers of intervention strategies
In the final step of our analysis we aim to get an understanding of the dynamic drivers of the 
intervention strategies of PDIs. We therefore look for some common (organisational) features of 
PDIs within the different groups distinguished in Figure 5.2. In this analysis we will not include 
the fourth group since this group is too small to make any statements about their distinguishing 
features useful.
The influence of experience
A central starting-point in the generation strategies model of Korten (1990) is the idea of an 
evolutionary process: driven by their experience, development organisations will continue to 
redefine their strategy from more top-down, direct poverty relief to bottom-up interventions 
aimed at bringing structural change. Applying this line of thought to our study, we would expect 
age to be a common denominator of the PDIs within the different groups, with younger PDIs 
being dominant within group 1 and older organisations more represented within groups 2 and 
4. 
To a certain extent our results corroborate this idea. PDIs in the first group are generally indeed 
organisations with fewer years of experience; the average age of the organisations is 9 compared 
with 15 years of those of the second group. This suggests that the intervention manner (how) of 
PDIs is determined by the experience of the organisation, with older organisations using a more 
participatory approach. We find, however, that the average age of PDIs in the fourth group, with a 
similar intervention manner to those of the second group, is comparable to that of the first group. 
We can make a similar conclusion regarding the relation between the age of the PDI and the 
intervention type (what). Since we do not find that PDIs characterised by second- or third-
generation strategies (group 4) are on average older than those PDIs supporting first-generation 
strategies (first and second groups), our results do not affirm the idea that the intervention type is 
influenced by the age of the PDI. This is best illustrated by the next example. 
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The oldest PDI (part of group 3) included in this study started more than 40 years ago to support 
different types of projects in a certain region. One of the first projects was the improvement of the 
quality of the schools in the region. More precisely, it started to support the schools in renovating 
their roofs and providing chairs for the pupils. More than 40 years later, it is still renovating roofs 
and providing chairs. What changed is that nowadays parents are asked to contribute, the PDI 
has expanded the area it works in and it also supports the schools in constructing toilets. We 
hence do not find a clear correlation between the age of PDIs and their intervention manner and 
intervention type. 
Dependence of the partner
The results of our study reveal that the majority of PDIs with an intervention manner with 
restricted participation of local stakeholders (group 1) cooperate with local partners that we refer 
to as mirror organisations. This means these organisations were not founded independently of 
the PDI, but started (often with the support of the PDI) when the PDI began to support a 
certain intervention. Partners of PDIs in the second and third groups are more often independent, 
experienced organisations with a larger group of (local) donors, making PDIs less influential 
regarding the local organisations and interventions. 
(Professional) background PDI member
We find as well that the (professional) background of a PDI member can have a strong influence 
on the selected intervention type. Someone trained as a nurse runs the risk of viewing local 
circumstances from the point of view of one’s own profession and lack a broader perspective. This 
can result in professional deformation whereby the perception of local stakeholders is dominated 
by the perception of an external professional. 
‘I saw that not a lot was done in the field of health care. And many children with burns, 
and I found that really sad. I am a nurse by profession, and I thought it should be very easy 
to do something about this.’  
(Interview PDI member)
Back-donors
Private back-donors of PDIs have a strong influence on the intervention type of PDIs. PDIs, 
rightly or wrongly, expect their donors to have a strong preference for money being spent on 
concrete, small-scale projects. This makes first-generation strategies on a micro level more obvious 
for PDIs (e.g. in groups 1 and 2). In these cases, the influence of private donors on the choice of a 
certain type of intervention transcends the influence of, for example, beneficiaries, local partners 
or other local stakeholders. 
‘Sometimes we receive very large donations […] and they say, ‘We have 10,000 or 15,000 
euro, but we would like it to be spent on the maintenance of children’.’  
(Interview PDI founder)
Private back-donors not only influence the intervention type of PDIs, but also affect the 
intervention manner. PDIs are related to many of their private back-donors or are friends with 
them and they want to ensure their money is spent well by demonstrating results in the short run. 
This drives PDIs towards greater influence and control. 
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Vision
We find that the vision of PDI members with regard to development cooperation in general and 
cooperation with local stakeholders in particular determines the intervention strategy. Most PDIs 
within group 4 combined their first-generation strategies (e.g. school building) from the start with 
second- or third-generation strategies (e.g. lobby activities). We find that, more than experience, it 
is the vision and attitude of PDI members that determine the intervention type. This is illustrated 
by a PDI that has since its establishment supported first-generation strategies. After eight years a 
new member, convinced that in order to bring change more was needed, joined the PDI. Since 
that time this PDI has increasingly complemented its first-generation interventions with second- 
and third-generation types of activity. This change was not driven by the experience of the PDI, 
but by the conviction of one member.
Small scale and the ‘fun-factor’ 
Finally, we find the two central characteristics of PDIs to be of strong influence on their 
intervention strategy. First is the small scale (i.e. budget and number of staff ) of the organisations. 
Some PDIs mention the limited time and money they have available as a reason not to start 
second- or third-generation strategies. They expect these processes to be more time-consuming 
and expensive compared with first-generation strategies and therefore out of their league. Others 
take into account a cost-benefit analysis in order to decide on the type of intervention they are 
going to support. 
‘[…] That girl, for example, she costs 300 euro per month, that is 3,600 euro per year. […] 
For the same amount of money you can send 10 healthy children to school. […] More and 
more we look at what else could we do with our money.’  
(Interview PDI founder)
When comparing PDIs adopting first-generation strategies (groups 1 and 2) with those PDIs with 
second- or third-generation strategies (group 4) we find that on average this last group of PDIs has 
a larger budget at its disposal. The average annual budget of PDIs within group 4 is 65,000 euro 
compared with 47,000 euro and 43,000 euro of respectively groups 1 and 2. In addition, we find 
that PDIs of group 4 on average have more members than groups 1 and 2. Although we cannot 
draw firm conclusions, the results give the impression that a certain size of organisation is helpful 
in extending PDIs’ first-generation interventions with second- or third-generation strategies. Our 
results are in line with Korten (1987) and Elliot who find that a certain level of organisational 
capacity is required for ‘effective agents of change’ (Elliot, 1987: 60).
Also, the voluntary character of PDIs affects the intervention strategy of PDIs. Many PDIs 
mention that involvement in the PDI is of great importance to them. Being a volunteer, many 
PDI members mention that in order to stay motivated the ‘work should stay fun’, as expressed by 
the founder of a PDI:
‘And we always say it should have our personal interest. […] Time and again our secretary 
says: ‘You should also have fun’. If you want to go for it [project], if you want to write about 
it in a local newspapers or if you have an interview on local television, than you have to 
fully stand behind it, also emotionally.’  
(Interview PDI founder)
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PDI members mention that being hands-on, especially in interventions with concrete, visible 
results, gives them the energy to design new interventions, to think of future plans, to make visits 
to their partner, the projects and the beneficiaries. 
‘I do not like the administrative tasks, I do it with reluctance. But being active in the field 
[project location], that is what I like.’  
(Interview PDI founder)
 ‘I can see the results, and that makes me feel comfortable.’  
(Interview PDI founder)
Hence, in order to fulfil their aims, many PDI members are strongly involved in the design and 
implementation of the intervention. It not only affects the intervention manner, but also the 
intervention type. First-generation strategies, such as the construction of a school, are preferred 
over more abstract third-generation strategies. Salamon (1987) refers to this as ‘philanthropic 
particularism’, a tendency for non-profit organisations to provide certain types of services to 
specific groups of people based on their own particular interests and preferences.
Above we indicated that in the diversity of intervention strategies we find groups of PDIs with a 
(more or less) common approach. In addition, we can distinguish several denominators determining 
the intervention strategy adopted by a PDI. The results of our study show as well, however, that 
there is a high degree of coincidence involved in determining the approach of PDIs. The selection 
of the country, the region, the local partner or the central theme are in many cases not deliberate 
but are the result of a high degree of happenchance. 
‘I was teaching in a secondary school in [Kenyan town]. I could as well have ended up in 
Nigeria, Pakistan or India.’ 
(Interview PDI founder)
‘By coincidence, we met with the waiter and decided to help him in supporting the 
orphans.’  
(Interview PDI founder)
Looking at the denominators of the intervention strategies of PDIs, it is striking that nearly all of 
these factors can be typified as intrinsic drivers, most of them related to the PDI and its members 
and to a lesser extent to the local organisation or local circumstances. Without ignoring the 
importance of the context wherein PDIs operate, we do not find notable differences between PDIs 
operating in Kenya or in Indonesia regarding the potential sustainability of their interventions. 
They are distributed over the different groups in a similar way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
146
5.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we offered an in-depth analysis of the diversity of intervention strategies of 
small-scale, voluntary development organisations, referred to as private development initiatives 
(PDIs), in the light of their (potential) sustainable contribution to poverty reduction. On the 
basis of this analysis, we wanted to classify PDI development interventions in terms of their 
potential sustainability. Therefore, we first designed a framework for studying the diversity of PDI 
interventions. The intervention manner (how) and the intervention type (what) are used as the 
two central criteria in this framework and subsequently used to assess the potential sustainability 
of the interventions. 
Second, we applied this framework in an empirical study of 49 PDIs and their interventions. 
We found that there is a relatively large group of PDIs whose intervention strategy puts at risk the 
sustainability of the intervention. This is mainly because the interventions are first and foremost 
aimed at the consequences of poverty by delivering direct relief, limiting the extent to which an 
intervention intends to bring structural change. In addition, the involvement of local stakeholders 
is rather limited, restricting the extent to which the intervention can be locally owned (and thus 
can be continued without external financial and technical support). So far, the results of our study 
confirm the results of previous studies on the interventions of PDIs (Chelladurai, 2006; De Bruyn, 
2011; Kinsbergen, 2007; Kamara & Bakhuisen, 2008; Schulpen, 2007; van der Velden, 2011). 
The framework allowed a more diverse picture to emerge, however. The analysis of our data shows 
there is also a group of PDIs that adopts a different intervention strategy with a greater potential 
to make a sustainable contribution to poverty reduction. It is clearly demonstrated that – although 
PDIs share some common characteristics compared with other development actors – they are not 
a homogeneous group with respect to the potential sustainability of their interventions. Hence, a 
more refined assessment is required for an understanding of PDIs as development actors.
Subsequently, our analysis looked for common characteristics of PDIs sharing a similar 
intervention strategy. A close look at the intervention strategies of the 49 studied PDIs 
demonstrates that there is no evolutionary process guiding PDIs from first- to second- and third-
generation strategies. There are PDIs with several decades of experience that still support relief 
and welfare types of activities in a top-down manner. In the same way, there are organisations 
with fewer than five or ten years of experience involved in programmes of community or systems 
development implemented in a participatory way. We find that it is not so much age of the 
PDI that is of influence on its intervention strategy. In this respect, our results warn against 
adopting an evolutionary perspective towards the development of PDIs. The external organisational 
characteristics that seem to influence the choice of the intervention strategy of a PDI are strongly 
related to the independence of the local partner and the size of the PDI (budget and number of 
staff). In addition, the results show that a number of intrinsic drivers influence the intervention 
strategy of PDIs whose influence is less obvious from a sustainable development perspective. These 
factors refer to the (professional) background of PDI members and their motivation to volunteer 
for a PDI.
The study shows that the framework we designed and applied is useful for studying the 
sustainability of PDI interventions in a structured style. The framework has proven to be valuable 
in terms of shedding light on the diversity of PDI interventions and their potential sustainability. 
In contrast to earlier studies concluding in general terms that the sustainability of PDI interventions 
is at risk, the framework used here to classify PDI interventions enabled us to ascertain that the 
potential sustainability of PDI interventions is diverse. 
Third, we refined our insights into the sustainability of PDI interventions by looking separately 
at the way in which PDIs intervene and the type of interventions they undertake. Korten (1990), 
Elliot (1987) and Brodhead (1987) assume that the intervention type, which development 
organisations employ, comes along with a certain intervention manner. They suggest that first-
generation strategies are characterised by a more top-down implementation and third- and fourth- 
generation strategies are more bottom-up in nature. We find, however, that the intervention 
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type and manner are not always inextricably linked. The second group of PDIs we distinguish is 
characterised by a first-generation strategy but the intervention manner is more participatory than 
Korten would probably expect. The dual approach undertaken in the study at hand allows us to 
identify more of the diversity among PDIs. In addition, this approach points to possible risks of the 
sustainability of PDI interventions in a more specific way. This in turn permits more tailor-made 
recommendations for how to increase the potential sustainability of PDI interventions.
Looking at the findings of our study, we have two important reservations. First, without 
undervaluing the results we found, caution is required in assuming over- simple, one-on-one 
causal relationships between characteristics of PDIs, the type of interventions supported and the 
sustainability of their interventions. The exact influence exerted by these factors is dependent 
– among others – on the exact circumstances in which the organisation operates and the 
characteristics of local actors, such as the capacity of their local counterpart.
Second, no actual comparison has been made between the functioning of PDIs and of other 
development actors, such as established development organisations. Hence, prudence is needed 
when comparing PDIs with other development actors on the basis of our results.
As the results of our study show that the potential sustainability of PDI interventions is diverse, 
our recommendations also need to reflect this diversity. PDIs within group 1 can enhance their 
potential sustainability in two ways. They can either increase the involvement of local stakeholders 
or they can start to complement their first-generation strategies with interventions more in line 
with second- or third-generation strategies. This latter recommendation could improve the 
potential sustainability of PDIs within group 2. Although the prospects for sustainability of the 
interventions of PDIs within group 4 look more favourable compared with those within groups 
1 and 2, the results of our study show that there is still substantial room for improvement. By 
decreasing their influence on the implementation of the intervention and balancing their financial 
role and increasing investment in structural change (e.g. strengthening the role of the local 
government), the probability of PDIs contributing sustainably to structural poverty reduction 
increases. A general recommendation for enhancing the sustainability of PDI interventions, 
applicable to all PDIs in this study, is to decrease the role of internal drivers (e.g. private donors, 
personal motivation) and increase the influence of external, local drivers (e.g. contextual factors 
on the intervention strategy.
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6. Conclusions
‘And that the boys are so healthy, that they are doing so well and therefore do not have to leave their 
house, … Well, I think that is great, that is a real success. 
I’m incredibly proud of it.’
Interview PDI founder 1
‘I do not think it is earthshaking what we have achieved. I do not think we have saved people’s lives 
or saved children from famine. If we stopped, there would be no deaths. But I think it is quite nice 
what we have done.’
Interview PDI founder
‘Everything we did, we always started by doing it a little bit wrong.’
Interview PDI founder
1  The quotes are derived from interviews with founders/members of  private development initiatives (see 
Chapter 5). The data are available on request.
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6.1 Introduction
Worldwide, a growing number of alternative actors are engaging in international development 
cooperation. From celebrities to multinational companies, from large charitable organisations to 
individual citizens, a diversified number of actors want to contribute to the global fight against 
poverty, inequality and exclusion. This study is focused on one of these alternative development 
actors, private development initiatives (PDIs): ordinary citizens who start their own small-scale 
voluntary development organisation, through which they provide direct support to individuals, 
communities or local organisations in development countries, independent of direct government 
support. A sincere fascination with this passionate engagement was the personal motivation for 
starting this study. Who are these people who spend so many hours in a PDI, what motivates them 
to do so and what are the results of their efforts? This study tells the stories behind the pictures of 
renovated school buildings, income-generating goat-farming projects or installed solar panels. In 
addition on the one hand to the words of praise of their supporters and on the other the critics 
who see the work of PDIs as amateurish, this thesis aimed to bring to the fore facts, figures and 
nuances. This study offers a broad and in-depth insight into PDIs as alternative development 
actors. Our central research question is:
Which factors shape the nature of private development initiatives and influence the 
sustainability of their development interventions?
The Netherlands, as one of the forerunners in the field of international development cooperation, 
is our site of study. The Netherlands is characterised by a high degree of generosity regarding 
charitable causes in general and development organisations in particular (Schuyt et al., 2013). 
In addition, the proliferation of the arena for international development cooperation – the 
background against which the establishment of PDIs is taking place – occurred quite early in 
the Netherlands (IS Academie NGO database; Schulpen et al., 2011). A final reason why the 
Netherlands is an interesting study in terms of PDIs is the fact that both in the political arena and 
in the public sphere the debate on the efficiency and effectiveness of development organisations in 
general and PDIs in particular has been very prominent for many years (Beerends, 2013; Bodelier 
& Vossen, 2007; Coumans et al., 2013; Halsema, 2013; Koch, 2007; Weisglas, 2012; WRR, 
2010).
Studies on PDIs so far have offered interesting first insights into the characteristics of PDIs and 
their functioning as development actors. They generally lack an integrated and contextualised 
approach, however, resulting in an overly one-dimensional and uniform understanding of the 
PDI phenomenon. We therefore provide a more detailed insight into the distinguishing features of 
PDIs (i.e. the organisations and their members), the underlying driving forces and the individual 
motives for citizens’ engagement in PDIs. This study pays major attention to the question of how 
the activities that PDIs undertake can be characterised and valued with respect to their potential 
sustainability. 
The analytical approach used to disentangle the origin, operations and background of PDIs 
is intended to do justice to the broad diversity within the group of PDIs. It takes into account 
the context wherein PDIs are operating in the Netherlands and analyses in an integrated manner 
what PDIs are, what they do and how they do it. We therefore employed the structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) framework as an integrative approach as it permits understanding of the 
interactions between these questions (Bain, 1956; Mason, 1939; McWilliams & Smart, 1993). In 
each of the four central chapters, specific aspects of the structure, conduct and/or performance of 
PDIs were central to the analysis. The central research question, combined with the SCP- approach, 
resulted in four sub-questions:
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Chapter 2: What drives the start of PDIs and what characterises PDIs,  
their members and their activities?
Chapter 3: What determines time investment of PDI volunteers?
Chapter 4: How do characteristics of development organisations influence  
the decision making of potential donors?
Chapter 5: What determines the sustainability of PDI interventions? 
6.2 Results 
6.2.1 Characterisation of PDIs
The second chapter of this thesis offers insight into the distinguishing features of PDIs, their 
establishment motives and their interventions. Since no large-scale dataset was available for 
studying the structure of PDIs, a unique data set has been created (CIDIN-PDI Database 2008-
09). The data were collected from nearly 900 PDIs with the use of a self-developed survey. We 
were particularly interested in understanding: 
What drives the start of PDIs and what characterises PDIs, their members and their 
activities?
What are PDIs?
The most distinctive feature of PDIs as compared with other development actors is their voluntary 
character: the majority of the PDI members undertake activities in the field of development 
cooperation on a voluntary basis, whereas the core tasks in established development organisations 
are carried out by paid staff members. Both regarding the annual budget and the number of 
members PDIs are small in scale. This is a second important distinguishing feature of PDIs 
compared with established development actors. The members of PDIs are in general middle-agers, 
almost equally divided between women and men and between those who consider themselves to 
be part of a religious community and those who do not. The majority of the members combine 
voluntary work in the PDI with a paid job. Regarding their income and educational level, the 
members of PDIs come from the average or above-average strata of Dutch society. The most 
important trigger for people to initiate or become actively engaged in a PDI is a holiday or longer 
stay in a developing country. 
What do PDIs do?
We find that the convictions concerning the origins of poverty of PDI members do not always 
correspond to their ideas on the solutions to poverty. PDIs consider restrictive economic structures 
and the absence of, and irregular access to, resources like education and healthcare as the two 
most important causes of poverty. They attach special importance, however, to investments that 
result in improved access to basic services like education and health care. In practice, these small-
scale, voluntary development organisations contribute in particular to direct poverty reduction, 
especially in the field of education and health care. They do so mainly in the (Sub-Sahara) African 
and Asian continents, in countries such as India, Indonesia, Ghana and Kenya. In other words, in 
practice their preferred intervention type is direct poverty alleviation. Although they also attach 
considerable importance to lobbying and influencing policy and civil society building, this is not 
reflected in the general picture of their actual investments.
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How do PDIs do it? 
At first sight, the working method of PDIs seems to be efficient (with regard to money and 
manpower) and effective (goals are being achieved). Various researches have made it clear, 
however, that some of the PDIs fail to take certain crucial steps before, during and/or after the 
implementation of development projects. A lack of thorough contextual analysis and evaluations 
and overly personal cooperation between PDIs and their partners often characterise the work of 
PDIs and jeopardise the sustainability (i.e. longevity) of their projects. 
Chapter 2 clearly shows that notwithstanding that PDIs share some common denominators 
that distinguish them as a group from other players in the field, PDIs as a group are very diverse. 
Although we applied a well-defined definition of PDIs, we find a high degree of diversity within 
the group. Whereas Chapter 2 focuses on the organisations, their members and their activities, 
in Chapter 3, we zoom in on one of the core distinguishing features of the organisations: their 
voluntary character.
6.2.2 Time investment of PDI volunteers
In order to understand PDIs as development organisations and to gain insight into if and how 
the specificity of PDIs affects their role as development actors, it is essential to study volunteers’ 
time investment as one of the basic features of PDIs. Consequently, the conduct of PDI volunteers 
was central to the analysis. With the use of the same dataset as in Chapter 2, in this third chapter 
we investigated the determinants of time investment among a sample of 661 PDI volunteers. 
We wanted to understand which factors make donating time beneficial and interesting for those 
engaged in voluntary work with PDIs.  The following sub-question was formulated:
What determines time investment of PDI volunteers?
We first of all find that – compared with general volunteers – PDI volunteers give a much larger 
number of hours, on average 37 hours per month. The average age of 55 years and the high 
average level of education could explain the comparatively high average number of hours of 
PDI volunteers. In addition, the specific characteristics of the PDI organisations may constitute 
an important part of the explanation. Whereas many (non-PDI) organisations mainly engage 
volunteers to support their paid staff members, the existence of most PDIs is totally dependent 
on the efforts of volunteers. Most of them were initiated on a voluntary basis and a large majority 
continue to depend solely on the efforts of volunteers.
Notwithstanding the large average number of hours they give, PDI volunteers face time and 
budget restrictions. This is partly because of their position in the (paid) labour market. Volunteers 
who are restricted in terms of time because of having a paid job and with free time that is more 
costly because of higher income spend less hours doing voluntary work. 
Differently from what we expected, we find that volunteers who are sceptical towards established 
development organisations increase time investment in PDIs. PDI volunteers who have doubts 
about the effectiveness and efficiency of development organisations may perceive their time 
investment in PDIs as an alternative and more successful way of expressing their involvement with 
the lives of people in developing countries and contributing to poverty reduction than supporting 
established development organisations.
Volunteers that bring frequent visits to developing countries spend more hours on PDI 
volunteering. This shows that empathy with the lives of people in developing countries – triggered 
by these visits – makes the distance to beneficiaries smaller and not only positively affects the 
decision to start a PDI and the willingness to volunteer in a PDI but also increases the time 
investment of PDI volunteers. The distance to beneficiaries is also mediated through the ethnic 
background of the volunteer: volunteers with a non-Western ethnic background implementing 
development projects in their country of origin are more strongly engaged in PDIs. 
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The results of this analysis show that not only does the supply side of voluntary hours (i.e. 
volunteers’ considerations) affect time investment in PDIs. The demand side of voluntary hours 
(i.e. organisational characteristics) also influences time investment. We find that more ‘professional’ 
PDIs with larger budgets and more staff attract volunteers who spend more hours volunteering. 
Chapter 3 thus reveals that PDIs can count on a strong involvement of their PDI volunteers and 
that the degree of their participation is not only determined by personal considerations but is also 
affected by the organisational characteristics of the PDI. In Chapter 4 we focused on the conduct 
of another important player in the world of PDIs: private donors. 
6.2.3 The quest for donors
Chapter 4 studies how (potential) private donors respond to the diversity of development actors. 
We included a unique experiment in the existing Family Survey of the Dutch Population (FSDP) 
and complemented the survey with a section of specific motivational questions (Kraaykamp et al., 
2009). The survey experiment allowed us to study the effect of both individual characteristics and 
organisational features on giving intentions. More precisely, it addressed the question which type 
of international development organisations is preferred by potential donors. We therefore posed 
the following sub-question:
How do characteristics of development organisations influence the decision making of 
potential donors?
Although this chapter focused on the relation between organisational characteristics and giving 
behaviour, the individual characteristics of (potential) donors were also included in the analysis. 
We find, among others, that women, religious people and frequent church attendees are more 
inclined to donate (more). Older people and better educated people are not more inclined to 
donate but those who donate have a higher probability of donating higher amounts. Interestingly 
enough  – and seemingly contrasting with the results of Chapters 2 and 3 – we also find that, for 
potential donors, visits to development countries have an inhibiting effect on their willingness to 
donate money to development organisations. More in line with Chapters 2 and 3 we find that 
those people who already donate to development organisations are inclined to donate higher 
amounts when they have visited a developing country. Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that bringing 
the beneficiary closer, among others, through visits to development countries positively affects the 
decision to become active in a PDI and increases the number of voluntary hours in a PDI. We 
need to acknowledge that the studies central in these two chapters could suffer from selection bias 
since they were conducted among a group of people already active in a PDI. 
With regard to organisational characteristics, the results of our study first of all show that next 
to characteristics of (potential) donors, organisational features have a substantial effect whether or 
not potential donors decide to donate and the amount they donate. (Potential) donors are clearly in 
favour of experienced development organisations that are familiar to them and that are mainly run 
by volunteers. As we expected, overhead costs of development organisations have a strong negative 
influence on the giving intentions of (potential) donors. When, however, organisations are mainly 
run by paid staff potential donors are in general more tolerant of higher overhead ratios. By and 
large, organisational characteristics have the same effect on giving behaviour for different types 
of donors, but we find that religious people and frequent church attendees are especially inclined 
to donate (more) to religious development organisations. In addition, we find that those donors 
with stronger beliefs in development organisations are somewhat more tolerant of overhead ratios.
The ideal development organisation is a hybrid type combining features of small(er) voluntary 
organisations and large(r) professional organisations. Development organisations with the highest 
probabilities of receiving a donation and of receiving a donation higher than 40 euro are, in general, 
familiar, have 10 to 20 years of experience, have no religious background, are active in more than 
one country, do not have any overhead costs and are mainly run by volunteers. Most, if not all, 
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of the traditional, established, large-scale development organisations are run by professional (i.e. 
paid) staff. Hence traditional development organisations do not constitute the ‘ideal’ organisation. 
Although PDIs are mainly run by volunteers, they are, in general, not the ideal organisation either, 
as most PDIs are active in only one developing country and many have only been established 
recently. PDIs can, however, take advantage of donors’ preference to donate to familiar development 
organisations since they mainly recruit donors in their personal network. Therefore there is a higher 
probability that (potential) donors are not only familiar with (the name of ) the organisations, but 
also with the person requesting a donation.
This analysis clearly demonstrated the importance of organisational characteristics in the donors’ 
decision-making process. Differently from what is sometimes assumed in the public debate on the 
diversification of the field of development actors, donors are not unambiguously in favour of small-
scale development organisations. In other words, from the donor’s perspective, small is not always 
beautiful. After focusing on the structure of PDIs and the conduct of their volunteers and donors 
(in Chapters 2, 3 and 4), Chapter 5 discusses the performance of the organisations. 
6.2.4 The sustainability of PDI interventions
In the fifth chapter of this thesis, the performance of PDIs has been analysed. More precisely, PDI 
interventions are classified according to their potential sustainability. In addition, the determinants 
of different intervention strategies are distinguished. This analysis is based on unique qualitative 
data collected during field research in the Netherlands, Kenya and Indonesia among 49 PDIs, 
their local partners and their development interventions. The key question addressed in this 
chapter is: 
What determines the sustainability of PDI interventions?
Our classification of PDI interventions results in four different groups. We find that there is a 
relatively large group of PDIs whose intervention strategy puts at risk the sustainability of the 
intervention because their intervention strategies are mainly aimed at delivering direct relief 
with rather limited involvement of local stakeholders. There is also, however, a group of PDIs 
that adopts a different intervention strategy with greater potential for making a sustainable 
contribution to poverty reduction.
We do not find evidence for an evolutionary process: we did not find age to be a straightforward 
determinant of the potential sustainability of PDI interventions. The different groups we 
distinguished cut across age, with some relatively young PDIs supporting interventions that 
are at lower risk regarding their sustainability compared with interventions of older PDIs. The 
results clearly show, however, that organisational features do relate to the sustainability of PDI 
interventions. The structure, conduct and performance of PDIs are hence not self-contained facets 
but strongly related parts. We find that the scale of the organisation (structure) affects the type of 
interventions PDIs (can) support (conduct) and by doing so the sustainability of the interventions 
(performance): PDIs mention that the available time (determined by the number of PDI members) 
and money are factors affecting the type of intervention they undertake. 
In a similar manner, the fact that PDIs are mainly supported by private donors (structure) 
with an overall preference for investing as much money as possible directly in the development 
interventions (conduct) also determines the type of interventions PDIs support and the extent to 
which they are involved in the implementation and therewith the potential sustainability of these 
interventions (performance). 
Finally, the voluntary character of PDIs turns out to be of decisive influence: most PDIs are 
mainly run by volunteers (structure) and they do so with great devotion (conduct). The fulfilment 
of their motives affects both the extent to which volunteers are involved in the design and 
implementation of the development interventions (and thereby, the extent of local ownership) 
and the type of interventions supported. Salamon (1987) refers to the latter as ‘philanthropic 
particularism’. 
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This implies that the tendency of non-profit organisations to provide certain types of services to 
specific groups of people is (partly) based on their own particular interest and preferences. We 
do not suggest that the same inclination is absent among paid staff of established development 
organisations. We do find indications, however, that because of their voluntary character PDIs are 
potentially more vulnerable to philanthropic particularism. It is namely plausible that volunteers - 
possibly more than paid staff members - are driven by an internal motivation that can, as the data 
show, be powered by the type of interventions supported (e.g. visible results) or the extent and 
type of involvement in the work of the PDI (e.g. hands-on involvement). 
Looking at the determinants of the intervention strategy, one could wonder whether the 
preference of private donors to donate to organisations mainly run by volunteers is – from a 
development perspective – in congruence with their desire to make impactful donations. In 
addition, the results from our study suggest that being an older organisation – with age functioning 
as a proxy for experience – does not turn out to be a guarantee of higher (potential) sustainability 
of PDI interventions.  
The results of this final chapter show that PDIs are not only diverse regarding their internal 
structure but also vary considerably with respect to the potential sustainability of their development 
interventions. Moreover, the results show a certain link between the organisational characteristics 
of PDIs and the diversity that we found regarding the sustainability of their interventions. Two 
important points need to be made, however. First, although we aimed to compose a sample of PDIs 
and interventions that offered an adequate reflection of PDIs as a group, we must be cautious about 
generalising the results to the entire PDI population. Second, without undervaluing the results 
we found, caution is required in assuming excessively simple, one-on-one causal relationships 
between characteristics of PDIs, the type of interventions supported and the sustainability of their 
interventions. The exact influence exerted by these factors is dependent – among others – on the 
specific circumstances in which the organisation is operating as well as the characteristics of local 
actors, such as the capacity of their local counterpart.
Reflecting on the findings of the different chapters and relating them to our central research 
question, we find evidence that two crucial features of PDIs shape the nature of PDIs and the 
sustainability of their development interventions. As summarised above, both their voluntary 
character and their small scale (i.e. number of members and budget) are distinguishing features 
compared with other development actors. Second, more than merely typifying PDIs, these 
organisational features turn out to be important factors in understanding PDIs as development 
actors. These two structure-related elements are pivotal to understanding both the conduct and 
performance of PDIs as alternative development actors. In conclusion, it can be said that both 
features are key to the identity of PDIs as a phenomenon in general and to the understanding of 
PDIs as alternative development actor in particular. 
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6.3. Scientific relevance
In the introduction we argued that our study relies on a particular analytical approach based on 
two key principles: (1) integrated analysis and (2) contextualised analysis. The first premise means 
that attention is focused on the linkages between three PDI components: structure, conduct and 
performance (‘what they are’, ‘what they do’ and ‘how they do it’). The second premise implies 
that we do not study PDIs in a vacuum but we take into account the (Dutch) context wherein 
PDIs are operating. 
As shown in Section 6.2.4 the integrated character of structure, conduct and performance of 
PDIs becomes particularly apparent in the analysis presented in Chapter 5 and even more when 
these results are related to those of Chapters 2, 3 and 4. We found, for example, evidence that the 
characteristics of the volunteer to a large extent influence the voluntary work of PDI members. 
Whereas financial and time restrictions affect the time spent on voluntary work, frequent visits 
and direct encounters with people in developing countries initially enhance voluntary engagement. 
In a similar vein, time spent on PDIs is strongly enhanced by value motives and social encounter 
reasons, both by founders and members. In addition, available budget and staffing enhance 
volunteers’ time spending whereas lifecycle aspects tend to counteract this tendency. Subsequently, 
in Chapter 5 this voluntary character of PDIs turns out to be of influence on the performance of 
PDIs. 
The importance of contextual characteristics for PDI performance is addressed in particular in 
Chapters 2 and 4. In order to understand (the rise of ) PDIs it is not sufficient to study PDIs and 
their members as we also must into account the broader environment wherein PDIs are positioned 
and how this environment responds to PDIs. The dependence of PDIs on private donors makes 
their perception of and their donation intentions to PDIs and other types of development actors 
crucial. Although we do not find unambiguous support for small-scale, voluntary development 
organisations, we do find that familiarity, governance costs (low overhead) and voluntary staffing are 
considered as key characteristics that can play to the strengths of PDIs in their quest for financial 
support. 
Although we mainly paid attention to the Dutch context wherein PDIs operate, in Chapter 5 
it becomes apparent that the context in the developing countries wherein PDIs intervene does not 
always receive sufficient attention. PDI members devote considerable importance to projects that 
focus on investments resulting in improved access to basic services like education and health care. 
The design or implementation of a development project is usually not preceded by a sound context 
analysis, however. Moreover, the PDI partnership is usually based on very personal relationships 
with local agents who may occupy a particular position in their communities. Whereas enthusiasm 
is widely available, implementation risks involved with reaching desired, sustainable, development 
outcomes tend to be high. This is indeed confirmed in the analysis of the prospects for sustainability 
of PDIs presented in Chapter 5. Even though there is a large diversity amongst PDIs, the fact that 
internal organisational characteristics to a large extent drive the choice of intervention strategies 
strongly challenges the likelihood of sustainability. 
Understanding the linkages between the structure, conduct and performance and taking into 
account the context wherein PDIs operate is fundamental to our understanding of PDIs as an 
alternative development actor. The different central perspectives of the chapters in this thesis 
broadened our understanding of PDIs and brought to the fore a more diversified picture than 
hitherto known. The SCP paradigm combined with the contextualised approach has hence been 
valuable and perhaps even indispensable in answering the central research question and in reaching 
the research objective. 
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6.4 Methods, constraints and avenues for future PDI research
We did not only reach the research objective with the integrated, contextualised approach. 
Applying mixed methods throughout the different chapters on different type of data turned out to 
be beneficial in terms of reaching the central research objective and answering the central research 
question and sub-questions. A survey among PDIs made it possible to question a large number 
of them, which was necessary for defining and characterising PDIs as a group and understanding 
PDI volunteering. The survey experiment offered a unique opportunity to study the preferences 
of donors and to analyse the effects of both individual and organisational characteristics on giving 
behaviour. Since we had access to a large-scale database of PDIs, which contained a large amount 
of background information on the organisations, we were able to draw up a solid sub-sample of 
PDIs to participate in the field research in a structured manner. This strengthened the quality of 
the data collected during the field research and the subsequent analysis.
Looking at the findings of our study, we must make two important points. First of all, although 
every effort was made to compose a representative sample of PDIs, since the total population of 
PDIs is unknown caution is required as regards generalising the results of Chapters 2, 3 and 5 to 
the entire PDI population. Since we do not find strongly anomalous results regarding features of 
PDIs and PDI members compared with other PDI studies, we believe that we have been successful 
in obtaining a certain degree of representativeness. 
Second, in this thesis, no actual comparison has been made between the functioning of PDIs 
and other development actors, such as established development organisations. Hence, prudence is 
needed in the comparison of PDIs with other development actors based on the results of our study. 
Although we were able to make some comparisons based on our findings and made some cautious 
statements about how for, example, differences in structure may affect differences in performance, 
for future research it would be worthwhile to compare the functioning of NGOs and PDIs in a 
structured manner.  
The limitations formulated above and the insights gained in the different chapters and the thesis 
as a whole, suggest several new research topics. First of all, further research is needed to enhance our 
understanding of PDI volunteering and PDI volunteers. In particular, more research – preferably 
with data that allow controlling for problems of endogeneity – is required to explain why PDI 
volunteers spend more time on voluntary work than general volunteers and why volunteering of 
PDI founders differs from that of general (PDI) volunteers. 
Second, a representative dataset including both PDI members and founders and (non) donors 
of development organisations would increase our understanding of the influence of the perceived 
distance to beneficiaries on charitable behaviour (i.e. voluntary time investment and financial 
donations) and on how encounters with these beneficiaries – through for example journeys to 
developing countries  – affect this behaviour. 
Both Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis made a contribution to the study of charitable behaviour 
by analysing the relation between donating time & money and organisational characteristics. Our 
contributions showed that organisational characteristics have an influence on charitable behaviour 
and indicate that they require a more prominent position in studies on donations of time and 
money to charities. Further research could enlarge our understanding of the role of organisational 
characteristics in charitable behaviour. This could be done by studying this relation in different 
types of charitable sectors (e.g. health care) or by constructing different scenarios; for example, 
scenarios including information on the type of support offered to beneficiaries.
Building on the findings of this thesis, it would also be worthwhile enlarging our understanding 
of PDI interventions in developing countries by conducting ex post sustainability and impact 
studies. Such studies would make it possible to deepen our understanding of PDI interventions, 
and more precisely to gain a better insight into the effect of PDI interventions on the lives of the 
beneficiaries and a better understanding of the factors determining this. Over the past few years, 
PDIs have slowly become part of the system of development cooperation in the Netherlands, and 
are increasingly recognised as such. A large number of trainings have been developed for PDIs, 
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network days are organised and PDIs have even established their own branch organisation (Partin). 
Future research will learn what will happen to the PDIs of today. Will they transform into the 
‘Oxfams’ of tomorrow? And if so, will a possible third wave of socialisation bring new blood to the 
sector of international development cooperation? Will the PDIs of today come to an end with the 
natural disappearance of the baby-boom generation that is in charge of many PDIs of today? Or 
will other generations take over? 
6.5 In retrospect, in prospect
In the Netherlands, a large number of people are involved in several thousand PDIs. These people 
are part of the socialisation or mainstreaming of international development cooperation. Helping 
the poor in developing countries is increasingly becoming part of everyday life, with almost 
everyone knowing someone involved in a sector that used to be the exclusive preserve of a small 
number of actors. At the pay desk of your local bakery you can read about the baker’s daughter 
who started a day-care centre in Ghana after she went there on a holiday, your neighbour is 
making a door-to-door collection to renovate a school in Ecuador which he visited during an 
exchange trip and during the annual flea market the staff of the local hospital are raising funds for 
their next medical mission trip to Indonesia by selling homemade cookies. 
These thousands of individuals devote – paid or voluntarily and for different reasons – many 
hours to small-scale, development organisations aimed at improving the lives of individuals, families 
or villages across the world. Their strong, enthusiastic involvement in the work of these PDIs 
results in enormous recruiting power; the willingness among private donors to donate to PDIs 
is apparently large. Established development organisations and the Dutch government also see 
potential in this group of active world citizens. They perceive PDIs as intermediates that are able 
to inform and involve the Dutch public in the complex world of development cooperation and/or 
they expect the work of PDIs to complement the efforts of other development actors in developing 
countries.
In developing countries, too, local people can reap the benefits of the strong engagement of PDI 
members as a large number of valuable development projects are (successfully) initiated and/or 
supported by PDIs. The results lay bare the tension between what PDIs are (small-scale, voluntary 
development organisations) and what they (want to) do (contribute to poverty reduction). 
Considering the results of this study, we wonder whether PDIs can always live up to their own 
expectations regarding their role as development actor or the expectations of their supporters.
The results show that the strong engagement of PDI members is the driving force behind 
PDIs necessary – among others – for raising funds and for (co-) designing and implementing 
development interventions. At the same time, however, it is this engagement that can – among 
others – hamper the sustainability of PDI development interventions (see Section 6.2.4 and 
Chapter 5). Yet this thesis does not want to issue a call for the professionalisation of PDIs. At 
least not the type of professionalisation that led many development organisations established 
in the 1950s and 1960s away from their core values and turned them into overly managed 
institutions (Elbers, 2011). Such a process would abolish the passion of PDI members that keeps 
the organisations running. 
This thesis instead wants to make a call for critical reflections by PDI (members) and their 
(institutional, governmental or private) supporters. PDIs are challenged to reflect on the change 
they want to see within the context where they are active, to think through what is needed (both 
‘today’ and ‘tomorrow’) for such a change and critically asses their abilities to contribute to the 
transformations they envision. It is a balancing act between staying true to their identity and at 
the same time keeping in mind what is required for a valuable contribution to poverty reduction. 
Established development organisations and the government are called on to critically reflect on 
the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of their involvement with PDIs. In addition they are challenged to design a 
cooperation strategy that is – more than in the past – based on what PDIs are, what they do and 
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what they are capable of instead of what they expect PDIs to do or want PDIs to do. The results 
demonstrate that when studying PDIs as development actor or when supporting them because of 
their alleged contribution to poverty reduction we need to formulate expectations that take into 
account the individuality of PDIs as small-scale, voluntary development organisations. PDIs, those 
engaged in the work of PDIs and those who study them are all called to look critically behind the 
pictures.
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Summary
Introduction
The two decades since the mid-1990s have seen a worldwide trend of alternative players joining 
the traditional actors in the field of international development cooperation. From celebrities 
such as Madonna and Bono to multinational companies such as Nestlé, from large charitable 
organisations to individual citizens, a diverse number of actors want to contribute to the global 
fight against poverty, inequality and exclusion. Development cooperation is no longer the 
exclusive domain of professionals (i.e. trained paid staff ) working in the offices of governments, 
multilaterals (e.g. World Bank) or established development organisations (e.g. Oxfam). 
This thesis focuses on the ‘next-door Madonnas and Bonos’ of today; thousands of ordinary 
individuals who actively engage in the fight against poverty by starting their own small-scale, 
voluntary development organisations, independent of direct government support. In this thesis they 
are referred to as Private Development Initiatives (PDIs). They are characterised by their small scale 
(i.e. in budget and number of staff) and their voluntary nature. The site of study is the Netherlands.
We can see the results of the efforts of PDIs in the pictures shown on their websites, in their 
leaflets and in other communications. Schools and orphanages have been built or renovated, micro-
credit programmes launched, and after-school programmes initiated. The accomplishments shown 
in the many pictures are appealing to (potential) donors: the results are visible (e.g. a school has 
been built) and the effects are clear (e.g. children can finish primary school). But what are the 
stories behind all these pictures? 
Studies made so far provide interesting first insights into, among other things, the organisational 
characteristics of PDIs and their contribution to the process of development. They remain 
explorative and descriptive, however, and mostly address specific aspects of PDI organisation 
or performance (e.g. organisational features). As a consequence, the insights gained so far have 
neither been fully exploited nor been related to each other, meaning that a more comprehensive 
understanding of PDIs as an alternative development actor is still lacking. In addition, studies 
have presented a rather uniform picture of PDIs, paying little attention to the diversity that can 
be found within the group. All this results in a one-dimensional, uniform understanding of PDIs, 
which limits our understanding of them as agents of development. 
This study distinguishes itself from earlier PDI studies due to the selected analytical approach. 
This approach is based on two key principles: (1) integrated analysis and (2) contextualised analysis. 
The first premise implies that in order to analyse PDIs comprehensively, it is not sufficient to study 
different aspects of PDIs separately. Instead we need to understand the linkages between ‘what 
they are?’, ‘what they do?’ and ‘how they do it?’. The second premise is that in order to understand 
PDIs as an alternative development actor it is necessary not only to study the actor itself (i.e. the 
organisations and their members) but also to take into account the broader environment wherein 
PDIs are positioned, and how this environment (e.g. back-donors, other development actors, local 
governments and communities) responds to PDIs.1  PDIs do not function in a vacuum, but are 
surrounded by several other actors and these contextual developments influence PDI activities and 
performance. An understanding of PDIs starts by analysing them in all their diversity, but also 
requires a detailed study of the social, institutional and governance environment wherein PDIs 
deploy their activities. 
1 The term ‘members’ refers to those individuals who on a regular basis, either voluntary or paid, are actively 
involved in PDIs
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In this study we aim to provide a more detailed insight into the characteristics of PDIs, the 
driving forces and the individual motives for citizen engagement in PDIs, and how the activities 
that PDIs undertake can be characterised and valued with respect to their potential sustainability. 
Each of the chapters presents a story behind the pictures; stories regarding the organisations (their 
foundation and structure), their members (their characteristics and motivations), their donors (their 
preferences and giving behaviour) and their interventions (type, sustainability). Studying PDIs from 
different perspectives and with different research methods results in a broad and in-depth insight 
into PDIs as alternative development actor. The central research question is:
Which factors shape the nature of private development initiatives and influence the 
sustainability of their development interventions?
We employed a structure-conduct-performance (SCP) framework as an integrative approach as 
it permits understanding of the interactions between the questions of what PDIs are (structure), 
what they do (conduct) and how they do it (performance). In order to answer the central research 
question a mixture of unique data has been collected, and several analytical approaches applied. 
Both qualitative and quantitative data and analytical methods are used to address the research 
objective. This thesis is composed of four empirical chapters, each answering one sub-question. 
The combination of the findings from the four chapters provides insight into the main research 
question. These four chapters are preceded by an introductory chapter and are followed by a 
concluding chapter. Chapter 2 to 4 are based on articles published in peer-reviewed scientific 
journals. 
The structure of PDIs
In Chapter 2, the structure of the PDIs is central. The sub-question answered in this chapter 
is: What drives the start of PDIs and what characterises PDIs, their members and their activities? 
Since no large-scale dataset was available for studying the structure of PDIs, a unique data set 
has been created. The data was collected from nearly 900 PDIs with the use of a self-developed 
survey. We find that these small-scale, voluntary development organisations work mainly in (Sub 
Sahara) Africa and Asia, in countries such as India, Indonesia, Ghana and Kenya. They mainly 
focus on education and health care and have a strong preference for direct poverty alleviation as 
intervention type. Although they also attach considerable importance to influencing policy (e.g. 
lobbying) and civil society building, this is not reflected in the general picture of their actual 
investments. Notwithstanding that PDIs share some common denominators that distinguish 
them as a group from other players in the field, Chapter 2 clearly shows that as a group they are 
very diverse. Whereas some organisations with twenty years of experience and ten members have 
an annual budget of 25,000 euros, others with only five years of experience have four members 
and 70,000 euros to spend yearly.
Voluntary time investment
Whereas Chapter 2 focuses on the organisations, their members and their activities, Chapter 3 
zooms in on one of the core distinguishing features of the organisations: their voluntary nature. 
By studying this basic feature of PDIs we gain insight into whether, and how, the specificity of 
PDIs affects their role as development actor. The sub-question central to this chapter reads: What 
determines the time investment of PDI volunteers? In order to answer this question, the same dataset 
as in Chapter 2 is used. 
We find that – compared with general volunteers – PDI volunteers give a much greater number 
of hours, on average 37 hours per month. As do general volunteers, PDI volunteers face time 
and budget restrictions, partly because of their position in the (paid) labour market. A sceptical 
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attitude towards established development organisations increases the time investment in PDIs. PDI 
volunteers who have doubts about the effectiveness and efficiency of development organisations may 
perceive their time investment in PDIs as an alternative and more successful way of contributing 
to poverty reduction, rather than supporting established development organisations.
Volunteers who frequently visit developing countries spend more hours on PDI volunteering. 
This shows that empathy with the lives of people in developing countries – triggered by these 
visits – makes the (psychological) distance to beneficiaries smaller. The results demonstrate that 
this not only positively affects the decision to start a PDI and the willingness to volunteer in a 
PDI but also increases the time investment of PDI volunteers. The distance to beneficiaries is also 
mediated through the ethnic background of the volunteer: volunteers with a non-Western ethnic 
background implementing development projects in their, or their parents’, country of origin, spend 
more voluntary hours in PDIs. 
The results of this analysis show that not only does the supply side of voluntary hours (i.e. 
volunteers’ considerations) affect time investment in PDIs, but the demand side of voluntary hours 
(i.e. organisational characteristics) also influences time investment. We find that more ‘professional’ 
PDIs, with larger budgets and more staff, attract volunteers who spend more hours volunteering. 
Donor support
In order to understand PDIs it is not sufficient only to study the conduct of their members. 
PDIs cannot exist only by the grace of their members’ efforts but are also strongly dependent 
on the conduct of private donors. Chapter 4 thus looks at the giving behaviour of potential 
private donors to development organisations. We analyse the extent to which characteristics of 
development organisations affect the decisions of potential donors to donate money. The sub-
question reads: How do characteristics of development organisations influence the decision making of 
(potential) donors? This question is answered through a unique experiment.
The results show that the ideal development organisation is a hybrid type combining features of 
small(er) voluntary organisations and large(r) professional organisations. Development organisations 
with the highest probabilities of receiving a (higher) donation are in general, familiar, have 10 to 
20 years of experience, have no religious background, are active in more than one country, do not 
have any overhead costs and are mainly run by volunteers. 
Most, if not all, of the traditional, established, large-scale development organisations are run 
by professional (i.e. paid) staff. Hence, traditional development organisations do not constitute 
the ‘ideal’ organisation. Although PDIs are mainly run by volunteers, they are, in general, not the 
ideal organisation either, as most are active in only one developing country and many have only 
been established recently. PDIs can, however, take advantage of donor preferences to donate to 
familiar development organisations since they mainly recruit donors in their personal network. 
There is thus a higher probability that (potential) donors are not only familiar with (the name of ) 
the organisations, but also with the person requesting a donation.
This analysis clearly demonstrates the importance of organisational characteristics in the donor 
decision-making process. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed in the public debate about the 
diversification of the field of development actors, donors are not unambiguously in favour of 
small-scale development organisations. In other words, from the donor’s perspective, small is not 
always beautiful. 
Sustainability of interventions
In the fifth chapter, the performance of PDIs in developing countries is analysed in light of their 
(potential) sustainability. We analyse the sustainability of a PDI development intervention by 
assessing (1) the extent to which an intervention aims to address and change underlying causes of 
poverty, and (2) the extent to which the intervention is locally owned (and thus can be continued 
without external financial and technical support). By outlining how PDIs intervene in developing 
countries and the type of activities they undertake, the potential sustainability of PDI intervention 
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strategies is typified, based on a detailed multi-criteria classification. In addition, the determinants 
of different intervention strategies are distinguished. This analysis is based on unique qualitative 
data collected during field research in the Netherlands, Kenya and Indonesia among 49 PDIs, 
their local partners and their development interventions. The sub-question addressed in this 
chapter is: What determines the sustainability of PDI interventions?
We find that there is a relatively large group of PDIs whose intervention strategy puts at risk 
the sustainability of the intervention because they aim mainly to deliver direct relief with a rather 
limited involvement of local stakeholders. There is also, however, a group of PDIs that adopts a 
different intervention strategy with greater potential for making a sustainable contribution to 
poverty reduction. These PDIs extend their relief and welfare type of activities to community 
development and sustainable systems development. In addition, their interventions are, to a greater 
or lesser extent, characterised by a relatively high degree of local ownership. 
We do not find evidence for an evolutionary process: age is not a straightforward determinant 
of the potential sustainability of PDI interventions. The results clearly show, however, that 
organisational features do relate to the sustainability of PDI interventions. The structure, conduct 
and performance of PDIs are hence not self-contained facets but strongly related parts. We find 
that the scale of the organisation (structure) affects the type of interventions PDIs (can) support 
(conduct) and by doing so the sustainability of the interventions (performance): PDIs explain that 
the available time (determined by the number of PDI members) and money are factors affecting 
the type of intervention they undertake. 
In a similar manner, the dependence of PDIs on private donors (structure) affects the (potential 
sustainability of the) intervention strategy of PDIs. PDIs explain that many of their private donors 
have a preference for spending their money mainly on concrete development projects (conduct). 
It is therefore that part of the PDIs does not proceed to support different types of interventions, 
aimed at, for example, community development.
Finally, the voluntary nature of PDIs turns out to be of decisive influence: most PDIs are 
mainly run by volunteers (structure) and they do so with great devotion. The fulfilment of their 
motives affects both the extent to which volunteers are involved in the design and implementation 
of the development interventions (and thereby, the extent of local ownership) and the type of 
interventions supported. A certain degree of ‘philanthropic particularism’ can be observed. This 
implies that the tendency of non-profit organisations to provide certain types of services to specific 
groups of people is (partly) based on their own particular interests and preferences. We do not 
suggest that the same inclination is absent among the paid staff of established development 
organisations. We do find indications, however, that because of their voluntary character, PDIs 
are potentially more vulnerable to ‘philanthropic particularism’. Volunteers – possibly more than 
paid staff members – are driven by an internal motivation. PDI members frequently mention that 
‘the work should stay fun’. The data shows that their motivation can particularly be powered by 
intervention strategies characterised by concrete development projects with visible results and a 
‘hands-on’ involvement in the design and implementation. 
In short
Reflecting on the findings of the different chapters and relating them to our central research 
question, we find evidence that two crucial features of PDIs shape the nature of PDIs and the 
sustainability of their development interventions. As summarised above, both their voluntary 
character and their small scale (i.e. in number of members and budget) are distinguishing features 
compared with other development actors. More than merely typifying PDIs, these organisational 
features turn out to be important factors in understanding PDIs as development actors. These 
two structure-related elements are pivotal to understanding both the conduct and performance 
of PDIs. 
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Implications for research, policy and practice
Understanding the linkages between the structure, conduct and performance, and taking into 
account the context wherein PDIs operate turns out to be fundamental to our understanding of 
PDIs as an alternative development actor. The different central perspectives of the chapters in this 
thesis broadened our understanding of PDIs and brought to the fore a more diversified picture 
than hitherto known. The SCP framework combined with the contextualised approach has hence 
been valuable and perhaps even indispensable in answering the central research question and in 
reaching the research objective. 
The results of this study lay bare the tension between what PDIs are (small-scale, voluntary 
development organisations) and what they (want to) do (contribute to poverty reduction). 
Considering the results of this study, the question is warranted of whether PDIs can always live up 
to their own expectations regarding their role as development actors or the expectations of their 
supporters.
The results show that the strong engagement of PDI members is the driving force behind PDIs 
necessary – among other things – for raising funds and for (co-) designing and implementing 
development interventions. At the same time, however, it is this engagement that can hamper 
the sustainability of PDI development interventions. Yet this thesis does not want to issue a call 
for the professionalisation of PDIs, at least not the type that led many established development 
organisations into overly managed institutions. Such a process would abolish the passion of PDI 
members that leads to their inception and keeps them running. This thesis instead wants to make 
a call for critical reflections by PDI (members) and their (institutional, governmental or private) 
supporters. PDIs are challenged (1) to reflect on the change they want to see within the context 
where they are active in close collaboration with local stakeholders; (2) to think through what is 
needed (both ‘today’ and ‘tomorrow’) for such a change and (3) to make a realistic assessment 
of their capabilities and limitations for contributing to the transformations they envision. It is a 
balancing act between staying true to their identity and at the same time keeping in mind what is 
required for a valuable, sustainable contribution to poverty reduction. 
Established development organisations and the government are called on to critically reflect on 
the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of their involvement with PDIs. In addition they are challenged to design a 
cooperation strategy that is – more than in the past – based on what PDIs are, what they do and 
what they are capable of, instead of what they expect PDIs to do or want PDIs to do. The results 
demonstrate that when studying PDIs as development actor, or when supporting them because 
of their alleged contribution to poverty reduction, we need to formulate expectations that take 
into account their individuality as small-scale, voluntary development organisations. PDIs, those 
engaged in the work of PDIs, and those who study them, are all called to look critically behind 
the pictures.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Introductie
Vanaf midden jaren ’90 is er wereldwijd sprake van een trend van alternatieve spelers die actief 
worden op het speelveld van internationale ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Van beroemdheden 
als Madonna en Bono tot multinationale ondernemingen als Nestlé, van grote charitatieve 
instellingen tot individuele burgers; meer dan ooit is er een gevarieerd aantal actoren dat een 
bijdrage wil leveren aan de wereldwijde strijd tegen armoede, ongelijkheid en uitsluiting. 
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking is niet langer het exclusieve terrein van professionals (lees: daartoe 
opgeleide, betaalde medewerkers), werkzaam in kantoren van overheden, multilaterale of 
gevestigde ontwikkelingsorganisaties. Dit proefschrift richt zich op de ‘Madonna’s en Bonos’ 
van om de hoek’; duizenden individuen die zich actief inzetten in de strijd tegen armoede door 
het opzetten van een eigen kleinschalige, vrijwillige ontwikkelingsorganisatie, onafhankelijk van 
directe overheidssteun. 
In dit proefschrift wordt hiernaar verwezen met de term ‘Private Development Initiatives’ (PDIs, 
private ontwikkelingsinitiatieven). Deze organisaties kenmerken zich door hun kleinschaligheid 
(budget en aantal leden) en hun vrijwillige karakter. Het onderzoek vertrekt vanuit de Nederlandse 
context.1
We zien de resultaten van de inspanningen van PDIs op de foto’s op hun websites en in hun 
brochures. Scholen en weeshuizen zijn gebouwd of gerenoveerd, micro-krediet programma’s zijn 
opgezet en naschoolse activiteiten worden geïnitieerd. De gerealiseerde projecten, getoond op de 
vele foto’s, zijn aantrekkelijk voor (potentiële) donateurs: de resultaten zijn zichtbaar (‘de school 
is gebouwd’) en de beoogde effecten zijn duidelijk (‘kinderen kunnen de basisschool afronden’). 
Maar wat zijn de verhalen achter al deze foto’s?
Studies tot nu toe bieden interessante inzichten in onder meer de organisatiekenmerken van 
PDIs en hun bijdrage aan ontwikkelingsprocessen. Maar de onderzoeken blijven voornamelijk 
exploratief en beschrijvend en richten zich vooral op één bepaald onderdeel van PDIs (o.a. 
organisatiekenmerken). Als gevolg daarvan zijn de verworven inzichten tot nu toe onvoldoende 
met elkaar verbonden en daarmee niet ten volle benut. Hierdoor ontbreekt het tot op heden aan 
een meer alomvattend begrip van PDIs als alternatieve ontwikkelingsactor. Bovendien besteden 
onderzoeken tot nu toe weinig aandacht aan de diversiteit die vastgesteld kan worden binnen 
de groep van PDIs. Dit alles resulteert in een eendimensionaal, uniform begrip van PDIs als 
ontwikkelingsactor. 
Het voorliggende onderzoek onderscheidt zich van eerdere onderzoeken door haar analytische 
benadering. Deze vertrekt vanuit twee centrale uitgangspunten: (1) een geïntegreerde analyse en (2) 
een gecontextualiseerde analyse. Het eerste uitgangspunt vertrekt vanuit het idee dat een analyse 
waarbij verschillende aspecten van PDIs afzonderlijk bestudeerd worden ontoereikend is om deze 
op een alomvattende manier te analyseren. In plaats daarvan is het noodzakelijk om de verbanden 
te begrijpen tussen de vragen: ‘wat zijn PDIs?’, ‘wat doen ze?’ en ‘hoe doen ze het?’. Het tweede 
uitgangspunt houdt in dat om te komen tot een goed begrip van PDIs het onvoldoende is om alleen 
PDIs zelf te bestuderen (zoals de organisaties en hun leden). Het is daarnaast noodzakelijk om 
ook de bredere omgeving waarbinnen ze opereren (zoals achterban, andere ontwikkelingsactoren, 
overheid) en de wijze waarop deze omgeving zich verhoudt tot PDIs in ogenschouw te nemen. 
Het begrijpen van PDIs als ontwikkelingsactor begint bij het analyseren van deze organisaties in 
1  De term ‘leden’ verwijst naar die individuen die op zich op regelmatige basis, vrijwillig dan wel betaald, 
actief  inzetten in PDIs.
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al hun diversiteit maar vereist daarnaast een gedetailleerde analyse van de sociale, institutionele en 
overheidsomgeving waarbinnen PDIs hun activiteiten ontplooien. 
In deze studie beogen we enerzijds een meer gedetailleerd inzicht te krijgen in de kenmerken 
van PDIs, de drijvende krachten achter deze organisaties en de motieven van individuen voor 
burgerbetrokkenheid in PDIs. Daarnaast heeft deze studie tot doel de ontwikkelingsactiviteiten 
van PDIs te typeren en te waarderen met betrekking tot hun potentiële duurzaamheid. Elk van de 
hoofdstukken presenteert een verhaal achter de foto’s; verhalen over de organisaties (de oprichting 
en structuur), hun donateurs (de voorkeuren en het geefgedrag) en hun interventies (types, 
duurzaamheid). Door PDIs vanuit verschillende perspectieven te bestuderen en door gebruik te 
maken van diverse onderzoeksmethoden ontstaat een breed en diepgaand inzicht in PDIs. De 
centrale onderzoeksvraag luidt:
Welke factoren bepalen de aard van PDIs en beïnvloeden de duurzaamheid van hun 
ontwikkelingsinterventies?
We maken gebruik van het ‘structure-conduct-performance’ (SCP) raamwerk. Deze benadering 
maakt het mogelijk om de vragen wat zijn PDIs (structure/structuur), wat doen PDIs (conduct/
gedragingen) en hoe doen ze het (performance/prestaties) op een geïntegreerde manier te 
bestuderen. Ten einde de onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden is er een mix van unieke gegevens 
verzameld en zijn verschillende analytische benaderingen toegepast. Er is gebruik gemaakt van 
zowel kwalitatieve als kwantitatieve gegevens en analysemethoden.
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit vier hoofdstukken die elk een deelvraag behandelen. Door de 
inzichten uit de vier hoofdstukken te combineren wordt het mogelijk om de hoofdvraag te 
beantwoorden. Deze vier hoofdstukken worden voorafgegaan en afgesloten door een introducerend 
en een concluderend hoofdstuk. Hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 4 zijn gebaseerd op artikelen die 
gepubliceerd werden in ‘peer reviewed’ wetenschappelijke tijdschriften. 
De structuur van PDIs
In hoofdstuk 2 staat de structuur van PDIs centraal. De deelvraag die beantwoord wordt in dit 
hoofdstuk is: Wat drijft de start van PDIs en wat kenmerkt de PDIs, hun leden en hun activiteiten? 
Aangezien er geen grootschalige dataset beschikbaar was die het mogelijk maakt om de structuur 
van PDIs te bestuderen, is er een eigen databestand opgezet. De gegevens werden verzameld onder 
bijna 900 PDIs met behulp van een zelf ontwikkelde vragenlijst.
We stellen vast dat deze kleinschalige, vrijwillige ontwikkelingsorganisaties overwegend 
actief zijn in (Sub Sahara) Afrika en Azië in landen als Ghana, Kenia, India en Indonesië. Ze 
zijn vooral gericht op de thema’s onderwijs en gezondheid en hebben een sterke voorkeur voor 
directe armoedebestrijding als interventietype. Hoewel ze ook aanzienlijk belang hechten aan 
beleidsbeïnvloeding en gemeenschapsopbouw, is dit niet terug te zien in het algemene beeld van 
hun daadwerkelijke interventies. Hoofdstuk 2 laat duidelijk zien dat, hoewel PDIs een aantal 
kenmerken gemeenschappelijk hebben die hen onderscheidt van andere spelers in het veld, ze als 
groep erg divers zijn. Waar sommige organisaties met twintig jaar ervaring en tien leden beschikken 
over een jaarbudget van 25,000 euro, zijn er andere met vijf jaar ervaring die vier leden hebben en 
jaarlijks 75,000 euro kunnen besteden.
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Vrijwillige tijdsinvestering
Waar hoofdstuk 2 zich richt op de organisaties, hun leden en activiteiten, zoomt hoofdstuk 
3 in op één van de onderscheidende kernmerken van PDIs: het vrijwillige karakter. Door dit 
basiskenmerk te bestuderen kunnen we inzicht krijgen in, of en hoe het specifieke karakter van 
PDIs hun rol als ontwikkelingsactor beïnvloedt. De deelvraag van dit hoofdstuk luidt: Wat bepaalt 
de tijdsinvestering van PDI vrijwilligers? Om deze vraag te beantwoorden wordt gebruik gemaakt 
van dezelfde dataset als in hoofdstuk 2.
We stellen vast dat PDI vrijwilligers vergeleken met algemene vrijwilligers veel meer uren 
spenderen aan hun vrijwilligerswerk: gemiddeld genomen 37 uur per maand. Net als andere 
worden PDI vrijwilligers beperkt door de beschikbaarheid van tijd en geld. Dit heeft deels te 
maken met hun positie op de (betaalde) arbeidsmarkt. Interessant is de bevinding dat een meer 
sceptische houding ten aanzien van gevestigde ontwikkelingsorganisaties resulteert in een hoger 
aantal vrijwilligersuren in PDIs. PDI vrijwilligers die twijfelen over de effectiviteit en efficiëntie van 
ontwikkelingsorganisaties, lijken hun tijdsinvestering in PDIs te zien als een alternatieve en meer 
succesvolle manier om bij te dragen aan armoedebestrijding dan het ondersteunen van gevestigde 
ontwikkelingsorganisaties. 
Daarnaast vinden we dat vrijwilligers die regelmatig een bezoek brengen aan ontwikkelingslanden 
meer uren besteden aan PDIs. Dit laat zien dat het medeleven met mensen in ontwikkelingslanden 
– versterkt door deze bezoeken – de (psychologische) afstand tot de doelgroep kleiner maakt. 
De resultaten laten zien dat dit niet alleen bijdraagt aan het oprichten van PDIs of het doen van 
vrijwilligerswerk in een PDI, maar ook de tijdsinvestering van PDI vrijwilligers positief beïnvloedt. 
De ervaren afstand tot de doelgroep wordt ook verkleind door de etnische achtergrond van de 
vrijwilligers. PDI vrijwilligers met een niet-Westerse achtergrond die projecten ondersteunen in 
hun land van herkomst of dat van hun ouders, spenderen meer vrijwilligersuren in PDIs. 
Het blijkt niet alleen de aanbodzijde te zijn die het aantal vrijwilligersuren bepaalt (overwegingen 
gemaakt door de vrijwilliger). Ook de vraagzijde (organisatiekenmerken) is van invloed op de 
intensiteit van het vrijwilligerswerk. We stellen vast dat meer ‘professionele’ PDIs, met grotere 
budgetten en meer leden, vrijwilligers aantrekken die meer uren besteden. 
Steun van donateurs
Om PDIs te begrijpen is het onvoldoende om de gedragingen en overwegingen van de leden 
te bestuderen. PDIs kunnen niet alleen bestaan dankzij hun inspanningen maar zijn ook sterk 
afhankelijk van de financiële ondersteuning door particuliere donateurs. Om die reden besteden 
we in hoofdstuk 4 aandacht aan de overwegingen gemaakt door (potentiële) donateurs van 
PDIs. We analyseren in welke mate kenmerken van ontwikkelingsorganisaties de beslissing van 
donateurs om geld te geven beïnvloeden. De deelvraag luidt: Hoe beïnvloeden kenmerken van 
ontwikkelingsorganisaties de besluitvorming van potentiële donateurs? Deze vraag wordt beantwoordt 
met behulp van een speciaal daartoe opgezet experiment. 
De resultaten laten zien dat de ideale ontwikkelingsorganisatie een hybride vorm heeft en zowel 
kenmerken heeft van kleinschalige(re), vrijwillige organisaties als van grote(re), professionele 
organisaties. Ontwikkelingsorganisaties met de grootste kans om een (hogere) donatie te ontvangen 
zijn over het algemeen (voor de donor) bekende organisaties met 10 of 20 jaar ervaring, zonder 
religieuze achtergrond. Ze zijn actief in meer dan één land, hebben geen overheadkosten en worden 
vooral door vrijwilligers geleid. 
De meeste gevestigde, grootschalige ontwikkelingsorganisaties worden geleid door professionele 
(lees: betaalde) medewerkers. Hierdoor voldoen de meeste van deze organisaties niet aan het ‘ideaal-
plaatje’. Hoewel de meeste PDIs door vrijwilligers worden geleid komen ook zij in de meeste 
gevallen niet overeen met de ideale organisatie. De meeste van hen ondersteunen namelijk slechts 
in één land ontwikkelingsprojecten en zijn vaak recent opgericht. PDIs kunnen wel hun voordeel 
doen met de voorkeur van (potentiële) donateurs om aan bekende organisaties te doneren. De 
meeste PDIs werven geld in hun eigen persoonlijke netwerk. Daardoor is er een grotere kans dat 
194
(potentiële) donateurs niet alleen bekend zijn met (de naam van) de organisatie maar ook met de 
persoon die om een donatie vraagt.
Deze analyse laat duidelijk het belang zien van organisatiekenmerken in het besluitvormingsproces 
van donateurs. Daarnaast tonen de resultaten aan dat, anders dan soms wordt beweerd in het 
publieke debat over de diversificatie van het speelveld van internationale samenwerking, (potentiële) 
donateurs geen eenduidige voorkeur hebben voor kleinschalige ontwikkelingsorganisaties.
Duurzaamheid van interventies 
In het vijfde hoofdstuk worden de prestaties van PDIs geanalyseerd in het licht van de (potentiële) 
duurzaamheid van hun ontwikkelingsinterventies. We analyseren de duurzaamheid door te kijken 
naar (1) de mate waarin een interventie erop gericht is om de onderliggende oorzaken van armoede 
te veranderen, en (2) de mate waarin een interventie ‘eigendom’ is van lokale belanghebbenden 
(en dus voortgezet kan worden zonder externe financiële en technische ondersteuning). We doen 
dit door te kijken hoe PDIs in ontwikkelingslanden interveniëren en wat voor soort interventies ze 
ondernemen. Daarnaast worden de determinanten van de interventiestrategieën onderscheiden. 
Deze analyse is gebaseerd op unieke kwalitatieve data, verzameld tijdens een veldonderzoek dat 
plaatsvond onder 49 PDIs en hun lokale partners in Nederland, Kenia en Indonesië. De deelvraag 
die wordt behandeld in dit hoofdstuk luidt: Wat bepaalt de duurzaamheid van PDI interventies?
We stellen vast dat er een relatief grote groep van PDIs is wiens interventies risico lopen op het 
gebied van duurzaamheid doordat ze gericht zijn op het bieden van directe vormen van hulp en 
doordat de betrokkenheid van lokale belanghebbenden vrij beperkt is. Daarnaast is er een kleinere 
groep van PDIs die haar activiteiten, gericht op directe armoedebestrijding, uitbreidt met vormen 
van gemeenschapsontwikkeling en verandering van systemen en structuren. De activiteiten van 
deze groep PDIs kenmerken zich daarnaast door een relatief sterke mate van lokaal eigenaarschap.
We vinden geen bewijs voor een evolutionair proces: leeftijd van de organisaties blijkt geen factor 
te zijn die de potentiële duurzaamheid van PDI interventies op een eenduidige manier bepaalt. De 
interventies van zowel jonge als oudere organisaties lopen wisselend meer of minder risico op het 
gebied van duurzaamheid. Maar de resultaten maken inzichtelijk dat organisatiekenmerken wel 
degelijk van invloed zijn op de potentiële duurzaamheid van PDI interventies. De structuur, de 
gedragingen en de prestaties van PDIs zijn dus geen op zichzelf staande onderdelen, maar zijn sterk 
met elkaar verbonden. Zo zien we dat de grootte van de organisatie (structure) van invloed is op 
het type interventies die PDIs kunnen ondersteunen (conduct) en op die manier de duurzaamheid 
beïnvloedt (performance). PDIs geven bijvoorbeeld aan dat ze verwachten dat lobbyactiviteiten 
kostbaarder zijn wat tijd en geld betreft en dat hun capaciteiten daartoe ontoereikend zijn. 
Op eenzelfde manier beïnvloedt de afhankelijkheid van PDIs van private donateurs (structure) 
de (potentiële duurzaamheid van hun) interventiestrategie. PDIs geven aan dat veel donateurs 
verkiezen om hun geld zoveel mogelijk in concrete ontwikkelingsprojecten te investeren (conduct). 
Dit maakt het voor sommige PDIs niet vanzelfsprekend om ander type projecten, gericht op 
bijvoorbeeld gemeenschapsontwikkeling, op te zetten of te ondersteunen.
Als laatste geldt dat er een sterke invloed uitgaat van het vrijwillige karakter van PDIs. De 
meeste van hen worden volledige gerund door vrijwilligers (structure) en deze doen dat met grote 
toewijding. Het vervullen van hun motieven blijkt zowel sterk van invloed op de manier waarop 
PDIs interveniëren als op het soort interventies dat ze ondernemen. Er is sprake van een zekere 
mate van ‘philantropic particularism’. Dit verwijst naar de neiging van non-profit organisaties 
om bepaalde vormen van ondersteuning te bieden aan bepaalde groepen mensen op basis van 
hun persoonlijke interesses en voorkeuren. We suggereren niet dat deze neiging afwezig is onder 
betaalde medewerkers van gevestigde ontwikkelingsorganisaties, maar we stellen vast dat omwille 
van het vrijwillige karakter PDIs mogelijk meer vatbaar zijn voor ‘philantropic particularism’. 
Vrijwilligers worden – misschien wel meer dan betaalde medewerkers – sterk gedreven door een 
interne motivatie. PDI leden geven veelvuldig aan dat het werk dat ze verzetten in het PDI ‘wel 
leuk moet blijven’. Vooral interventiestrategieën die worden gekenmerkt door concrete projecten 
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die zichtbaar resultaat opleveren en een ‘hands-on’ betrokkenheid bij het ontwerp en de uitvoering 
worden door de PDI leden genoemd als motiverend.
In het kort
Wanneer we reflecteren op de bevindingen uit de verschillende hoofdstukken en deze relateren 
aan de centrale onderzoeksvraag, zien we dat twee cruciale kenmerken van PDIs de aard van PDIs 
bepalen en van invloed zijn op de potentiële duurzaamheid van hun interventies. Zoals hierboven 
samengevat, zien we dat zowel het vrijwillige karakter als de kleinschaligheid onderscheidende 
kenmerken zijn van PDIs ten opzichte van andere ontwikkelingsactoren. Maar deze twee factoren 
zijn meer dan louter typerende kenmerken van PDIs. Deze twee structuur-gerelateerde elementen 
vormen de sleutel tot het begrijpen van de gedragingen (conduct) en de prestaties (performance) 
van PDIs als alternatieve ontwikkelingsactor. 
Implicaties voor onderzoek, beleid en praktijk
Dit onderzoek laat zien dat het begrijpen van de verbanden tussen de structuur, de gedragingen en 
de prestaties van PDIs en het in ogenschouw nemen van de context waarbinnen PDIs opereren, 
van fundamenteel belang is voor het begrijpen van PDIs als alternatieve ontwikkelingsactor. De 
perspectieven in de verschillende hoofdstukken hebben bijgedragen aan het verbreden van ons 
begrip van PDIs en aan een meer gediversifieerd beeld van deze actor. Het Structure-Conduct-
Performance raamwerk en de gecontextualiseerde benadering zijn waardevol, misschien zelfs 
onontbeerlijk, gebleken in het beantwoorden van de centrale onderzoeksvraag en het behalen van 
de onderzoeksdoelstelling. 
De resultaten van deze studie leggen een spanning bloot tussen wat PDIs zijn (kleinschalige, 
vrijwillige ontwikkelingsorganisaties) en wat PDIs (willen) doen (bijdragen aan armoedebestrijding). 
Kijkend naar de resultaten van deze studie is het gerechtvaardigd om de vraag te stellen of PDIs hun 
eigen verwachtingen of die van hun ondersteuners wel altijd kunnen waarmaken. 
Het onderzoek laat zien dat de sterke betrokkenheid van PDI leden de drijvende kracht is 
achter deze organisaties, noodzakelijk voor onder andere het werven van fondsen en het (mede)
ontwikkelen van ontwikkelingsinterventies. Tegelijkertijd is het diezelfde betrokkenheid die de 
duurzaamheid van PDI interventies kan belemmeren. Dit proefschrift doet geen oproep tot 
professionalisering van PDIs. Toch niet het soort dat veel gevestigde ontwikkelingsorganisaties 
maakte tot overmatig beheerde instituties. Zo een proces zou een einde maken aan de passie die 
PDIs in leven roept en houdt. Dit proefschrift wil vooral een oproep doen tot kritische reflecties 
door PDI (leden) en haar (institutionele, overheid of private) ondersteuners. PDIs worden 
uitgedaagd om (1) te reflecteren op de verandering die ze voor ogen hebben binnen de context 
waarin ze actief zijn en dit in nauw overleg met lokale belanghebbenden; (2) grondig te doordenken 
wat ter plekke nodig is (zowel ‘vandaag’ als ‘morgen’) en (3) een realistische inschatting te maken 
van hun mogelijkheden en beperkingen om bij te dragen aan deze beoogde verandering. Het is een 
balansoefening tussen trouw blijven aan hun identiteit en tegelijkertijd voor ogen houden wat er 
vereist is om een waardevolle, duurzame bijdrage aan armoedebestrijding te leveren. 
Gevestigde ontwikkelingsorganisaties en de overheid worden opgeroepen om kritisch te 
overdenken ‘waarom’ en ‘hoe’ ze betrokken willen zijn bij PDIs. Ze worden uitgedaagd om een 
samenwerkingsstrategie te ontwikkelen die – meer dan in het verleden – gebaseerd is op wat PDIs 
zijn, wat ze doen en waartoe ze in staat zijn in plaats van wat men verwacht of wil dat PDIs doen.
De resultaten tonen aan dat, wanneer we onderzoek doen naar PDIs als ontwikkelingsactor of 
wanneer we hen ondersteunen omwille van hun veronderstelde bijdrage aan armoedebestrijding, het 
noodzakelijk is om verwachtingen te formuleren die rekening houden met de eigenheid van PDIs 
als kleinschalige, vrijwillige ontwikkelingsorganisaties. PDIs, zij die betrokken zijn bij het werk van 
PDIs en zij die hen onderzoeken, allen worden opgeroepen om kritisch achter de foto’s te kijken. 
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From celebrities to multinational companies, from 
large charitable organisations to individual citizens, a 
diversified number of actors wants to contribute to the 
global fight against poverty, inequality and exclusion. 
This study focuses on the ‘next-door Madonnas and 
Bonos’ of today. These are the thousands of ordinary 
individuals that actively engage in the fight against 
poverty by starting their own small-scale, voluntary 
development organisation.
We can see the results of their efforts in the 
pictures shown on their websites and in their 
leaflets. Schools and orphanages have been built or 
renovated, micro-credit programmes launched and 
after-school programmes initiated.
But who are those individuals and what motivates 
them? Are private donors in favour of this type of 
development organisations? And what can be said on 
the sustainability of their development interventions? 
This study sheds a critical light on the stories behind 
the pictures.
